


# Bandelier

## Administrative History



## **BANDELIER NATIONAL MONUMENT: AN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY**

**Hal Rothman**

**1988**

National Park Service  
Division of History  
Southwest Cultural Resources Center  
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## DEDICATION

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In memory of Lisa Eller Bruhn, who felt the spirituality of Bandelier.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Located in north central New Mexico, Bandelier National Monument encompasses an array of archeological, historic, and natural features. Its main attraction, Frijoles Canyon, contains ruins that include the community house called Tyuonyi and Ceremonial Cave. The canyon is a popular destination among American travelers, but it is not the only significant feature contained in the monument. In 1986, the monument included a designated wilderness area of 23,267 acres among its 32,737.2-acre total area.

At the turn of the century, the area that became Bandelier National Monument was of interest to preservationist constituencies. The region became the focus of attempts to establish a national park in New Mexico. Archaeologists saw the value of the region, as did local commercial interests, but the different groups were not able to reconcile the points of contention between them. Because the El Rito de los Frijoles was on its lands, the U. S. Forest Service (USFS) advocated the establishment of Bandelier National Monument as a way to circumvent efforts to establish a national park. Its maneuver succeeded, and the USFS administered Bandelier from 1916 to 1932.

Throughout the 1920s, however, the National Park Service lobbied for a national park in the region. Its primary effort failed as a result of resistance offered by Frank Pinkley, the superintendent of the southwestern national monuments group of the agency. He opposed the archeological national park on the grounds that the area did not fit the standards the Park Service established earlier in the 1920s and that the concept of an archeological national park violated the Antiquities Act of 1906. Pinkley's opposition led the agency to rethink its position. In 1932, the Park Service acquired Bandelier National Monument.

Since the 1930s, there have been a number of efforts to establish a national park in the region. The 100,000-acre Baca Location # 1, the Valle Grande, north and west of Frijoles Canyon, became critical to the conception of a park as the agency emphasized the geological attributes of the region instead of its archeology. In the early 1960s, the commitment of the agency to the concept of a park area with both natural and cultural values became evident when it transferred archeological ruins to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in exchange for the pristine Upper Frijoles Canyon area. Yet national park efforts failed to succeed, and in 1986, the Bandelier National Monument comprised the extent of agency holdings in the region.

Through the mid-1980s, development at Bandelier followed a "boom-bust" cycle. After the Park Service took over the monument, it embarked upon a program to create administrative and visitor facilities in Frijoles Canyon. A Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) camp facilitated the development of the park, and between 1933 and 1940, its workers built the entire Frijoles Canyon headquarters area. Between 1940 and the early 1960s, park administrators retrenched in the face of changing patterns of visitor use. With the implementation of the Mission 66 program for Bandelier in 1963, the agency again initiated development programs, culminating in a master plan that laid the basis for increased use of the back country. The public adversely responded to the proposal, advocating the

establishment of a designated wilderness area as an alternative. In the end, the agency went along with its constituency. Although the master plan continued to advocate development at the southern tip of the monument, a designated wilderness area was established at the site in 1976.

Until the 1970s, issues of resource management at Bandelier focused on its prehistoric assets. But the pressure of increased visitation and the establishment of the wilderness area caused the staff at the park to manage its resources as part of an integrated whole. A resource management unit, with responsibility for all the resources of the monument, was the result.

The 1980s saw a number of threats to the integrity of the park. The Department of Energy, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Public Service Company of New Mexico were all among the groups whose proposals threatened the monument. Although by 1987, the Park Service had successfully resisted many threats, problems on the Pajarito Plateau seemed likely to escalate. Limited by its location and the minute size of its primary feature, Bandelier served as a microcosm of the external threats facing the park system. The survival of its resources will require continued vigilance on the part of the agency.

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## INTRODUCTION

When I moved to the Bandelier National Monument in the summer of 1985, I was struck by how much Frijoles Canyon was world unto itself. In the early morning sunshine, nestled under red rock cliffs, it seemed a place that existed outside modern concepts of time. Life continued there at its own pace, beyond the perils of the world around it. Opening and closing again within the space of a mile and one half, Frijoles Canyon became a prism through which to view a timeless world. Layers of humanity overlapped in the confined area between the north and south mesas. What was there must have always been there, from the community house ruins of Tyuonyi to the administrative structures built by the CCC camp. Even the electric power lines and security alarms seemed to belong to an undisturbed frozen moment.

As the stream of cars arrived each morning, afternoon, and evening, I realized that my early morning sense was an illusion. Frijoles Canyon was part of the larger world that surrounded it, and the site itself reflected that reality. The whirring of automobile engines, the noise of children shouting, and the people in each and every mystical place reminded me that while the canyon offered spiritual sanctuary from the world around it, it was not immune to the same kinds of pressures.

Ironically, I discovered by talking to visitors that many of them felt something special about the area. They, too, sought the serenity of its timelessness and felt lucky to have the opportunity to experience it. Yet they and I realized that our mutual presence eroded the unique qualities of the place. By seeking its spirituality, we encroached upon what we came to find and inexorably altered it.

This is the story of the tensions inherent in the process of bringing the unique places of the North American continent to the public, and of the seekers who came to Bandelier and linked it to the modern world. It begins in the open spaces of the plateau and spans the twentieth century, ending in a world crowded by people searching for something different than their everyday world held. It is the story of the efforts of the National Park Service to preserve and protect the unique qualities of the canyon and its surroundings.

My work has benefited from the assistance of many people. I would like to thank Superintendent John D. Hunter and his staff, including Kevin McKibbin, John Lissoway, Ken Stephens, Virginia Robicheau, and Rory Gauthier, for their patience and cooperation throughout the course of this project. They and everyone at the park answered my numerous queries, directed me to other sources, and generally tolerated an intrepid researcher asking strange questions in their midst. Their thoughtful suggestions have helped me tremendously. Chris Judson's insightful comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript helped shape its focus. Dave Paulissen, Al de la Cruz, Sari Stein, and everyone else at the monument provided constant support and friendship, and I feel fortunate to have the opportunity to know the people who live and work at Bandelier. To all of you, many thanks.

Oral history interviews have played an important part in shaping this manuscript, and for these additional insights, I would like to thank those who gave of their time to allow their

thoughts to be recorded. Richard Boyd of Chama, New Mexico, Paul and Frances Judge of Albuquerque, and Homer Pickens shared their many memories of the Bandelier area with Virginia Robicheau and I. Dr. Milford R. Fletcher of the Park Service enlightened me about resource management and its ramifications. By telephone or letter, former Superintendents, Linwood E. Jackson, Fred Binnewies, and Jim Godbolt also offered their help. Linda Aldrich of the Los Alamos Historical Society, Theresa Strottman of the Museum of New Mexico History Library, and Laura Holt of the Laboratory of Anthropology offered the benefits of their experience in the study of the history of New Mexico. Barbara Greene Chamberlain provided a major hand in the editing of the manuscript.

Finally, I would like to thank the person whose efforts have had the most significant impact on this study. Melody Webb, the Southwest Regional Historian, has offered not only insightful criticism and thoughtful advice, but has also done much more to improve both this study and my scholarship. A young historian could find no one better under whom to work.

To all of these people, I am grateful. Any mistakes that remain are strictly my own.

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## CHAPTER 1: THE OPEN PLATEAU

The establishment of the Bandelier National Monument in 1916 was a direct result of conflicting pressures on the limited space of the Pajarito Plateau. Archaeologists, homesteaders, stockmen, and the Santa Fe business community all had a stake in the region. Each group thought its use should take precedence and none retreated from its position. The intervention of Federal agencies only complicated an already volatile situation, and the eventual establishment of the monument was a compromise that was a prelude to further conflict.

Between 1899 and 1916, the concept of a national park on the Pajarito Plateau frequently met solid opposition. By the time a park became a viable option, there were too many groups with interests in the region. Influential local residents periodically hindered the effort. Homesteaders upon the plateau worried that the park might threaten their livelihood. The rights of Native Americans also proved an insurmountable obstacle. Later, the United States Forest Service (USFS) posed a problem for park advocates and when an assistant secretary felt that a proposal compromised the integrity of the new park, even the Department of the Interior fought the effort.

The differing interests forced park advocates to trim their plans for the region. After 1906, a large national park, including archeological ruins, surrounding forest land, and mountain scenery was out of the question. Local stockmen and homesteaders saw to that. The resources of the region formed the basis for their living, and they fought every park effort that restricted use of land upon the plateau. Advocates never found a compromise that suited both economic and cultural interests. As a result, a 200,000-acre national park on the Pajarito Plateau was never authorized. Instead, Bandelier National Monument remains the focus of National Park Service interest in the region.

During the 1890s, southwestern archeological ruins attracted the attention of the American public as the conservation of natural resources became an important social issue. In the late 1890s, the General Land Office (GLO) began to study many of the ruins in the Southwest. After 1900, the perception that men like Richard Wetherill, a Colorado rancher who excavated throughout the four corners area, engaged in "pot-hunting" led the GLO to dramatically increase its inspections. Many sites its special agents visited later became national monuments. El Morro came to the attention of the Department of the Interior in 1899, as did other areas of peculiar interest, such as the petrified forest region of Arizona. In need of an immediate way to protect such obviously unique natural and cultural features, the GLO began to pursue a policy of "temporary withdrawal," under which it reserved land from claims until the Government decided to what disposition each tract was best suited. [1]

The attempts to create a national park on the Pajarito Plateau were a direct result of the policy of temporary withdrawal. Prior to 1906, establishment of a national park was the only available form of permanent reservation. When GLO inspectors found an area that they believed was worth preserving, the only option they had was a proposal to create a national

park. As a result, before 1906, Congress considered many areas that did not fit later standards for park status.

Edgar L. Hewett, an educator and archeologist, was the catalyst for the initial park efforts in the Bandelier area. While superintendent of the Colorado Normal School in Greeley, Colorado, he became interested in archeology. In the 1890s, Hewett began to survey the ruins of the Pajarito Plateau. His activities intensified in 1898, when he became the president of New Mexico Normal University in Las Vegas, New Mexico. A scholar, albeit one without formal archeological training at that time, Hewett became famous throughout the Southwest.

By the end of the decade, Hewett believed that ruins throughout the Southwest were in serious danger, and he began to prod government agencies to take action. In his mind, the ruins of the Pajarito Plateau were particularly vulnerable. No longer protected because they were isolated and inaccessible, the ruins offered an easy target for depredators. Hewett wrote the Department of the Interior to see if it could protect the ruins. In 1899, John F. Lacey, the Chairman of the House Public Lands Committee, approached the Commissioner of the General Land Office to request a bill that would establish a national park on the Pajarito Plateau.

The GLO knew little of the region, and in late 1899, Commissioner Binger Hermann ordered J. D. Mankin, an agency clerk in New Mexico, to make an inspection of the ruins. Mankin was astonished to find himself in the midst of a lost civilization. "From a single eminence on the Pajarito," he wrote, "the doors of more than two thousand [cave and cavate lodge] . . . dwellings may be seen, and the number in the entire district would reach tens of thousands. If arranged in a continuous series they would form an unbroken line of dwellings of not less than sixty miles in length." [2]

During the course of the inspection, Hewett accompanied Mankin and significantly shaped his perspective. The report recommended the establishment of the "Pajarito National Park," encompassing 153,620 acres and including all the major ruins on land administered by the Department of the Interior. The bill suited Hewett's purposes. The establishment of a park would outlaw the wanton vandalism afflicting other archeological sites in the Southwest. [3]

Hewett continued to worry about the fate of ruins in the region. While the GLO prepared a bill in early 1900, an urgent situation developed on the plateau. Hewett informed Mankin that "irresponsible parties are making preparations to invade the territory in the early spring, with a view to opening the rooms of the Communal Dwellings and exploring the caves for relics." [4] He asked the department to establish a national park immediately. Mankin agreed and urged instant action. Nothing happened. On October, 26, 1900, Hewett again wrote GLO Commissioner Binger Hermann to urge the establishment of the park. He reported an increase in vandalism during the summer of 1900 and claimed that depredators destroyed many valuable sites. Hewett believed that the best opportunity for an archeological national park was slowly eroding at the hands of miscreants. [5]

GLO officials were ready to act and they sought out the House Public Land Committee. Late in 1900, the GLO transmitted Mankin's report and a draft of its bill to Lacey. On December 21, 1900, the Congressman proposed the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives. H. R. 13071 went to Lacey's committee, and on January 23, 1901, they reported favorably upon it. As the result of opposition in New Mexico, however, the committee added a number of clauses that indicated compromise. The most important allowed grazing at the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior. They also suggested changing the name of the proposed park from "Pajarito" to "Cliff Cities" on the grounds that an English-speaking public would mispronounce the former. [6] Later, this innocuous suggestion became a major problem.

A national park on the Pajarito Plateau seemed imminent, and the Federal bureaucracy geared up for its proclamation. The Smithsonian Institution added its support to Mankin's proposal, and other government agencies followed suit. In accordance with Mankin's report, on July 31, 1900, Commissioner Hermann of the GLO ordered the temporary withdrawal of the 153,620-acre proposed tract in contemplation of national park status for the region.

Despite Hermann's withdrawal, the first serious attempt to create a national park on the Pajarito Plateau went no further than the proposal stage. The existing national parks were vast, spectacular areas, such as Yosemite, Yellowstone, and Mt. Rainier. There was little precedent for an archeological national park. Western congressmen questioned the efficacy of the proposal, and the House of Representatives did not act upon the bill. It expired along with the 56th Congress.

Interest in the park possibilities of the Pajarito region did not end with the initial bill. On January 9, 1902, Lacey reintroduced the earlier measure to the 57th session of Congress as H. R. 8323. Opposition in the New Mexico territory quickly appeared. The Santa Fe newspaper, the New Mexican, expressed its fear that this was just another way for the Federal Government to seize control of large tracts of land in the state. The paper supported the principle of a national park filled with archeological ruins, but its editors expressed concern that the federal government already reserved too much land in New Mexico and further withdrawals would hamper local commerce. On March 4, 1902, the paper asked New Mexico Territorial Delegate Bernard S. Rodey to block the bill. [7]

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## CHAPTER 2: THE COMING OF THE PARK SERVICE

Between 1916 and 1932, the move to establish a national park on the Pajarito Plateau again gathered momentum. After the establishment of the Bandelier National Monument, Edgar L. Hewett became an obstacle to the project, but by the early 1920s, he and the National Park Service joined forces to offer the most comprehensive proposal to date. The Forest Service resisted the takeover, but the Park Service was in a commanding position. Chances for a Pajarito Plateau national park looked excellent. Internal resistance within the NPS, however, thwarted the agency, and instead of a large national park, the agency assumed responsibility for the administration of the Bandelier National Monument.

The initial proclamation of the monument was no guarantee that attempts to create a national park on the Pajarito Plateau were over. Assistant Secretary of the Interior Stephen T. Mather, who became the first director of the National Park Service, did not regard the monument proclamation as final. Nor did William B. Douglass and the Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce. Douglass publicly lambasted the Department of the Interior for its "deaf ear" and to work for the park, he founded the New Mexico National Parks Association. The Chamber of Commerce appointed another committee to work for passage of the bill. [1] It enlisted Senator Catron, and in December of 1915, he introduced another measure, S. 2542, to establish a national park on the Pajarito Plateau.

Although Catron believed that the new measure would receive the support the others lacked, S. 2542 had serious flaws. While the Department of the Interior deemed the previous bill unsuitable because of its compromises, the new one was sure to encounter resistance in New Mexico. It appeared to abrogate the rights of local constituencies.

Opposition to the new measure arose instantly. In December 1915, Douglass wrote a letter to the editor of the New Mexican that supported the bill, sight unseen. Harold Brook, by now firmly ensconced on the Pajarito Plateau, attacked Douglass' stand. "The settlers [of the region] contend," Brook wrote, "that the difference between the benefits gained by the judicious handling of the ruins, as they are, and the benefits gained by a park, would not justify, morally or commercially, the unfair unreasonable ruination of a great many homesteaders." [2] Forced to again consider substantial local opposition, Douglass, Hewett, and the rest of the Chamber of Commerce met in February 1916, to iron out their differences.

Four clauses in the bill created obstacles for either Hewett or Douglass. No one was satisfied with the way the bill approached the rights of Native Americans. There was no clause to allow grazing within the boundaries of the park. This was sure to enrage Harold Brook and the powerful New Mexico Stockmen's Association. The name of the park was again to be "Pajarito." Hewett was pleased with that choice but it bothered other members of the Chamber of Commerce. "Pajarito" was no easier to pronounce in 1916 than it was in 1900. Two other clauses worried Hewett. The bill prohibited taking original and duplicate specimens outside of New Mexico, and it severely limited excavation. This was a distinct threat to Hewett's power base. S. 2542 appeared to be as questionable as earlier efforts.

As a result, the group offered a compromise that changed its strategy but not its ultimate goal. Instead of a national park on the plateau, the men proposed four national monuments. Along with the existing Bandelier, they requested the Pajarito National Monument, which would be north of the Ramon Vigil Grant and included the northern bank of the Guaje river and its ruins. Puye and Shufinne would become the Santa Clara National Monument, while ruins in the Jemez Mountains were included in the Jemez National Monument. Despite the change in tactics, the objective remained the same. From the perspective of the committee, the "creation of the four national monuments on the Pajarito Plateau will hasten the creation of the Pajarito National Park." [3]

But the fragile coalition dissolved. Hewett and Douglass could not stay on the same side of any issue for long. Although they both favored a national park, they had different ideas about its purpose. Douglass and the Chamber of Commerce wanted Santa Fe to develop as an important tourist center. In their view, the surface ruins in the region were a major attraction for visitors. Hewett was interested in what lay below the ground. He worried that the park would curtail his fieldwork. In April, 1916, published an attack on S. 2542 in El Palacio, the Journal of the Museum of New Mexico. He contended that the bill had little support in New Mexico and that it severely restricted the advancement of archeological science. The establishment of a national park offered little economic advantage, he asserted, and even the name suggested for the park, "Cliff Cities," was misleading. Differing perspectives upon the purpose of the park created divisions among those who supported the principle of a national park on the Pajarito Plateau. [4]

After reading Hewett's account of the shortcomings of the new measure, Douglass responded aggressively in the New Mexican. He contended that Hewett was misleading the public. While many influential people did not support S. 2542, nearly everyone supported the idea of a national park on the Pajarito Plateau. Douglass quoted letters from Bond & Nohl, a major livestock enterprise, revealing that the ranching community supported the project so long as the Department of the Interior permitted grazing within the park. Douglass had notes from the Governor of New Mexico and various departmental officials that also supported the concept of the park. He pointed out that the park would make a sizable economic contribution to the region, for the many visitors would have to be fed and lodged in the north central New Mexico region. In addition to countering Hewett's objections, Douglass offered advantages of the proposal. He revealed that the new bill would compel excavators to leave the relics they discovered either in a museum run by the State of New Mexico or in a new museum at either the Puye or Frijoles site.

Despite all the challenges Douglass offered to Hewett's arguments, he knew that S. 2542 was a mistake. Because the bill forbid grazing on the plateau, Douglass asserted that the New Mexico National Parks Association, of which he was the secretary, requested its withdrawal. In its current state, the bill would cause the livestock industry to oppose it. Yet in light of Hewett's attack, Douglass had to defend the proposition. If he did not, Hewett's prestige might turn the public against the project as a whole.

His rebuttal attacked Hewett personally, charging that malice inspired Hewett's opposition. Douglass contended that Hewett wrote the disparaging article only because the Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce rejected his suggestion to call the park "Pajarito" instead of "Cliff Cities." [5] In Douglass' view, Hewett behaved in a manner unbecoming a man of influence, and his petulance was inappropriate in such an important situation.

Douglass' accusations were defensible. No stranger to controversy, Hewett once again placed his personal interests ahead of those of his neighbors. His article fragmented the coalition and led to public speculation that he had been working against the national park idea all along. Hewett's real objection to S. 2542 was the provision that prevented him from doing as he

pleased with what he uncovered in the ruins on the Pajarito Plateau. His contention that no serious depredations occurred there in the preceding decade was essentially true. Because he controlled archeological investigation on the plateau through Judge A. J. Abbott, Hewett's friend who served as informal custodian of the monument from his summer home in Frijoles Canyon, and held simultaneous excavation permits for nearly every important ruin in the region, Hewett's permission was an essential prerequisite for all excavators. In 1916, Hewett ruled the Pajarito Plateau. The existing national monument allowed him to continue his reign; the park proposition might have ended it. Douglass believed that Hewett wrote the article to confuse the public in hopes of turning them against the idea of a national park in the Bandelier vicinity.

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## CHAPTER 3: EXPANDING BANDELIER

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The acquisition of the Bandelier National Monument was only a stepping stone for the Park Service. Although Frank Pinkley made a convincing case for keeping Bandelier in the monument category, agency officials retained a vision of a large national park in the region. The area surrounding the monument contained archeological and natural features that the agency coveted. Horace Albright set an aggressive tone that shaped acquisition policy long after he left the agency, and his successors followed his lead in places like the Pajarito Plateau.

As a result, the Park Service continued its efforts to acquire land in the region. During the 1930s, archeological areas dominated agency thinking about the plateau. Puye and the Ramon Vigil Grant became the focus of efforts to expand the monument. After 1939, the agency took a broader view of the attributes of the region. The Park Service developed its vision of a comprehensive national park that included natural and archeological features. The coming of the Manhattan Project put pressure upon the resources of the park, and the agency acquired a buffer zone around Frijoles Canyon. As its ecological perspective developed during the 1950s and 1960s, the Park Service again began to eye the Pajarito Plateau. Soon a new form of the old park proposals appeared, with the Baca Location # 1 as its center.

But with the exception of additions to the national monument during the 1960s and 1970s, acquisition efforts in the region met with little success. Competing interests, including the Forest Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and private landowners, thwarted the agency. Bad luck dogged Park Service attempts on the Pajarito Plateau, and the agency never acquired the lands it wanted.

Even after the transfer of the monument, land controversies continued to rage in the Bandelier area. Like so many of the national park proposals, the transfer itself was a compromise. Associate Director Arno B. Cammerer and, to a lesser extent, Director Horace Albright still believed that the area merited park status, but the compromise that ceded the monument to the NPS limited the options of the agency.

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## CHAPTER 4: A SHOW PLACE FOR THE AMERICAN TOURIST

When the Park Service assumed responsibility for Bandelier National Monument in 1932, the development of visitor-use facilities played a significant role. Two major periods of development defined Bandelier. The initial phase, during which the major administrative and visitor-use facilities were constructed, lasted from 1933 until the Civilian Conservation Corp (CCC) camp closed in 1941. The second period began with the Mission 66 program for Bandelier, which led to major construction during the 1960s. In the 1980s, planning for the physical plant at the monument remained under the influence of the Mission 66 plan.

The three master plans designed for Bandelier revealed the evolution of Park Service attitudes towards development and accommodation of visitors. The initial plan, dating from 1934, was an unrestricted program of development. Its primary focus was to create facilities that allowed the monument to become an integral part of the southwestern national monuments group. Centered around the building of an entrance road into the Frijoles Canyon, the plan created a physical plant which made the site into a pre-eminent tourist attraction.

The master plan of 1953, revised under the auspices of the Mission 66 program, sought to alleviate the impact of the Los Alamos community upon the monument. Local residents came to see Bandelier as a "city park," causing serious overcrowding on the canyon floor. The master plan was a belated response to existing conditions, designed to address the conditions of the 1950s. Its emphasis on acquisition and development revealed a preoccupation with providing a buffer zone for the resources of the monument. Visitation at the site, however, quickly outgrew this plan.

After being caught short during the 1950s and early 1960s, Park Service planners tried to anticipate growth before it occurred. The master plan of 1977, in the works for a decade before its approval, planned for an expected increase in visitation. Confronted with the imminent opening of the Cochiti Dam recreation facility, Park Service planners took preventative action. Rather than wait for the impact, as they had in the 1940s, NPS officials created a plan to facilitate what they expected to be the impact on the monument.

The Park Service and the powerful environmental community clashed over the proposal as the development ran afoul of another NPS program—the legally mandated evaluation of larger-than-5000-acre roadless areas for wilderness status. Wilderness areas were highly desirable to the environmental constituency. When the NPS recommended no wilderness for Bandelier, local and national organizations attacked the agency, claiming its stance would cause the degradation of the Bandelier back country. Although at the time the proposals seemed antithetical, in reality careful management made development of the facilities at the park and wilderness preservation into complimentary objectives.

Ironically, by the late 1980s, the expected growth of the Cochiti Lake region, the catalyst for the controversy, had not occurred. In 1986, the implementation of the proposals that exasperated local and regional environmental groups appeared to be a decade in the future.

The Park Service took a more cautious approach to future plans of accommodating visitors at Bandelier. Agency focus shifted from trying to entice visitors to the site to providing visitors that arrived with a quality experience.

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## CHAPTER 5: CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND INTERPRETATION AT BANDELIER

As the Park Service built its physical plant during the 1930s, Frank Pinkley and others began programs to protect the monument and present its features to the public. From the outset of agency administration at the monument, these two programs were symbiotically linked. In the ensuing half century, the programs, practices, and policies of the Park Service changed dramatically, reflecting the evolution of agency policy and technological advances in resource management. Three distinct periods of management, each embodying a different administrative philosophy and addressing the specific problems of successive eras, have defined the management of Bandelier National Monument.

These periods mirrored the evolution of Park Service priorities at the area. Frank Pinkley's initiative shaped the first phase, which began in 1933 and ended when the CCC camp closed in 1941. Beginning with the onset of World War II in the early 1940s, a "hold-the-fort" or consolidation philosophy dominated NPS policy at the monument. This second phase continued during the massive influx of visitors throughout the late 1940s and the 1950s. In the mid 1960s, the Park Service itself underwent a transformation. While Mission 66, a ten-year capital development program initiated during the 1950s, provided new facilities to counter problems such as overcrowding at beleaguered parks like Bandelier, a new concern with preservation of the resources of the system took hold. An ethic that singled out preservation as the primary agency obligation emerged. The emphasis on cultural resources at Bandelier became part of a more inclusive concept of resource management.

Like many other archeological parks in the Southwest, Bandelier National Monument was excavated before the National Park Service existed. Edgar L. Hewett was the most important early excavator and one of the few who made any record of his work. Beginning in the summer of 1897, he led a group that surveyed the Frijoles Canyon ruins. Hewett dug at Otowi in 1905, and in 1907 initiated work in Frijoles Canyon. Excavations at Tyuonyi and the Ceremonial Cave began in 1908, as did limited work at Long House, the Great Kiva, and the House of the Water People. The following year, Hewett began work on Talus House while continuing to excavate Tyuonyi and other sites in the canyon.

Under Hewett's direction, his associates followed his lead on the plateau. In 1910, Jesse L. Nusbaum, Hewett's long-time assistant who later became the Superintendent of Mesa Verde National Park, completed the restoration of the kiva in Ceremonial Cave. Between 1908 and 1914, Alfred V. Kidder, who briefly studied under Hewett and became the most important American archeologist of the first half of the twentieth century, excavated Frijolito Ruin, on the south mesa of Frijoles Canyon. During the same period, Yapashi and San Miguel pueblos were also excavated by Hewett and his associates.

But for an empire-builder like Edgar L. Hewett, the Pajarito Plateau was only a base of operations. After 1912, when the Tyuonyi excavation was completed, his interests began to

shift away from the Pajarito Plateau. By 1914, Hewett's School of American Archeology summer school, which usually ran for about three weeks in August, was doing what little work was accomplished in the ruins of Frijoles Canyon.

The most visible achievement of the summer school program was the reconstruction of Talus House in the main canyon area. Nusbaum and Kenneth Chapman, another of Hewett's associates from the New Mexico Normal School, supervised the crew of Tewa Indians from San Ildefonso Pueblo that did the actual digging. They gathered building stone from talus slopes and the dumps left from the excavation at Tyuonyi, mixed soil from the canyon floor with clay to create mortar, and made plaster for the interiors. Although Chapman and Nusbaum used some modern materials, such as tar paper and newspapers, the reconstruction offered a clear view of the prehistoric home. [[1](#)]

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## CHAPTER 6: NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN MESA AND CANON COUNTRY

During the 1970s, the Park Service broadened its view of its responsibilities at Bandelier. As a result of a number of factors, including changing attitudes within the agency, the establishment of the Bandelier wilderness on October 20, 1976, the burro issue, and the La Mesa fire, the management of natural resources took on new significance. After years of adhering strictly to the mandate in the organic legislation that established Bandelier, the Park Service developed an integrated program of resource management at the monument. In 1980, cultural and natural resource management were merged into one division headed by a natural resource manager.

Although an innovative concept, the idea of integrated management raised problems. Cultural resource managers often felt that budgetary allocations did not reflect their concerns. Many in the park and the regional office questioned the efficacy of a program that centered on anything but the archeological ruins that the monument was established to protect. Natural resource managers presented a different picture. In the words of Regional Scientist Dr. Milford R. Fletcher, the two entities were "different ends of the same piece of string," and an integrated program of management was the only way to preserve the integrity of the entire monument. [1]

Much of the tension over resource management at Bandelier resulted from the changing cultural climate in the U.S. After the passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964, the public and its legislators articulated strong concerns about the state of the American physical environment. Throughout the 1960s, burgeoning national awareness of the concept of ecology brought parks to the attention of a powerful grass roots movement. Expanding environmental groups like the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society and many others began to promote an environmental agenda. After a decade in which use of the park system overwhelmed preservation of its resources, the Park Service began a dramatic shift in the opposite direction.

The environmental movement was part and parcel of a heightened sensitivity to preserving the natural beauty of the U.S. The "Keep America Beautiful" campaign that Lady Bird Johnson initiated during her husband's presidency became the basis of a groundswell in that late 1960s and early 1970s. "Back-to-nature" movements flourished, the Federal Government proclaimed "Earth Day" in 1970, and the concept of preservation took on social significance previously paralleled only during the Progressive Era. Americans cared about their land, and the Park Service was one beneficiary. Doves of enthusiastic young preservationists sought to enter the agency. Ironically, while many of these people valued the natural attributes of the system, the tone of the era dictated the protection of nature from the depredations of humanity. Visitor use of the park system played a small and unimportant role in this concept of preservation. [2]

Directors Stephen T. Mather and Horace Albright had initially promoted the park system because of its scenic beauty. During the 1920s and 1930s, use of the parks was their goal, but they promoted the parks to a public that lacked the opportunity and affluence of later generations. Only after World War II could millions of Americans visit the park system. When their impact overwhelmed the system, the NPS responded with capital development programs like Mission 66. By the 1970s, the increases in visitation made management of natural resources like cultural resources, imperative. If the natural resources of the park system were to survive, they required close attention.

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## CHAPTER 7: "AN ISLAND BESIEGED": THREATS TO THE PARK

During the 1970s and 1980s, the pressure on Bandelier National Monument from the matrix of interests on the Pajarito Plateau mounted greatly, and park managers found themselves in a difficult situation. The plans of neighbors of the park often threatened the ability of park managers to uphold their mandate. Superintendent John D. Hunter described his position when he addressed a town meeting that evaluated road development in nearby White Rock in June 1985. Bandelier, he told the audience, was "an island besieged by external threats." [1]

By the mid-1980s, Bandelier had become an outpost of preservation threatened by the needs of the world around it. Throughout the twentieth century, the Pajarito Plateau had been the focus of conflicting interests. As each constituent group, Government agency, and private interest laid claim to portions of the region and attempted to implement their programs, the amount of available open space diminished. What had been a snarl of assertions of needs became an impasse that resembled the gridlock of urban traffic. A situation emerged in which the gains of any group were counterbalanced by the losses of another one.

Changing perceptions of American society contributed to more aggressive vigilance on the part of the Park Service. Beginning in the 1960s, the conservation movement in the United States took a more holistic approach to preservation. Its concerns stretched beyond the protection of the park system into the beautification of ordinary landscapes. For the Park Service this translated into a concern for lands beyond the borders of park areas.

By the middle of the 1970s, the National Parks Association [later the National Parks and Conservation Association (NPCA)] and other groups that supported the park system had expressed concern for the lands surrounding park areas. In 1976, Director Gary E. Everhardt declared that the most severe threats the system faced were external. By 1980, this position had become an integral part of agency policy. Park Service documents such as the State of the Parks 1980 report to Congress focused on external threats such as commercial enterprises and industrial development outside park boundaries with the potential to affect park units. The Park Service began to develop ways to identify and counteract the broadening range of potential threats. The issue became prominent on the agenda of the agency, and individual park units stepped up responses to new threats. [2]

The combination of the new perception of threats and the tremendous pressure upon resources in the region demanded considerable attention from the staff at Bandelier. Protecting Park Service holdings meant more than preserving archeological ruins and wilderness values. Superintendent Hunter and his staff had to track the plans of Federal agencies, private companies, and other interest groups and assess the manner in which their implementation could affect Bandelier. As elsewhere in the park system, encroachment on surrounding scenic vistas, noise pollution, the threat of acid rain, damage from sulfur dioxide emissions, and other similar concerns spurred active response from the administration at Bandelier National Monument.

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## BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

Administrative histories are different than most other kinds of history. They require emphasis on issues that more broad-based projects rarely address. Yet a good administrative history also requires knowledge and understanding of the context surrounding the events at any particular park area. In the case of Bandelier National Monument, this meant a knowledge of the Park Service and its history and American archeology and its evolution as well as a documentary search for the specific details of the story of Bandelier.

In recent years, scholarship about the National Park Service, its leaders, and its policies has proliferated. Alfred Runte, [National Parks: The American Experience](#), 2nd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1987), remains the top book in the field. This synthesis offers the most comprehensive look at the evolution of American attitudes about the national park system. Runte is less complete when looking at the Park Service as an agency. John Ise, [Our National Park Policy: A Critical History](#) (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961), offers a look at the legislative history of the park system. Ise's book is marred by inconsistency both in the text and the footnotes, and his interpretation often seems dated. Ronald Foresta [America's National Parks and Their Keepers](#) (Washington D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1984), is an ambitious book that focuses on Park Service policy during the last two decades. Although valuable in certain areas, the book does not live up to its title. It is an account of the parks and their policy makers, not their keepers, and the idiosyncratic perspective of the author often interferes with the presentation of the material. Foresta is not a historian, and his work reflects that fact. Hal Rothman "Protected By a Gold Fence With Diamond Tips": A Cultural History of the American National Monuments (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 1985), covers the evolution of monument category. The Park Service has also produced general studies of its history. Harlan D. Unrau and G. Frank Williss, [Administrative History: Expansion of the National Park Service in the 1930s](#) (Denver: Denver Service Center, 1983), is a helpful account of the growth of the system during the Great Depression. John C. Paige, [The Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Park Service, 1933-1942: An Administrative History](#) (National Park Service, 1985), looks closely at the impact of the CCC on the system.

Biographies of leading Park Service figures provide another means to locate events at a specific park in their milieu. Donald C. Swain, [Wilderness Defender: Horace M. Albright and Conservation](#) is an excellent if laudatory look at the second director of the Park Service. Swain's "Harold Ickes, Horace Albright, and the Hundred Days: A Study in Conservation Administration," [Pacific Historical Review](#), 34 (November 1965), 455-465 is an outstanding analysis of Albright's maneuvering during the early days of the Roosevelt administration. Horace M. Albright as told to Robert Cahn, [The Birth of the National Park Service: The Founding Years, 1913-1933](#) (Salt Lake City: Howe Brothers, 1985), tells the story of the early years of the Park Service in Albright's own words. An interesting and informative account, this study suffers from the problems that plague oral histories. A check of documentary sources reveals that Albright's memory is often selective, and in many cases, he engages in myth-making and self-promotion. Robert Shankland, [Steve Mather of the National Parks](#) (New York: Knoph, 1951), tells the story of the early years of the agency and

the dynamic leader who brought the parks to the attention of the American public in an engaging fashion. Unfortunately, the Shankland book lacks footnotes.

The history of American archeology is another important component of the story of Bandelier National Monument. The best overall study of the topic is Gordon R. Willey and Jeremy A. Sabloff, *A History of American Archeology* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1974). Another recent book that includes historical information about southwestern archeology and the ruins of the Pajarito Plateau is Robert H. Lister and Florence C. Lister, *Those Who Came Before* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1983). Together these two books create a context for the excavations on the Pajarito Plateau.

Despite his importance, Edgar L. Hewett, the leading archeologist of the first two decades of the twentieth century, remains largely unstudied. Hewett's own writings, particularly *The Pajarito Plateau and Its Ancient People* (Albuquerque: The University of New Mexico Press, 1938), give considerable insight into this volatile and influential figure. One pseudo-biography, Beatrice Chauvenet, *Hewett and Friends: A Biography of Santa Fe's Vibrant Era* (Santa Fe: Museum of New Mexico Press, 1983) falls far short of the mark. Derived strictly from Hewett's papers and almost completely devoid of any context or interpretation, it does not do justice to the complexity of Hewett, his time, or the early years of southwestern archeology. Curtis M. Hinsley Jr., "Edgar Lee Hewett and the School of American Research in Santa Fe, 1906-1912," in David J. Meltzer, Don D. Fowler, and Jeremy A. Sabloff eds., *American Archaeology Past and Future* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986), does a much better job, but his article looks at only a small story within a much larger picture. Hewett's influence on southwestern archeology and tourism was immense; the scholarly record is far from complete.

The administration of Bandelier itself has not been the subject of a great deal of scholarship. Two articles pertaining to the Pajarito Plateau have recently appeared. Hal Rothman, "Conflict on the Pajarito Plateau: Frank Pinkley, the Forest Service, and the Bandelier Controversy," *Journal of Forest History*, 29 (April 1985), covers the issues presented in chapter two of this manuscript. Thomas L. Altherr, "The Pajarito of Cliff Dwellers National Park Proposal, 1900-1920," *New Mexico Historical Review*, 60 (July 1985), is an incomplete and inconsistent look at the early park efforts covered here in the initial chapter.

The conflict between the Park and Forest Services has been the subject of an increasing amount of scholarship. Most authors have studied the conflicts from one side or the other, and as a result, their premises embody bias that the other side finds untenable. In recent years, a number of efforts to synthesize the material on this issue in an objective form have occurred. Ben Twight, *Organizational Values and Political Power: The Forest Service Versus the Olympic National Park* (University Park, PA.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983), is an interesting start in this direction. Rather than follow the traditional stand of the USFS, that the NPS aggressively encroached on its domain, Twight posits that the values of the USFS and the kind of people attracted to a career in forestry gave the Forest Service a point of view that it found difficult to defend when faced with NPS arguments. Although Twight relies too heavily on social science theory to make his point and does not really look at the actions of the NPS, his work is a start. Another study that builds off Twight's work is Hal Rothman, "Shaping the Nature of a Controversy: The Park Service, The Forest Service, and the Cedar Breaks National Monument," *Utah Historical Quarterly*, 55 (Summer 1987). This piece looks at the interplay of factors that led to the establishment of the Cedar Breaks National Monument from a tract of the Dixie National Forest. Again, this is an area with plenty of room for future scholarship.

Administrative histories necessarily rely on primary source documents and reports, and this example is no exception. Record Group 79 of the National Archives, the Records of the

National Park Service, contain a wealth of information on all facets of the administration of Bandelier National Monument. The information is divided among the proposed national park files, file O-32, and the Bandelier National Monument files. The collection of material in the National Archives ends in approximately 1949. The National Archives material is listed under the old Park Service filing system. The Denver Federal Records Center, which contains records that the park and the regional office have sent there for storage, follows the modern system of classification. The material from the Denver Center is less valuable than that from other places; it is in Denver because earlier park officials perceived it to be unimportant. The Southwest Regional Office library in Santa Fe has some important documents pertaining to Bandelier. These consist of copies of reports commissioned by the Park Service on subjects such as feral burros, soil erosion, and other topics. The library at Bandelier contains much valuable information, including the paperwork pertaining to the exchange of lands with the Atomic Energy Commission that gave up most of the Otowi section of the monument. In addition, other reports that cover a variety of topics are also housed in the park library. These include material for interpretation, natural and cultural resource management, and other similar topics. The superintendent's active files, referred to in the notes as "park files," provide a wealth of information on current topics. Without the excellent record-keeping at the monument, chapter seven of this manuscript could not have been written.

A number of studies produced by the Park Service provided particularly valuable information. Foremost were Laura Soulliere Harrison and Randy Copeland, "Historic Structures Report: CCC Buildings, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico," draft manuscript at National Park Service's Denver Service Center and Robert P. Powers, "Draft Archeological Research Design for a Sample Inventory of Bandelier National Monument," draft manuscript in Division of Anthropology, Southwest Regional Office, National Park Service, Santa Fe. Both these documents are detailed reports by experts that provide the administrative historian with an inside picture of the nature of specific activities at the park.

Finally, oral history has contributed greatly to this study. Interviews with Richard Boyd, Paul and Frances Judge, Homer Pickens, and Dr. Milford R. Fletcher offered important perspectives to that augmented documentary research. In addition, day-to-day conversations with Superintendent John D. Hunter, Chief Ranger Kevin McKibbin, Resource Manager John D. Lissoway, and other members of the staff at Bandelier contributed greatly. These people were participants in many of the activities covered in this manuscript; including their perspective is an essential part of authoring an administrative history.

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## APPENDIX A: VISITATION STATISTICS FOR BANDELIER NATIONAL MONUMENT (1932-1987)

Year	Total	Year	Total
1932	4,164	1962	97,200
1933	3,906	1963	113,800
1934	9,457	1964	116,300
1935	12,381	1965	105,800
1936	12,944	1966	134,000
1937	14,380	1967	193,200
1938	14,619	1968	136,800
1939	10,998	1969	133,400
1940	13,689	1970	210,200
1941	11,460	1971	209,500
1942	4,558	1972	213,000
1943	3,765	1973	171,000
1944	7,689	1974	209,500
1945	10,689	1975	258,500
1946	22,009	1976	283,200
1947	24,803	1977	136,400
1948	27,275	1978	153,800
1949	36,334	1979	161,300
1950	47,059	1980	176,400
1951	46,909	1981	198,374
1952	55,006	1982	211,684
1953	61,142	1983	200,570
1954	63,700	1984	216,401
1955	66,000	1985	239,158
1956	70,000	1986	238,758
1957	79,800	July 1987	261,527
1958	83,200		
1959	85,400		
1960	81,600		
1961	90,500		

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## APPENDIX B: CUSTODIANS AND SUPERINTENDENTS OF BANDELIER NATIONAL MONUMENT

### Custodians

Edgar Rogers	August 15, 1933-October 16, 1933
Martin O. Evensted (Acting)	October 17, 1933-June 20, 1934
Luther E. (Earl) Jackson	June 21, 1934-January 31, 1937
Clinton G. Harkins	February 16, 1937-January 16, 1939
Chester A. (Art) Thomas (Actg.)	June 1, 1939-August 1, 1947

### Superintendents

Fred W. Binnewies	August 2, 1947-May 3, 1954
Paul A. Judge	May 16, 1953-March 31, 1962
Albert G. Henson	May 27, 1962-July 6, 1964
Thomas B. Hyde	October 11, 1964-January 29, 1966
James W. Godbolt	January 29, 1966-April 7, 1968
Stanley T. Albright	April 21, 1968-March 22 1970
Linwood E. Jackson	April 5, 1970-June 22, 1974
John D. Hunter	July 21, 1974-February 27, 1988
Jose A. Cisneros	February 29, 1988-

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## APPENDIX C: A CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS AT BANDELIER NATIONAL MONUMENT

February 1916—Bandelier National Monument is established; under the terms of the Antiquities Act of 1906, administration falls to the United States Forest Service.

February 1932—Administration of the monument transferred to the National Park Service.

November 1933—Civilian Conservation Corps camp opens in Frijoles Canyon.

December 1933—First automobile traverses the road to the floor of Frijoles Canyon.

1934—First six-year master plan for Bandelier developed.

1939—Jemez Crater National Park proposed for Bandelier area.

July 1940—CCC camp in Frijoles Canyon closes.

December 1942—The U.S. Army acquires the Los Alamos Ranch School in preparation for the establishment of a secret research facility.

1944—Bandelier and Regional Office officials protest after the "army" builds a road through the Otowi section without permission.

August 1945—The secret of Los Alamos becomes public after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

August 1947—Fred Binnewies becomes first superintendent of Bandelier.

1952—Visitation tops 50,000; Second master plan developed.

March 1957—Mission 66 for Bandelier approved.

January 1961—Frijoles Mesa transferred to the National Park Service.

1962—Proposal to create Valle Grande-Bandelier National Park; NPS attempt to purchase Baca Location #1 thwarted by sale to private parties.

May 1963—Park Service acquires the Upper Canyon area, while turning administration of the portion of the Otowi section west of Highway 4 over to the Atomic Energy Commission.

1963—Visitation at Bandelier tops 100,000.

1964—Wilderness Act of 1964 passes Congress; it mandates that Federal roadless areas of more than 5,000 acres be reviewed for their suitability for inclusion in a system of designated wilderness areas.

Summer 1986—Archeological survey of Bandelier National Monument begins.

1970—New draft master plan developed; it includes the recommendation that no designated wilderness area be established at Bandelier.

1970—Visitation at Bandelier tops 200,000.

December 1971—Public hearing in Los Alamos shows extensive support for the idea of a wilderness at Bandelier.

1974-1977—\$130,000 spent on studies and removal of feral burros at Bandelier.

1976—First Resource Management Plan at Bandelier approved.

October 1976—Designated Wilderness area at Bandelier is established.

June 1977—La Mesa fire occurs. Burro eradication program implemented during the fire. Archeologists precede bulldozers along fire lines in an effort to save cultural resources.

1980—Resource Management unit, combining cultural and natural resource management, is formed.

1980-1983—Park Service is enjoined from continuing burro eradication program; an agreement with the Fund for Animals Inc. allows for a live capture program; after completion of the program, Park Service removed remaining burros.

June 1985—Cochiti Dam floods area along the Rio Grande; flooding continues during following summers.

Fall 1985—Proposal for alternate road to Los Alamos gathers momentum. Proposed routes include one adjacent to the eastern boundary of the monument and another south of Tsankawi.

November 1985—Public outcry to protect Bandelier from Project Overblast; the Los Alamos National Laboratory subsequently rescinds the proposed development.

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## APPENDIX D: SELECTED LEGISLATION RELATING TO BANDELIER NATIONAL MONUMENT

### 7. Bandelier National Monument

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Enlarging the area: Proclamation (No. 1991) of February 25, 1932.....	123

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

#### A PROCLAMATION

[No. 1322—Feb. 11, 1916—39 Stat. 1764]

WHEREAS, certain prehistoric aboriginal ruins situated upon public lands of the United States, within the Santa Fe National Forest, in the State of New Mexico, are of unusual ethnologic, scientific, and educational interest. and it appears that the public interests would be promoted by reserving these relics of a vanished people, with as much land as may be necessary for the proper protection thereof, as a National Monument;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the power in me vested by section two of the Act of Congress approved June 8, 1906, entitled "An Act for the Preservation of American Antiquities", do proclaim that there are hereby reserved from appropriation and use of all kinds under all of the public land laws, subject to all prior valid adverse claims, and set apart as a National Monument, all the tracts of land, in the State of New Mexico, shown as the Bandelier National Monument on the diagram forming a part hereof.

The reservation made by this proclamation is not intended to prevent the use of the lands for forest purposes under the proclamation establishing the Santa Fe National Forest. The two reservations shall both be effective on the land withdrawn, but the National Monument hereby established shall be the dominant reservation, and any use of the land which interferes with its preservation or protection as a National Monument is hereby forbidden.

Warning is hereby given to all unauthorized persons not to appropriate, injure, remove, or destroy any feature of this National Monument, or to locate or settle on any of the lands reserved by this proclamation.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

[SEAL] DONE at the City of Washington this eleventh day of February in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and sixteen, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and fortieth.

WOODROW WILSON.

By the President:  
ROBERT LANSING,  
*Secretary of State.*

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### VIII. NATIONAL MONUMENTS—BANDELIER

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

#### A PROCLAMATION

[No. 1991—Feb. 25, 1932—47 Stat. 2503]

WHEREAS it appears desirable, in the public interest, to add to the Bandelier National Monument as established by proclamation of February 11, 1916 (39 Stat. 1764), certain lands of the United States within the Santa Fe National Forest, in the State of New Mexico, and to exclude said national monument as enlarged from the Santa Fe National Forest;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Herbert Hoover, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the power in me vested by section 2, act of June 8, 1906 (34 Stat. 225; U. S. Code, title 16, sec. 431), and the act of June 4, 1897 (30 Stat. 11, 34; U. S. Code, title 16, sec. 473), do proclaim that the boundaries of the Bandelier National Monument be, and they are hereby, changed so as to include certain additional lands in T. 19 N., R. 7 E., New Mexico principal meridian, subject to all valid existing rights, and that the reservation as so enlarged is hereby excluded from the Santa Fe National Forest, the lands within the reservation as enlarged being described as follows :

#### NEW MEXICO PRINCIPAL MERIDIAN

T. 19 N., R. 7 E., south half of secs. 7, 8, and 9;  
secs. 16 to 21 inclusive;  
fractional secs. 28, 29, and 30;

All lands in unsurveyed Tps. 17 and 18 N., R. 6 E., lying north of the Canada de Cochiti Grant, south of the Ramon Vigil Grant, and west of the Rio Grande River.

Warning is hereby given to all unauthorized persons nor to appropriate, injure, remove, or destroy any feature of this national monument, nor to locate or settle on any of the lands reserved by this proclamation.

Nothing herein contained shall modify or abridge the right of the public to travel over any or all public roads now existing within or upon the lands herein described or roads subsequently constructed to take the place of such existing roads, nor shall public travel over said roads be subject to any restriction or

condition other than those generally applicable to the use of public roads in the State of New Mexico.


The Director of the National Park Service, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, shall have the supervision, management, and control of this monument as provided in the act of Congress entitled "An act to establish a National Park Service, and for other purposes," approved August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535-536), and acts additional thereto or amendatory thereof.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

[SEAL] DONE at the City of Washington this 25th day of February, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and thirty-two, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and fifty-sixth.

HERBERT HOOVER.

By the President:  
HENRY L. STIMSON,  
*Secretary of State.*



(click on image for an enlargement in a new window)

90 STAT.  
2692

PUBLIC LAW 94-567—OCT. 20, 1976

Public Law 94-567  
94th Congress

### An Act

Oct. 20, 1976  
[H.R. 13160]

To designate certain lands within units of the National Park System as wilderness; to revise the boundaries of certain of those units; and for other purposes.

Wilderness  
areas.  
Designation.  
16 USC 1132  
note.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in accordance with section 3(c) of the Wilderness Act (78 Stat. 890; 16 U.S.C. 1132(c)), the following lands are hereby designated as wilderness, and shall be administered*

by the Secretary of the Interior in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Wilderness Act :

Bandelier  
National  
Monument,  
N. Mex.

(a) Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico, wilderness comprising twenty-three thousand two hundred and sixty-seven acres, depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Plan, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico" numbered 315—20,014—B and dated May 1976, to be know as the Bandelier Wilderness.

Gunnison  
National  
Monument,  
Colo.

(b) Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Monument, Colorado, wilderness comprising eleven thousand one hundred and eighty acres, depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Plan, Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Monument, Colorado" numbered 144-20,017 and dated May 1973, to be known as the Black Canyon of the Gunnison Wilderness.

Chiricahua  
National  
Monument,  
Ariz.

(c) Chiricahua National Monument, Arizona, wilderness comprising nine thousand four hundred and forty acres, and potential wilderness additions comprising two acres, depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Plan, Chiricahua National Monument, Arizona", numbered 145-20,007—A and dated September 1973, to be known as the Chiricahua National Monument Wilderness.

Great Sand  
Dunes  
National  
Monument,  
Colo.

(d) Great Sand Dunes National Monument, Colorado, wilderness comprising thirty-three thousand four hundred and fifty acres, and potential wilderness additions comprising six hundred and seventy acres, depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Plan, Great Sand Dunes National Monument, Colorado", numbered 140—20,006—C and dated February 1976, to be known as the Great Sand Dunes Wilderness.

Haleakala  
National  
Park, Hawaii.

(e) Haleakala National Park, Hawaii, wilderness comprising nineteen thousand two hundred and seventy acres, and potential wilderness additions comprising five thousand five hundred acres, depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Plan, Haleakala National Park, Hawaii", numbered 162—20,006—A and dated July 1972, to be known as the Haleakala Wilderness.

Isle Royale  
National  
Park, Mich.

(f) Isle Royale National Park, Michigan, wilderness comprising one hundred and thirty-one thousand eight hundred and eighty acres, and potential wilderness additions comprising two hundred and thirty-one acres, depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Plan, Isle Royale National Park, Michigan", numbered 139—20,004 and dated December 1974, to be known as the Isle Royale Wilderness.

Joshua Tree  
National  
Monument,  
Calif.

(g) Joshua Tree National Monument, California, wilderness comprising four hundred and twenty-nine thousand six hundred and ninety acres, and potential wilderness additions comprising thirty-seven thousand five hundred and fifty acres, depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Plan, Joshua

- Tree National Monument, California", numbered 156—20,003—D and dated May 1976, to be known as the Joshua Tree Wilderness.
- Mesa Verde National Park, Colo. (h) Mesa Verde National Park, Colorado, wilderness comprising eight thousand one hundred acres, depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Plan, Mesa Verde National Park, Colorado", numbered 307—20,007—A and dated September 1972, to be known as the Mesa Verde Wilderness.
- Pinnacles National Monument, Calif. (i) Pinnacles National Monument, California, wilderness comprising twelve thousand nine hundred and fifty-two acres, and potential additions comprising nine hundred and ninety acres, depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Plan, Pinnacles National Monument, California", numbered 114—20,010—D and dated September 1975, to be known as the Pinnacles Wilderness.
- Saguaro National Monument, Ariz. (j) Saguaro National Monument, Arizona, wilderness comprising seventy-one thousand four hundred acres, depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Plan Saguaro National Monument, Arizona", numbered 151—20,003—D and dated May 1976, to be known as the Saguaro Wilderness.
- Point Reyes National Seashore, Calif. (k) Point Reyes National Seashore, California, wilderness comprising twenty-five thousand three hundred and seventy acres, and potential wilderness additions comprising eight thousand and three acres, depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Plan, Point Reyes National Seashore", numbered 612—90,000—B and dated September 1976, to be known as the Point Reyes Wilderness.
- Badlands National Monument, S. Dak. (l) Badlands National Monument, South Dakota, wilderness comprising sixty-four thousand two hundred and fifty acres, depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Plan, Badlands National Monument, South Dakota", numbered 137—29,010—B and dated May 1976, to be known as the Badlands Wilderness.
- Shenandoah National Park, Va. (m) Shenandoah National Park, Virginia, wilderness comprising seventy-nine thousand and nineteen acres, and potential wilderness additions comprising five hundred and sixty acres, depicted on a map entitled "Wilderness Plan, Shenandoah National Park, Virginia," numbered 134—90,001 and dated June 1975, to be known as the Shenandoah Wilderness.
- Map and description, public inspection. SEC. 2. A map and description of the boundaries of the areas designated in this Act shall be on file and available for public inspection in the office of the Director of the National Park Service, Department of the Interior, and in the office of the Superintendent of each area designated in the Act. As soon as practicable after this Act takes effect, maps of the wilderness areas and descriptions of their

boundaries shall be filed with the Interior and Insular Affairs Committees of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, and such maps and descriptions shall have the same force and effect as if included in this Act: *Provided*, That correction of clerical and typographical errors in such maps and descriptions may be made.

Publication in  
Federal  
Register.  
16 USC 1131  
note.

SEC. 3. All lands which represent potential wilderness additions, upon publication in the Federal Register of a notice by the Secretary of the Interior that all uses thereon prohibited by the Wilderness Act have ceased, shall thereby be designated wilderness.

Boundary  
revision.

SEC. 4. The boundaries of the following areas are hereby revised, and those lands depicted on the respective maps as wilderness or as potential wilderness addition are hereby so designated at such time and in such manner as provided for by this Act :

Isle Royale  
National Park,  
Mich.

(a) Isle Royale National Park, Michigan :

The Act of March 6, 1942 (56 Stat. 138; 16 U.S.C. 408e—408h), as amended, is further amended as follows :

(1) Insert the letter "(a)" before the second paragraph of the first section, redesignate subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of that paragraph as "(1)", "(2)", "(3)", respectively, and add to that section the following new paragraph :

"(b) Gull Islands, containing approximately six acres, located in section 19, township 68 north, range 31 west, in Keweenaw County, Michigan."

16 USC 408g.

(2) Amend section 3 to read as follows:

"SEC. 3. The boundaries of the Isle Royale National Park are hereby extended to include any submerged lands within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States within four and one-half miles of the shoreline of Isle Royale and the surrounding islands, including Passage Island and the Gull Islands, and the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to acquire title by donation to any such lands not now owned by the United States, the title to be satisfactory to him."

Pinnacles  
National  
Monument,  
Calif.

(b) Pinnacles National Monument, California :

(1) The boundary is hereby revised by adding the following described lands, totaling approximately one thousand seven hundred and seventeen and nine-tenths acres :

(a) Mount Diablo meridian, township 17 south, range 7 east: Section 1, east half east half, southwest quarter northeast quarter, and northwest quarter southeast quarter; section 12, east half northeast quarter, and northeast quarter southeast quarter; section 13, east half northeast quarter and northeast

quarter southeast quarter.

(b) Township 16 south, range 7 east : Section 32, east half.

(c) Township 17 south, range 7 east: Section 4, west half; section 5, east half.

(d) Township 17 south, range 7 east : Section 6, southwest quarter southwest quarter; section 7, northwest quarter north half southwest quarter.

Publication in  
Federal  
Register.

(2) The Secretary of the Interior may make minor revisions in the monument boundary from time to time by publication in the Federal Register of a map or other boundary description, but the total area within the monument may not exceed sixteen thousand five hundred acres : *Provided, however,* That lands designated as wilderness pursuant to this Act may not be excluded from the monument. The monument shall hereafter be administered in accordance with the Act of August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535; 16 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), as amended and supplemented.

(3) In order to effectuate the purposes of this subsection, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to acquire by donation, purchase, transfer from any other Federal agency or exchange, lands and interests therein within the area hereafter encompassed by the monument boundary, except that property owned by the State of California or any political subdivision thereof may be acquired only by donation.

Appropriation  
authorization.

(4) There are authorized to be appropriated, in addition to such sums as may heretofore have been appropriated, not to exceed \$955,000 for the acquisition of lands or interests in lands authorized by this subsection. No funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to this Act shall be available prior to October 1, 1977.

Rincon  
Wilderness  
Study  
Area,  
suitability  
review.  
16 USC 1132  
note.

SEC. 5. (a) The Secretary of Agriculture shall within two years after the date of enactment of this Act, review, as to its suitability or nonsuitability for preservation as wilderness, the area comprising approximate sixty-two thousand nine hundred and thirty acres located in the Coronado National Forest adjacent to Saguaro National Monument, Arizona, and identified on the map referred to in section 1(j) of this Act as the "Rincon Wilderness Study Area," and shall report his findings to the President. The Secretary of Agriculture shall conduct his review in accordance with the provisions of subsections 3(b) and 3(d) of the Wilderness Act, except that any reference in such subsections to areas in the national forests classified as "primitive" on the effective date of that Act shall be deemed to be a reference to the wilderness study area designated by this Act and except that the President shall advise the Congress of his recommendations with respect to this area

Report to  
President.  
16 USC 1132.

within two years after the date of enactment of this Act.

Hearings,  
notice.

(b) The Secretary of Agriculture shall give at least sixty days' advance public notice of any hearing or other public meeting relating to the review provided for by this section.

Administration.

SEC. 6. The areas designated by this Act as wilderness shall be administered by the Secretary of the Interior in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Wilderness Act governing areas designated by that Act as wilderness areas, except that any reference in such provisions to the effective date of the Wilderness Act shall be deemed to be a reference to the elective date of this Act, and, where appropriate, any reference to the Secretary of Agriculture shall be deemed to be a reference to the Secretary of the Interior.

16 USC 459c-  
6.

SEC. 7. (a) Section 6(a) of the Act of September 13, 1962 (76 Stat. 538), as amended (16 U.S.C. 459c-6a) is amended by inserting "without impairment of its natural values, in a manner which provides for such recreational, educational, historic preservation, interpretation, and scientific research opportunities as are consistent with, based upon, and supportive of the maximum protection, restoration and preservation of the natural environment with the area" immediately after "shall be administered by the Secretary".

16 USC 459c-  
7.

(b) Add the following new section 7 and redesignate the existing section 7 as section 8:

The Clem  
Miller  
Environmental  
Education  
Center,  
designation.  
16 USC 459c-  
6a.


"SEC. 7. The Secretary shall designate the principal environmental education center within the Seashore as 'The Clem Miller Environmental Education Center' in commemoration of the vision and leadership which the late Representative Clem Miller gave to the creation and protection of Point Reyes National Seashore."

Whiskey  
Mountain  
Area,  
classification  
as a  
primitive area.

SEC. 8. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any designation of the lands in the Shoshone National Forest, Wyoming, known as the Whiskey Mountain Area, comprising approximately six thousand four hundred and ninety-seven acres and depicted as the "Whiskey Mountain Area—Glacier Primitive Area" on a map entitled "Proposed Glacier Wilderness and Glacier Primitive Area", dated September 23, 1976, on file in the Office of the Chief, Forest Service, Department of Agriculture, shall be classified as a primitive area until the Secretary of Agriculture or his designee determines otherwise pursuant to classification procedures for national forest primitive areas. Provisions of any other Act designating the Fitzpatrick Wilderness.


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Last Updated: 28-Aug-2006




































# Bandelier

## Administrative History



## ENDNOTES

### Chapter 1

- [1.](#) Hal Rothman, "Protected By A Gold Fence With Diamond Tips:" A Cultural History of the American National Monuments" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1985), pp. 87-115. See also Ronald F. Lee, The Antiquities Act of 1906 (Washington: National Park Service, 1971) for background on this question.
- [2.](#) James D. Mankin report to Commissioner of the General Land Office Binger Hermann, December 4, 1899, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Pajarito, Record Group 79, National Archives.
- [3.](#) The "Pajarito" name became characteristic of the park proposals that Hewett orchestrated.
- [4.](#) Mankin to Hermann, March 3, 1900, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Pajarito, RG 79, NA.
- [5.](#) Edgar L. Hewett to Hermann. October 26, 1900, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Pajarito, RG 79, NA.
- [6.](#) John J. Cameron, "The Proposed Cliff Cities or Pajarito National Park," circa 1935, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, Los Alamos, New Mexico. Cameron's piece is the best summary of part attempts that is available.
- [7.](#) Santa Fe New Mexican, March 2 and 4, 1902.
- [8.](#) "The Pajarito Cliff Dwellers National Park," Santa Fe New Mexican, May 20, 1902.
- [9.](#) Samuel P. Hayes, Conservation and the Gospel of Social Efficiency (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959) pp. 10- 22.
- [10.](#) Cameron, "Proposed National Park," p. 4.
- [11.](#) Rothman, "Protected By A Gold Fence," covers Baum's activities in great detail, pp. 35-75.
- [12.](#) Clinton J. Crandall to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, May 22, 1903, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.
- [13.](#) Stephen J. Holsinger, "Report on the Proposed Pajarito National Park," 1904, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, Los Alamos, New Mexico.
- [14.](#) House Public Lands Committee Hearing, January 11, 1905, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.

[15.](#) Executive Order 80218, July 29, 1905; Edgar L. Hewett, "Anthropological Miscellanea: Preserving Antiquities," American Anthropologist 7, (Fall 1905) 570.

[16.](#) Edgar L. Hewett, Excavations at Puye, 1907 and Excavations at Tyuonyi, 1908, (Santa Fe: School of American Research, 1909). See also the Edgar L. Hewett papers, Box 22, Museum of New Mexico History Library, for copies of his permits.

[17.](#) Harold Brook to Edgar L. Hewett, November 11, 1909, Museum of New Mexico History Library, Hewett papers, Box 22.

[18.](#) Alfred Runte, The National Parks: The American Experience, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979) pp. 33-82 cover the idea of "scenic monumentalism."

[19.](#) Secretary of the Interior Richard A. Ballinger to GLO Commissioner Fred Dennett, December 8, 1909; Ballinger to Secretary of Agriculture James Mason, December 8, 1909; Mason to Ballinger, December 11, 1909; and Assistant Secretary of Interior Eric C. Finney memorandum, attached to Mason's December 11, 1909, letter, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.

[20.](#) See Rothman, "Protected By A Gold Fence," pp. 107-111.

[21.](#) GLO Commissioner Fred Dennett to Secretary of the Smithsonian W.D. Walcott, October 19, 1910, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.

[22.](#) Crandall to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, July 11, 1910, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.

[23.](#) Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs F. H. Abbott to Secretary of the Interior, October 13, 1910; and Dennett to Walcott, October 19, 1910, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA. Abbott's letter quotes the exact phrases that Crandall's letter of July 11, 1910 attributes to Hewett.

[24.](#) Walcott to Dennett, October 26, 1910; and Dennett to Walcott, October 28, 1910, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.

[25.](#) Cameron, "Proposed National Park," p. 18. See also Museum of New Mexico History Library, Thomas B. Catron papers, Box 222.

[26.](#) Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato Sells to Secretary of the Interior, March 16, 1914, Proposed National Park File 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.

[27.](#) Commissioner of the General Land Office Clay Tallman to Assistant Secretary of the Interior A. A. Jones, April 4, 1914, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.

[28.](#) G.H. Van Stone to A. A. Jones, May 5, 1914, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.

[29.](#) Hewett to Jones, April 3, 1914, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.

[30.](#) Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce to Jones, April 4, April 11, May 9, 1914, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.

[31.](#) Secretary of Agriculture D. F. Houston to Chairman, Senate Public Lands Committee,

Henry C. Myers, April 29, 1914, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.

[32.](#) William B. Douglas to New Mexico Representative Harvey B. Fergusson, May 9, 1914, Proposed National Park File 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.

[33.](#) From the Albuquerque Morning Journal, June 9, 1914.

[34.](#) Tallman report to Secretary of the Interior, July 1, 1914, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.

[35.](#) Assistant Secretary of the Interior Bo Sweeney to Myers, October 7, 1914, Proposed National Park file 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.

[36.](#) Arthur C. Ringland, "Conserving Human and Natural Resources," oral interview by Amelia Fry (Berkeley: Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, 1970), pp. 95-98. See also Arthur C. Ringland to Linwood E. Jackson, July 24, 1972, file H14, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.

## Chapter 2

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[1.](#) William B. Douglass in the Santa Fe New Mexican, February 7, 1915, Museum of New Mexico History Library, Edgar L. Hewett papers, scrapbook S-24.

[2.](#) Douglass in the New Mexican, December, 1915; and Harold L. Brook rebuttal, January, 1916, Edgar L. Hewett papers, Scrapbook S-24.

[3.](#) From the New Mexican, circa. February, 15, 1916, Hewett papers, Scrapbook S-24.

[4.](#) Edgar L. Hewett, "The Proposed National Park of the Cliff Cities," El Palacio, 3 (April, 1916), 37-55.

[5.](#) "Douglass has sizzling reply to opposition to National Park," Santa Fe New Mexican, April, 1916.

[6.](#) Governor W.E. Lindsey to Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane, November 21, 1917; Douglass to Lane, February 26, 1918; Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles Burke to Joseph Cotter, January 25, 1919, Proposed National Park File 0-32, Cliff Cities, RG 79, NA.

[7.](#) Stephen T. Mather telegram, January 30, 1919, NA.

[8.](#) Horace M. Albright telegram, February 1, 1919, NA.

[9.](#) Herbert W. Gleason to Mather, June 15, 1919, NA.

[10.](#) Douglass to Albright, June 15, 1919, NA.

[11.](#) Gleason to Mather, June 15, 1919, NA.

[12.](#) Albright to Douglass, June 25, 1919, NA.

[13.](#) Douglass to Albright, July 4, 1919. See also New Mexican editorial, June 25, 1919, NA.

[14.](#) Mather to Gleason, August 9, 1919, NA.

[15.](#) Herbert W. Gleason Report to the Secretary of the Interior and the National Park Service, 1919, Bandelier National Monument Archives, Accession # 595, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.

[16.](#) Arthur E. Demaray to Arno B. Cammerer, November 29, 1919, NA.

[17.](#) John Ise, Our National Park Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), 296-97.

[18.](#) Edgar L. Hewett to A. A. Jones, June 21, 1919, Edgar L. Hewett papers, Box 44. Santa Fe New Mexican December 12, 1921; New Mexican editorial, December 14, 1921, NA.

[19.](#) Cammerer to Hewett, February 1, 1923, Hewett papers, Box 44.

[20.](#) Cammerer to Hewett, February 14, 1923, Hewett papers, Box 44.

[21.](#) Hewett to Robert S. Yard, August 4, 1923, NA.

[22.](#) By the late 1920s, the Forest Service began to realize that competition with the NPS would require that it develop a recreational policy. Elements in the USFS began to agitate for such a policy in the early 1920s, but it took until 1929 for the development of the L-20 regulations. As part of the counterattack, the USFS took to calling the approach of the NPS to land management "single-use," to differentiate it from its own broad-based development of commercial resources. Like many other Forest Service jobs at the NPS, this one fell well short of the mark. See Harold K. Steen, The United States Forest Service (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976) and Sally K. Fairfax and Samuel T. Dana, Forest and Range Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980).

[23.](#) Yard to John Oliver La Gorce, August 26, 1924, NA.

[24.](#) United States Forest Service, "Memorandum for the members of the coordinating committee on national parks and forests," attached to Acting Forester L. F. Kneipp to Mather, July 10, 1925, NA.

[25.](#) Dr. Jesse L. Nusbaum's confidential report to Director Mather, September 10, 1925, NA. Nusbaum wrote this nineteen-page indictment of the Forest Service immediately after the incident described. He was obviously distraught. No comparable USFS response to the meeting in Santa Fe exists.

[26.](#) During the First World War, Franklin K. Lane's feelings of patriotism inspired him to grant grazing leases in the Yosemite. The Sierra Club got wind of it and the project was promptly terminated. See Shankland, Steve Mather of the National Parks, 1970, p. 203. In National Parks such as Lassen Volcanic National Park, this type of multiple use was permitted. The precedent for grazing leases in the national monuments was established with the creation of the Mt. Olympus National Monument in 1909. See Shankland, Steve Mather, on Lassen, and Ise, Our National Park Policy, and the Mt. Olympus files in the National Archives, RG 79, Series 6, O-35, 12-5. The issue of allowing area residents to collect dead timber came up at Mukuntuweap (Zion) in 1914. The General Land Office at first forbade collection, but quickly reversed itself. Timber collecting was also allowed at Natural Bridges and at other remote national monuments where there was some chance that establishment of a monument deprived locals of their livelihood. National Archives, RG 79, Series 6, Zion (Mukuntuweap) and Natural Bridges file 12-5.

[27.](#) Nusbaum to Mather, September 10, 1925, NA.

[28.](#) Jesse L. Nusbaum to John Morrow, September 12, 1925, NA.

[29.](#) Nusbaum to Mather, September 10, 1925, NA.

[30.](#) Assistant Director Arno B. Cammerer memo for the files, December 3, 1925; Jesse L. Nusbaum to Horace M. Albright, March 20, 1928, National Archives, RG 79, Series 6, Bandelier National Monument file 12-5. The announcement appeared in the March 3, 1928, Santa Fe New Mexican, and Nusbaum attached a clipping of the article to his bitter and despondent letter.

[31.](#) Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Coordinating Commission on National Parks and Forests, December 8, 1925, NA.

[32.](#) Arthur Ringland to Edgar L. Hewett at San Diego, March 25, 1927, Bandelier National Monument file 12-5, Series 6, RG 79, NA.

[33.](#) Frank Pinkley to A.E. Demaray, "Report on the Bandelier National Monument," May 23, 1927, Bandelier National Monument file 12-5, Series 6, RG 79, NA.

[34.](#) Horace Albright to Stephen T. Mather, June 8, 1927, Bandelier National Monument file 12-5, Series 6, Rg 79, NA.

[35.](#) Edgar L. Hewett to Arno B. Cammerer, January 17, 1928; Stephen T. Mather to Edgar L. Hewett, January 24, 1928; Series 6, Bandelier National Monument file 12-5, Series 6, RG 79, NA.

[36.](#) Jesse L. Nusbaum, Roger W. Toll, and M. R. Tillotson. "The Bandelier National Monument and the Proposed Cliff Cities National Park," November 26, 1930, NA.

[37.](#) Arno B. Cammerer to Albright, December 3, 1930, NA.

[38.](#) Albright memo, January 2, 1931, NA.

[39.](#) Dr. Clark Wissler to Director, February 10, 1931, Bandelier National Monument file 12-5, Series 6, RG 79, NA.

[40.](#) Cammerer memo for the files, February 12, 1931, Bandelier National Monument file 12-5, Series 6, RG 79, NA .

[41.](#) Roger W. Toll to Director, December 3, 1931, Bandelier National Monument file 12-5, Series 6, RG 79, NA.

[42.](#) H.C Bryant memo for the files, February 26, 1931, Bandelier National Monument file 12-5, Series 6, RG 79, NA.

[43.](#) United States Forester Major R.Y. Stuart to Horace Albright, November 10, 1931, Bandelier National Monument file 12-5, Series 6, RG 79, NA. During a two-year period , Albright and Stuart corresponded on the Bandelier issue. With Park Service assurance that it would remain a national monument, by early 1932, Stuart was more than glad to turn Bandelier over to the NPS.

[44.](#) Executive Proclamation 1991, February 25, 1932. See also U.S. Statutes At Large 47 Stat. 2503.

## Chapter 3

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- [1.](#) Horace M. Albright to Stephen T. Mather, March 3, 1928, Proposed Parks File O-32, Cliff Cities, Series 6, Record Group 79, NA.
- [2.](#) H. C. Bryant memo to the Director, March 25, 1931, Proposed Parks File 0-32, Cliff Cities, Series 6, Record Group 79, NA.
- [3.](#) Arthur E. Demaray memo to the Director, June 8, 1931, Proposed Parks File O-32, Cliff Cities, Series 6, Record Group 79, NA.
- [4.](#) Jesse L. Nusbaum to Albright, March 18, 1932, Nusbaum's File, Bandelier National Monument Files, National Park Service Southwest Region Library, Santa Fe, New Mexico.
- [5.](#) Regional Geologist Charles N. Gould, "Report on the Proposed Jemez Crater National Park," February 2, 1939, Bandelier National Monument Archives, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico. Citations from the Bandelier National Monument Library that follow will be designated "BAND."
- [6.](#) Demaray memo to Acting Regional Director, April 29, 1939, Proposed Park File O-35, Jemez Crater, Series 7, National Park Service Records, Denver Federal Records Center.
- [7.](#) Bandelier Legislation File 3, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.
- [8.](#) Regional Director Hugh M. Miller to Director Conrad L. Wirth, July 29, 1958, File L1417, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.
- [9.](#) Superintendent Paul Judge to Regional Director Hugh M. Miller, July 9, 1958, File L1417, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.
- [10.](#) The transfer was affected in Public Law 1006, 70 Stat. 1069, Section 8, Act of August 6, 1956
- [11.](#) Ben Thompson, Chief of Recreation and Resource Planning, memo for the files, March 6, 1959, File L1417, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.
- [12.](#) National Park Service memo of meeting on June 25, 1959 with General Services Administration officials, File L1417, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.
- [13.](#) E. T. Scoyen memo to Regional Director, Region 3 (Southwest), July 29, 1959; and Judge to Regional Director, Region 3, August 4, 1959, File L1417, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.
- [14.](#) Judge to Regional Director, August 4, 1959, File L1417, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.
- [15.](#) Hugh Miller to Wirth, August 11, 1959, File L1417, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.
- [16.](#) Superintendent Paul Judge to Regional Director Hugh M. Miller, July 9, 1958, File L1417, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.
- [17.](#) George Von Der Lippe and Edward J. Widmer, "A Field Report on the Uncontrolled Use of the Otowi Section of Bandelier National Monument," March 4, 1960, Bandelier National

Monument Files, National Park Service Southwest Region Library, Santa Fe, New Mexico.

[18.](#) William Bowen memo to Regional Director, April 6, 1960, File L1417, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.

[19.](#) Judge to Miller, April 15, 1960, File L1417, BAND.

[20.](#) Paul Judge, Boundary Status Report, Bandelier National Monument, June 28, 1960, File L1417, BAND.

[21.](#) Leslie Arnberger memo to the Regional Director, July 18, 1960; Jerome Miller memo to the Regional Director, July 25, 1960; and George Kell memo to the Regional Director, July 26, 1960, File L1417, BAND.

[22.](#) Charlie Steen memo to the Regional Director, July 26, 1960, File L1417, BAND.

[23.](#) George Miller memo to the Regional Director, July 28, 1960, File L1417, BAND.

[24.](#) William Bowen to Regional Director Thomas J. Allen, August 3, 1960, File L1417, BAND.

[25.](#) Allen to Wirth, August 9, 1960, File L1417, BAND.

[26.](#) Judge to Allen, August 17, 1960, File L1417, BAND.

[27.](#) Arnberger memo for the files, May 31, 1961; and John J. Burke to Allen, June 21, 1961, File 417, BAND.

[28.](#) Allen to Wirth, March 6, 1962, File L1417, BAND.

[29.](#) Burke to Bandelier Superintendent Albert Henson, June 19, 1962, File L1417, BAND.

[30.](#) George W. Miller to Wirth, June 29, 1962, File L1417, BAND.

[31.](#) Wirth to Allen, June 2, 1961, File 6, Land Records, BAND.

[32.](#) Allen to Wirth, June 29, 1961, File 6, Land Records, Bandelier National Monument Library, BAND.

[33.](#) Ben Thompson to Wirth, July 19, 1961, File 6, Land Records, BAND.

[34.](#) "Texans Buy 100,000 Acre Jemez Tract," Santa Fe New Mexican, January 29, 1963.

[35.](#) Untitled, Albuquerque Tribune, June 5, 1964.

[36.](#) John Adams to Regional Director, February 11, 1971, File L1419, Lands and Recreation Planning, BAND.

[37.](#) Author's interview with Bandelier Superintendent John D. Hunter, June 29, 1985.

[38.](#) Brewster Lindner to Pat Dunigan, May 3, 1973, File L1425, Baca Acquisition, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.

[39.](#) Author's interview with Bandelier Chief Ranger Kevin McKibbin, June 28, 1985; interview with John D. Hunter, June 29, 1985.

[40.](#) Lindner, memo for the files, January 1, 1979, File L1425, Baca Acquisition, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.

[41.](#) Marc Sagan to Regional Director, Southwest, May 22, 1979, L1425, Baca Acquisition, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.

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[1.](#) Arthur E. Demary to Jesse L. Nusbaum, January 18, 1932, Bandelier National Monument File 12-5, Series 7, RG 79, NA.

[2.](#) Frank Pinkley to Horace M. Albright, October 8, 1932, Bandelier National Monument File 12-5, Series 7, RG 79, NA.

[3.](#) Nusbaum to Albright, November 7, 1932, Bandelier National Monument File 12-5, Series 7, RG 79, NA.

[4.](#) Demaray to Nusbaum, November 18, 1932, Bandelier National Monument File 12-5, Series 7, RG 79, NA.

[5.](#) George Grant, "Report on the Bandelier National Monument," November 20, 1932, Bandelier National Monument File 12-5, Series 7, RG 79, NA.

[6.](#) Demary to Nusbaum, November 18, 1932, Bandelier National Monument File 12-5, Series 7, RG 79, NA.

[7.](#) Pinkley to Hunter Clarkson, May 23, 1933, Bandelier National Monument File 12-5, Series 7, RG 79, NA.

[8.](#) Demaray to F. A. Kittredge, October 18, 1932, Bandelier National Monument File 12-5, Series 7, RG 79, NA.

[9.](#) Laura Soulliere Harrison and Randy Copeland, "Historic Structures Report: CCC Buildings, Bandelier National Monument," (Denver: National Park Service, 1984), pp. 22-55. See also [Southwestern National Monument Monthly Report](#), December 1933, p. 19, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.

[10.](#) Pinkley to Director Arno B. Cammerer, November 6, 1933, Bandelier National Monument File 600, Lands, Roads, Buildings and Trails Federal Records Center, Denver, Colorado.

[11.](#) Kittredge to Pinkley, September 11, 1934, Bandelier National Monument File 600, Lands, Roads, Buildings and Trails Federal Records Center, Denver, Colorado.

[12.](#) Ibid.

[13.](#) Pinkley to Field Headquarters, San Francisco, September 28, 1934, Bandelier National Monument File 600, Lands, Roads, Buildings and Trails Federal Records Center, Denver, Colorado.

[14.](#) Ibid.

[15.](#) Ibid.

[16.](#) See "CCC Work Accomplished Under Supervision of National Park Service [at Bandelier National Monument] from November, 1933, to June, 1939." Bandelier National Monument File 207, Administration: Reports, General, Federal Records Center, Denver, Colorado.

[17.](#) Ibid.

[18.](#) Chester A. Thomas memo to the Superintendent of the Southwestern National Monuments, February 8, 1943, File H14, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.

[19.](#) Thomas memo to the Superintendent of the Southwestern National Monuments, February 18, 1934, H14, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.

[20.](#) M. R. Tillotson memo to the Director, October 20, 1944, H14, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.

[21.](#) Tillotson confidential memo to the Director, October 21, 1944, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.

[22.](#) Fred W. Binnewies to the author, November 24, 1985.

[23.](#) See Conrad L. Wirth, Parks, Politics, and People (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), pp. 150-210, for Wirth's own account of his achievements and philosophy as NPS Director.

[24.](#) 1953 Master Plan, Bandelier National Monument. Bandelier National Monument File D18, 1953 Master Plan, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[25.](#) Paul Judge to Director Wirth, July 18, 1955. Bandelier National Monument File A9815, Bandelier National Monument Library, New Mexico.

[26.](#) Robert Hall to Regional Director Hugh M. Miller, August 10, 1955, Bandelier National Monument File A9815, Bandelier National Monument Library, New Mexico.

[27.](#) Jerome Miller, memo for the files of September 6, 1955; and K. M. Saunders undated memo for the files, circa September, 1955. Bandelier National Monument File A9815, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.

[28.](#) Hugh M. Miller to Director Wirth, September 7, 1955. Bandelier National Monument File A9815, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.

[29.](#) "Mission 66 For Bandelier National Monument," April 19, 1956, Bandelier National Monument File A9815, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.

[30.](#) Unsigned memo of March 3, 1960, from Regional Planning Office to Paul Judge, Bandelier National Monument File D18, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico, and Regional Director to Director, November 20, 1958; Acting Director, NPS to Secretary of the Interior, October 21, 1963, L2419, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument. See also, "Anderson Introduces Bill to Obtain Two-Mile by One-Mile Chochiti Lake," The New Mexican, February 8, 1963, and "Bill Would Create Recreational Lake," LASL News, February 14, 1963.

[31.](#) Steve Schum, University of New Mexico Mountaineering Club to Linwood E. Jackson,

Bandelier Superintendent, December 18, 1971; and Elizabeth A. Jackson to Superintendent Jackson, January 2, 1972, Bandelier National Monument File D18, Proposed Wilderness Hearing, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[32.](#) Norman Bullard to Superintendent Jackson, January 15, 1972, Bandelier National Monument File D18, Proposed Wilderness Hearing, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[33.](#) "Wilderness Recommendation," August, 1972, Bandelier National Monument File D18, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

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[1.](#) Edgar L. Hewett, The Excavations at El Rito de Los Frijoles in 1909, Papers of the School of American Archeology 10 (Santa Fe: School of American Archeology, 1910). Hewett kept notes on his work although it took him almost thirty years to publish them.

[2.](#) "Frijoles and Otowi Chronology," undated, vertical file, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.

[3.](#) Frank Pinkley aggressively pursued the acquisition and development of Bandelier as early as 1923. His efforts culminated in his inspection in 1927, described in detail in chapter 2 of this manuscript. By 1928, he began to work on a "wish-list" of programs for the monument. When the Park Service acquired the site, he simply put it into action. See Bandelier National Monument file 12-5, Series 6, Record Group 79, National Archives.

[4.](#) See the "Southwestern National Monuments Monthly Report," February, 1934, p. 8; and March, 1934, p. 24, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.

[5.](#) "Frijoles and Otowi Chronology," undated, vertical file, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico. Many years after the fact, Hewett discussed the excavations in Frijoles Canyon in great detail in his The Pajarito Plateau and its Ancient People (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1938), pp. 87-94.

[6.](#) See Hal Rothman, "Forged By One Man's Will; Frank Pinkley and the Administration of the Southwestern National Monuments 1923-1932," The Public Historian, 8 (Spring 1986), pp. 83-100.

[7.](#) Robert Rose, "A Plan for a Museum at Bandelier National Monument," January 27, 1935, CCC Files, Job 24, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.

[8.](#) Frank Pinkley, "Ruminations" column, "Southwestern National Monuments Monthly Report," August, 1936, pp. 158-159, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico. See also Ansel F. Hall to Arno B. Cammerer, September 18, 1936; and Hall telegram to Cammerer, October 10, 1936, Casa Grande file 12-5, Series 7, Record Group 79, National Archives.

[9.](#) Gordon R. Willey and Jeremy A. Sabloff, A History of American Archeology (London: Thames and Hudson, 1974), pp. 94-96, 118.

[10.](#) See the "Southwestern National Monuments Monthly Report," April and May, 1936,

Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.

[11.](#) Laura Soulliere Harrison and Randy Copeland, "Historic Structures Report on the Bandelier National Monument," pp. 69-76, draft manuscript in Division of History, Southwest Regional Office, National Park Service in Santa Fe.

[12.](#) Robert P. Powers, "Draft Archeological Research Design For a Sample Inventory of Bandelier National Monument," draft manuscript in Division of Anthropology, Southwest Regional Office, NPS in Santa Fe, pp. 23-25.

[13.](#) Powers, "Draft Research Design," pp. 26-27. See also "Frijoles and Otowi Chronology," vertical file, Bandelier National Monument Library, Bandelier National Monument, New Mexico.

[14.](#) Fred W. Binnewies to the author, November 26, 1984.

[15.](#) Powers, "Draft Research Design," pp. 28-30.

[16.](#) Ronald A. Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers (Washington: Resources for the Future, 1984).

[17.](#) Powers, "Draft Research Design," pp. 28.

[18.](#) "Resources Management Plan, Bandelier National Monument," April, 1976, Southwest Regional Office Library, Santa Fe, New Mexico.

[19.](#) "The First Practical Application of the Subterrene," The Atom 10 (May 1973), pp. 1-4.

[20.](#) Dr. Milford R. Fletcher conversation with the author, August 21, 1986; Senior Archeologist Cal Cummings to Chief Anthropologist, WASO, January 24, 1986. Dr. Fletcher was kind enough to send the author a copy of this letter.

[21.](#) Dr. Fletcher conversation with the author, August 21, 1986.

[22.](#) Ibid.

[23.](#) John D. Lissoway, telephone interview, February 20, 1987.

[24.](#) Lissoway telephone interview. February 20, 1987; see also Harrison and Copeland, "Historic Structures."

[25.](#) Lissoway telephone interview, February 20, 1987.

## Chapter 6

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[1.](#) Dr. Milford R. Fletcher, interview with the author, August 21, 1986.

[2.](#) Ronald Foresta, America's National Parks and Their Keepers, (Washington, Resources for the Future, 1984), pp. 93-99.

[3.](#) Fletcher interview, August 21, 1986.

[4.](#) Information on reactive natural resource responses at Bandelier is widely scattered. I will include a sampling of citations. Information about webworm control can be found in the

"Southwestern National Monuments Monthly Report," May, June, and July, 1935, and June, 1936, in the Bandelier National Monument Library. The Bandelier Library contains reports on forestry under its "Y" heading, as well as much other information about natural resources under a variety of headings. The Denver Federal Records Center contains much information in this vein in its "Y" series reports under the Bandelier heading. Because the Park Service did not think of natural resource management as a unified concept prior to the 1970s, the information is scattered under the most appropriate heading. Flooding can be found in water-related files, windstorms in natural disasters, and others usually in the most likely place.

[5.](#) John Lissoway, interview with the author, August 17, 1986, and telephone conversation with the author, February 17, 1987. See also Michael Wolfe, "The Wild Horse and Burro Issue, 1982," *Environmental Review*, 7 (Summer, 1983), pp. 179-92. Wolfe offers a summary of the impact of the Wild Horse and Burro Act on federal lands.

[6.](#) The Park Service commissioned a number of reports on the burro situation at Bandelier. These include John R. Morgart, "Burro Behavior and Population Dynamics," (M. A. Thesis. Arizona State University, 1978); Roland H. Wauer, "Feral Burro Control Program for Bandelier," and David Koehler, "Preliminary Reconnaissance Report-Feral Burro Ecological Impact Project." Of these authors, only Wauer was an employee of the agency. All the reports and a number of others are available in the Interpretation Library, Southwest Regional Office, Santa Fe, New Mexico.

[7.](#) Fletcher interview, August 21, 1986.

[8.](#) Lissoway telephone conversation, February 17, 1987; and Fletcher interview, August 21, 1986.

[9.](#) Superintendent John D. Hunter conversation with the author, June 29, 1985; Chief Ranger Kevin McKibbin, conversation with the author, June 30, 1985; Resource Manager John Lissoway conversation with the author, January 22, 1986; and Fletcher interview, August 21, 1986.

[10.](#) Ibid.

[11.](#) Lissoway conversation with the author, January 22 and February 18, 1986.

[12.](#) Hunter conversation with the author, June 29, 1985.

[13.](#) Lissoway conversation with the author, January 22 and February 18, 1986.

[14.](#) Fletcher interview, August 21, 1986; and Lissoway telephone conversation, February 20, 1987.

## Chapter 7

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[1.](#) Superintendent John D. Hunter, quoted in J.W. Schomisch, "White Rock wants Bypass out of Town," *The New Mexican*, June 28, 1985.

[2.](#) Ronald Foresta, *America's National Parks and Their Keepers*, (Washington: Resources For the Future, 1984), pp. 225-28, 232-35.

[3.](#) "Girl Scout Camp will turn into Three Homes," *Los Alamos Monitor*, October 19, 1980.

4. Evelyn Vigil, "Camp Evergreen Sold to Local Partnership," Los Alamos Monitor, November 18, 1980; and Russell D. Butcher, NPCA Southwest Regional Representative to Hunter, October 25, 1980, L3215, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

5. Tom Lucke to "Roger," October 20, 1980; and Hunter memo for the files, December 30, 1980, L3215, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument. See also Charmian Schaller, "Evergreen Rezoning Bid Rekindles Conflict," Los Alamos Monitor, January 10, 1981.

6. Westgate Families, letter to the Editor, Los Alamos Monitor, January 25, 1980; and Clifton Swickard, letter to the Editor, Los Alamos Monitor, March 31, 1981.

7. The referendum became a headline issue in Los Alamos. For weeks preceding the referendum, it dominated the local newspaper. See the Los Alamos Monitor for the weeks preceding June 30, 1981.

8. John Lissoway, telephone conversation with the author, February 17, 1987.

9. Reconstructing the roads to the Pajarito Plateau required much historical legwork. The papers of L. Bradford Prince contain letters from Harry Buckman that describe his efforts. They are located at the New Mexico State Archive and Record Center in Santa Fe. A number of diaries that detail travel routes to the Pajarito Plateau exist. The best of these were written by Grace Spradling Ireland and Ida Patton Abbott, the wife of Judge A.J. Abbott. The Bandelier National Monument Library contains copies of both in its vertical file. The Los Alamos Historical Society possesses much information about the Ranch School and its roads under its "Los Alamos Ranch School" headings.

10. See Nusbaum's File, Southwestern Regional Library, for details. See also D. H. Thomas, The Southwestern Indian Detours (Phoenix: Hunter Publishing, 1978) and Robert Athearn, The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1977). The Thomas book is of marginal value to scholars.

11. New Mexico State Highway Department, "Public Involvement Meetings: The Santa Fe-Los Alamos Corridor," copy in L7619, New Road, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

12. Hunter to Regional Director Robert Kerr, October 10, 1984, L7619, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

13. Draft of John Hunter's comments to the public involvement meeting in White Rock on June 27, 1985, L7619, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

14. Forest Supervisor Maynard T. Rost to Thomas Scanlon of H.W. Lochner Inc., June 14, 1985, L7619, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

15. Schomisch, "White Rock Wants Bypass."

16. James Metzger, Mountain Research West Inc. to Hunter, September 22, 1978, L7619, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

17. PNM-DOE, "Draft Preliminary Environmental Analysis," May 16, 1979.

18. Wayne Eckles, RNM to Regional Director John Cook, February 2, 1979, L7619, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

19. John Cook to Hunter, February 21, 1979, L7619, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[20.](#) Ibid.

[21.](#) Wayne Cone to Ray Brechbill, DOE, March 30, 1979, L6719, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[22.](#) Acting Director Ira J. Hutchinson to Cristobal Zamora, November 8, 1979, L7619, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[23.](#) Jon Bowman, "LASL to Drill Deeper for 'Hotter' Well System," Los Alamos Monitor, March 6, 1979, L7619, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument; John Hunter interview with the author, November 10, 1986; and John Lissoway telephone conversation with the author, February 17, 1987.

[24.](#) PNM, "Ojo Line Extension Project Newsletter," August 3, 1985.

[25.](#) "Brief for Sotero Muniz on OLE Project," File L7621, Ojo Line extension, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[26.](#) Thomas Ribe "A Proposed Powerline Jolts New Mexico," High Country News, March 31, 1986, p. 6; Thomas Ribe to the Editor, Los Alamos Monitor, November 8, 1985; and Hunter to Robert Kerr, October 31, 1985, L7621, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[27.](#) PNM, "Ojo Line Extension Project Newsletter," December 4, 1985; Eldon G. Reyer, Associate Director, Planning and Cultural Resources, Southwest Region, to Vincent Little, Area Director, Albuquerque Office, Bureau of Indian Affairs, August 15, 1985; James Overbay, Acting Regional Forester, to Little, August 16, 1985; and Reyer to Little, January 17, 1986, L7619, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[28.](#) Bureau of Indian Affairs, "Final Environmental Impact Statement: Proposed Ojo Line Extension," (Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1986); John D. Hunter interview with the author, November 10, 1986; and Craig Allen, telephone conversation with the author, February 6, 1987.

[29.](#) John D. Hunter to Harold Valencia, May 10, 1985; Hunter to Eloy Nunez, Chief, Project and Facility Management Branch, DOE, June 3, 1985, Hunter to Regional Director Robert Kerr, June 17, 1985; Valencia to Hunter, June 21, 1985; Hunter to Reyer, July 23, 1985, L7621, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[30.](#) Hunter to Kerr, June 17, 1985, S34, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[31.](#) Valencia to Kerr, September 5, 1985, L7619, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[32.](#) Kerr to Valencia, October 22, 1985; and John Lissoway memo, September 18, 1985, L7619, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[33.](#) Tom Ribe, "Weapons Research Harasses Monument," High Country News, November 11, 1985, p. 6; Tom Ribe "Bandelier Officials Worry About Noise from Lab Projects;" The New Mexican, November 10, 1985, p. B-6; editorial, "Bandelier No Place to Test Explosives," The New Mexican, November 14, 1985; and Hunter to Kerr, November 14, 1985, L7619, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[34.](#) Valencia to Kerr, February 14, 1986; Russell D. Butcher to Hunter, March 3, 1986; Butcher to W.L. Thompson, LANL, March 3, 1986; and Janet E. Schmitt to Hunter, February 20, 1986, L7619, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[35.](#) USDA Forest Service, "RARE II: A Quest for Balance in Public Lands" (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978); "RARE II: Questions and Answers," L7619, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument. See also M. Rupert Cutler, "National Forests in the Balance," American Forests May 1978, and Western Wildlands: A Natural Resource Journal, 5 (Summer 1978), the entire issue of which was devoted to the RARE II question.

[36.](#) "New Mexico Wilderness Newsletter," July 1978, presented the objections to RARE II proposals in New Mexico. See also Denise Tessier, "Time for Decision Nears on State Wilderness Areas," Albuquerque Journal, August 13, 1978; and The Wilderness Report, September 1978, pp. 1-2; October 1978 p. 2; November 1978, and December 1978.

[37.](#) John Lissoway, telephone conversation with the author, February 20, 1987.

[38.](#) USDA Forest Service, "RARE II: Santa Fe National Forest," no publication information available.

[39.](#) John Hunter to Regional Director, July 31, 1978; and David S. Wright, Assistant Director to Regional Directors, July 10, 1978, copy in L7619, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[40.](#) David Crosson, "RARE II Results Final; 'An Acute Disappointment,'" High Country News, January 12, 1979.

[41.](#) John Hunter interview with the author, November 10, 1986; Hunter to Cristobal B. Zamora, Forest Supervisor, November 21, 1977, L3027, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[42.](#) Hunter to Regional Director, December 14, 1977, L3029, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[43.](#) Hunter to James L. Perry, Forest Supervisor, April 13, 1979, L3029, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[44.](#) Overbay to Kerr, undated, L3029, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[45.](#) Superintendent Albert Henson to Regional Director Daniel B. Beard, April 1, 1964; George Miller, Acting Regional Director, to Henson, April 21, 1964; Henson to Forest Supervisor Owen Lattimore, April 22, 1964; Beard to Lattimore, July 22, 1964; Beard to Director, July 23, 1964; and Forest Supervisor John M. Hall to Joe Cayou, February 1, 1971, L3027, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[46.](#) Kerr to Overbay, April 2, 1981; Perry to District Ranger Fred Swetnam, April 29, 1981; Fred Swetnam, "Decision Notice and Finding of No Significant Impact: Water Timber Sale," July 6, 1981, L3027, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[47.](#) Dorothy Hoard to Laura Loomis, Boundary Projects Coordinator, NPCA, September 9, 1985; and Dorothy Hoard to Forest Supervisor Maynard T. Rost, February 15, 1986, L7619, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument.

[48.](#) John Hunter interview with the author, June 28, 1985. See also William deBuys, "Cochiti: The Dam That Got Away," Audubon Magazine, June 1977, pp. 121-23

[49.](#) Regional Director to Director, November 20, 1958, L30, Park Files, Bandelier National Monument; for the stories of Echo Park and Glen Canyon, see Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 202-19, 228-37.

[50.](#) Sandi Doughton-Evans, "Bandelier Canyons will be Flooded" Los Alamos Monitor, May 10, 1985; Nolan Hester, "Reservoir's Storage Rate to Double," Albuquerque Journal, May 14, 1985;

[51.](#) Iver Peterson, "Big Spring Runoff, New Water Battle," New York Times, June 13, 1985.

[52.](#) J.W. Schomisch, "River Threatening Indian Ruins," The New Mexican, May 17, 1985; and Sandi Doughton-Evans, "Bandelier Flooding to Affect Eagles," Los Alamos Monitor, May 22, 1985.

[53.](#) John Hunter and Kevin McKibbin, quoted in The New Mexican, June 17, 1985.

[54.](#) Sandi Doughton-Evans, "Protesters Speak Out On Flooding," Los Alamos Monitor, June 20, 1985; Mike Leary, "Fight Over Water Threatens a Park," The Philadelphia Inquirer, June 17, 1985; and "Water Threatens Bandelier Treasures," The Denver Post, June 23, 1985.

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# Bandelier

## Administrative History



## CHAPTER 1: THE OPEN PLATEAU (continued)

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In the summer of 1902, Lacey visited the Southwest and discovered the depth of resistance to the proposal. Hewett served as his guide in northern New Mexico, and the men found that many New Mexicans opposed the project. Even the more "enlightened" factions of the Santa Fe community expressed reservations about the new park. An editorial in the New Mexican during Lacey's stay again supported the principle of the park, but cautioned: "Not an acre more than necessary . . . should be included in the area reserved. New Mexico is being plastered up with forest and other reservations which are at least three times the area necessary to serve the purpose for which they are created." [8]

Westerners were responding to the aggressive conservation policies of Theodore Roosevelt. They long resented the power of the federal government over what they felt was their land, and Roosevelt's ascendance frightened western constituencies. The idea of withdrawing land from the public domain inevitably met strong resistance in the West. Many in the region believed that bureaucrats in Washington, D. C. too often made the decisions that determined their economic future. [9] The national park idea was only taking shape, and except to the far-sighted, the establishment of the National Park Service offered little obvious benefit. To some, Lacey's Pajarito Plateau proposition seemed just another example of government officials whimsically taking away someone else's ability to make a living.

The astute Lacey recognized the importance of mustering support in the West. He already encountered western opposition to previous restrictions on public land that he proposed, and he knew that he would have to accommodate them if any of his future measures were to pass Congress. These factors, and Hewett's persistent coaxing, convinced Lacey to compromise. In 1903, he revised the bill, reduced the acreage drastically, and reentered it as H. R. 7269. [10] A pragmatic accommodation, the new bill stood a better chance of passage than its predecessors. In order to appease local stockmen, the size of the proposed park was reduced from the original 153,620 acres to 55 sections, about 35,000 acres. Although the compromise satisfied local interests, park advocates were not pleased.

Anthropologists and Archeologists also recognized the significance of preventing vandalism in southwestern ruins. Headed by the Reverend Henry Mason Baum, the founder of the Records of the Past Society and the editor of its journal, they began to make inroads to establish a favorable intellectual climate in which to pass legislation to preserve archeological ruins. Americans began to recognize the cultural value of the North American continent, and the fervent nationalism of the turn of the century helped their cause. The perspective of the scientists, however, was often different from that of government officials looking to protect ruins or local merchants trying to attract tourists.

Baum found Lacey's revision unacceptable. In 1902, he headed an expedition of the Records of the Past Society to the Southwest that visited a number of archeological sites, including the Pajarito region. Despite his lack of formal training, Baum saw himself as the preeminent Americanist on the continent. While quite impressed with the Chaco Canyon region, upon his

return he belittled the national park qualifications of the Pajarito bill in the society's journal, Records of the Past. [11] The membership of the society included many influential archeologists, and Baum's contentions were the damning blow that soon came back to haunt the park effort.

New opposition also arose to Lacey's bill. The GLO transmitted the measure to other Government agencies that administered land in the region. In January 1903, Clinton J. Crandall, the Superintendent of the Santa Fe Indian School who doubled as the agent for area pueblos, tried to have the boundaries of Santa Clara Reservation extended. His superiors informed him that the lands he wanted were already reserved within the temporary withdrawal of 1900. Crandall expressed his dismay to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. He felt that the park proposal was inappropriate. "It is a locality not visited frequently by tourists or others," he wrote. "If instead of creating a national park, this land could be set aside for the benefit of the Santa Clara Indians . . . it would serve every purpose." [12] The ruins were safer in Indian hands than as a national park, he contended, and cited Baum's article as evidence that the park idea was flawed. The Santa Clara claim antedated the park proposal, and Crandall believed that it should take precedence. Since both agencies were divisions of the Department of the Interior, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs requested an inspection of the area. GLO Special Agent Stephen J. Holsinger was appointed to the task.

Holsinger had long been the man in the field for archeological inspections by the Department of the Interior. Prior to the Pajarito proposal, Holsinger reviewed a wide range of cases. In 1900, he visited Chaco Canyon to report on Richard Wetherill's unauthorized excavations. He broke up a ring of "pot-hunters" in Arizona in late 1902 and inspected the Montezuma Castle and other archeological sites. He arranged to place a watchman at the proposed Petrified Forest National Park. When GLO officials wanted an important inspection in the Southwest, they nearly always called on Holsinger.

By 1903, a national park in the Pajarito region had become the focus of conflicting interests. Advocates of archeological preservation lined up in favor of the park. Local stockmen expressed the traditional western fear of centralized authority. The rights of Native Americans in the area also became a significant obstacle. Stockmen, area homesteaders, the Santa Fe community, and area Pueblos would all have to be satisfied with a proposal before a national park on the Pajarito Plateau had become reality.

Compromise was already an integral part of any solution. Park advocates sensed that they would have to make concessions to get what they wanted. At the turn of the century, the best national parks were large areas. Most allowed grazing under a system of permits. Stockmen were powerful in territorial New Mexico, and park advocates were willing to allow grazing in the proposed park in order to secure the support of this important constituency. Even Hewett understood this reality. Perhaps the most influential figure in American archeology in the first decade of the twentieth century, he envisioned a national park for archeological study. Grazing did not interfere with his objectives, and he placed his growing national influence behind the park effort.

Stephen J. Holsinger's job was to determine the validity of the various claims and come up with an equitable solution. His report evaluated the contentions of each group and strongly sided with park advocates. Holsinger characterized the Santa Claras as a "distinctly agricultural people," intimating that Crandall's assertion of the need of the Santa Clara Pueblo for more land was "not well-founded." Its agricultural economy made the addition of pasture land unnecessary. Holsinger noted that vandalism remained endemic, and there was strong support for the park in Santa Fe. Holsinger also discounted the notion that the area was too remote for a park, arguing that the difficulty would not deter the truly interested. He incorrectly claimed that existing national park regulations in 1904 provided for roads to be

"speedily built." [13] In his mind, a national park on the Pajarito Plateau was an important step forward.

Since Hewett supported Lacey's revision of the bill and Holsinger reported that the other objections were specious, there appeared to be no further obstacles to the establishment of the national park. Lacey's committee took Holsinger's report and revised it to allow the Secretary of the Interior to permit grazing within the boundaries of the park. They also decreased the size to a forty-section tract that included Otowi, Tsankawi, and Puye, but which left out the Rito de Los Frijoles ruins. The area that included Frijoles Canyon was proposed as a forest reserve, and privately owned land separated its ruins from the rest of the park. Given the limits of the compromise, there was no way to include the Rito as a contiguous section. The Department of the Interior was willing to take a park in the northern half of the plateau. The Bureau of Forestry approved the new plan, as did the Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs, A. C. Tonner, and GLO Commissioner W. A. Richards. All possible opposition was legislated out of the bill, and passage again appeared imminent.

Despite general concurrence among Federal agencies, many New Mexicans were still uncomfortable with the ramifications of a national park. From their perspective, the Government managed too much of New Mexico and residents of the state had little part in shaping their own destiny. They opposed any measure that gave Washington additional control over lands in the territory. When the newest edition of the park bill debated in a House of Representatives Public Lands Committee hearing on January 11, 1905, it was paired with a bill to establish the Mesa Verda [Verde] National Park. Both bills were closely tied to the movement to preserve American antiquities, which the Lodge-Rodenberg Bill personified in 1904-05.

The Lodge-Rodenberg bill, of which Henry Mason Baum was the major proponent, caused serious controversy at the end of the prior congressional session in 1904. The bill raised objections among westerners for it granted the Secretary of the Interior unlimited discretion over unreserved public lands. The Smithsonian Institution publicly opposed the bill and sent its representatives to the floor of Congress to lobby against it. The crisis fractured the preservation constituency. With Lodge-Rodenberg again current, opposition to national park bills became prominent.

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## Administrative History



## CHAPTER 1: THE OPEN PLATEAU (continued)

Following the demise of the first national monument proposal in 1910, the concept of a national park on the Pajarito Plateau remained dormant until 1914. Hewett's excavations continued at Puye and Frijoles, often as a part of the same type of archeological training project to which Douglass objected so vociferously in 1908. The Government agencies that renewed his multiple excavation permits every year did not challenge his archeological empire on the Pajarito Plateau. The status quo suited him. But the Federal Government revived its interest in the project, and in 1913, Department of the Interior Inspector Herbert W. Gleason made a cursory inspection of the region. Gleason advocated the idea of a park and wrote to New Mexico Senator Thomas Catron to urge that the senator work for the establishment of a national park. Catron responded that he planned to put a bill forward in the coming session of Congress. [25]

Attempts to establish a national park on the Pajarito Plateau again began in earnest. On February 14, 1914, Catron entered S. 4537, to establish the National Park of the Cliff Cities, which he soon replaced with S. 5176. On March 18, 1914, New Mexico Representative Harvey B. Fergusson authored and entered a companion measure, H. R. 14739. The new bills were ambitious proposals, consolidating ruins from the Santa Clara reservation, the Jemez National Forest, and the public domain into a 252,620-acre national park. This was nearly 100,000 acres larger than the original proposal and the temporary withdrawal of 1900. Instigated with the assistance of the Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce, the new bills seemed likely to revive every conceivable objection the earlier bills created.

After his inspection of Puye in 1911, Douglass remained in Santa Fe and became the premier advocate of the Pajarito Plateau national park. He continued to make inspections for the Department of the Interior, but also began a number of projects of his own. The park headed his list. He joined the Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce and awakened interest in the park there. If a park could be established while Americans were travelling to California for the Panama-Pacific Exposition in 1915, Douglass believed it provided an opportunity to help the local economy grow. With Douglass in the lead, support for the project galvanized.

When Catron proposed the new bill, Douglass effectively countered much of the prior opposition. The bill included Puye, but did not restrict the rights of Indians living within the proposed park boundaries. The Commissioner of the Office of Indian Affairs, Cato Sells, did not object. [26] Douglass accommodated local grazing interests by including a clause in the bills that allowed the Department of the Interior to lease much of proposed park for grazing. He also tried to pacify USFS resistance with a provision that made the Forest Service responsible for the administration of grazing leases within the new park. The community of Santa Fe publicly favored the bill, and chances of passage seemed good.

Opposition arose in a new quarter. Clay Tallman, the Commissioner of the GLO, challenged the validity of the new proposal. He informed Undersecretary of the Interior A. A. Jones that he believed the proposed lands were too scattered for inclusion in a national park. The Santa

Fe Chamber of Commerce only wanted a national park because Congress appropriated money for parks, Tallman insinuated, while it had not for monuments. "Doubtless if [the area] were incorporated into a forest reserve it would receive substantially the same protection and be of substantially the same use," Tallman continued. "There appears to be no good objection to permitting it to remain a National Forest." [27]

The Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce defended its position, responding quickly and vehemently to Tallman's assertions. In a scathing letter, G. H. Van Stone, the secretary of the organization, asserted that the lands it requested were contiguous and claimed that Tallman could not have looked at a map before he made his remarks. Van Stone also objected to the protection offered the area by Indian police and the Forest Service. "Under the present rules, any college that wishes a collection of pottery can get a permit to excavate. . . . [The] scientific value [of archeological parks and monuments] has been wholly or partly obliterated by the removal of unrecorded antiquities." Emotional and hyperbolic, Van Stone objected to uncontrolled excavation by men like Hewett. He asserted that the establishment of a national park would afford the "virgin" ruins of the Pajarito Plateau better protection than Indian police or the Forest Service could offer. [28]

Despite Van Stone's veiled attack on his professional integrity, Hewett put his public support behind the proposals. [29] An all-encompassing archeological national park would further the ends of the School of American Archeology and certainly lend its director greater prestige. It also meant protection for the ruins, and since by 1914, Hewett had ceased to excavate the region himself, it offered a suitable finale to his efforts on the Pajarito Plateau.

With Hewett's support, the project seemed even more likely to succeed. The Chamber of Commerce continued to barrage the Department of the Interior with testimonials to the advantages of the park. Letters from park advocates regularly covered A. A. Jones' desk, each announcing broad public support for the bill. On April 21, 1914, the Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution requesting the rapid establishment of the park, and its tenacity overwhelmed local opposition. [30]

But passage of the bill required more than the support of the local business community. The Forest Service strongly opposed the measure, as did Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston. From his point of view, the bill lacked provisions to make a "real park," along the lines of Yosemite. Houston wrote that he did not object to a national park if the bill included clauses encouraging development, but he would not approve a national park that was essentially a national forest under the administration of the Department of the Interior. [31] The Forest Service had a clearly defined sphere, and Houston did not want the Department of the Interior to encroach upon it.

When he learned of the opposition, Douglass tried to satisfy the USFS. He met with Don P. Johnston, the Forest Service Supervisor in the Jemez District, to work out the problems. Senator Catron was also in Santa Fe, and he, Johnston, and Douglass met with the park committee of the Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce. The group worked out an acceptable agreement. On May 14, 1914, Fergusson reintroduced the changed bill as H. R. 16546.

Douglass gushed over the popularity of the measure in letters to Fergusson and Catron. "Nearly everybody is 'for it,' [and, if the bill passed,] an appreciative public will reward you in the future," Douglass wrote Fergusson. [32] From the perspective of the Chamber of Commerce, passage of the bill during the 1914 session was imperative. Its members were willing to meet any conditions the New Mexico congressional delegation thought would help.

Despite Johnston's cooperation, Secretary Houston was not convinced of the need for such restrictive protection of the Pajarito Plateau. In early 1914, he expressed his sympathy for the

idea to New Mexico Governor William McDonald, but also asserted that he did not yet see the need for specific park legislation. Douglass immediately worked to alter the bill to fit Houston's objections, but before he could counter the objections completely, the Department of the Interior sent him to western New Mexico to make an inspection. By the time he returned, the Forest Service had solidified its position. [33]

There were still problems within the Department of the Interior. When he made his report on S. 5176 for the Senate Public Lands Committee that July, GLO Commissioner Clay Tallman gave the project a luke-warm endorsement. He suggested that 94,275 acres on the west and south should be excluded from the 252,620-acre proposal. Because the bill included the entire Santa Clara reservation, Tallman also recommended a report from the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Despite his slight objections, Tallman thought that the park was a good idea because it would "give uniform jurisdiction" to the ruins on reservation land and protection to those on the unreserved public domain. [34]

Although the Chamber of Commerce worked long and hard to please every constituency, S. 5176 was far from assured of passage. From the perspective of the Department of the Interior, the bill became too much of a compromise. It contained provisions that allowed the commercial use of resources in the park if later exploration revealed that economic potential existed. The Department of the Interior had begun to rid the national parks of commercial exploitation, and this vague clause presented evident future problems. Another unusual procedure allowed the Forest Service to retain its right to grant grazing permits and at the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior, the Forest Service could manage areas of the park as if it was a national forest. Houston previously objected to this clause, arguing that if the area was to be a national park, it ought to be reserved as such. The Department of the Interior agreed. From its perspective, the proposal suffered from unacceptable ambiguity.

Douglass' effort to appease the Department of Agriculture backfired. Not only did Houston object, the Department of the Interior could not live with the compromise either. In October 1914, Assistant Secretary of the Interior Bo Sweeney recommended that the Senate committee turn the bill back. He agreed that passage of the proposal would create a park with divided jurisdiction and asserted that the Department of the Interior wanted to wait until a bureau of national parks was established to pursue the project any farther. Then "competent persons connected therewith" could determine the feasibility of the project. Sweeney sent a copy of the letter containing the unfavorable recommendation along with his request that the House Committee also table the bill to Rep. Scott Ferris, the chairman of the House Public Lands Committee. [35]

Without the support of the Department of the Interior, the attempt to establish a Pajarito Plateau national park was finished. The bills on the floor of Congress did not meet the existing standards of the department. Threatened by the aggressiveness of Douglass and Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce and aware of the inferior national parks created during the first decade of the twentieth century, departmental officials backed off. Few representatives would vote to establish a national park of which the administering department did not approve, and efforts in Congress stalled.

The end of the park effort resulted in increased interest on the part of the Department of Agriculture. Secretary Houston continued to oppose the entire park idea, and realized that the failure of the existing proposal gave him an opportunity to terminate park proposals once and for all. He ordered an inspection of the region with an eye towards the creation of a national monument. Because Frijoles Canyon was included in the Jemez National Forest, a national monument established there became the responsibility of USFS.

Houston's idea resulted in the establishment of Bandelier National Monument. In early 1915,

Will C. Barnes, the chief of grazing for the agency, and Arthur Ringland, the District Forester in Albuquerque, made an inspection tour of the area. They saw an "extraordinary exhibition of ruins and cliff-dwellings" and discussed the merits of national park status for the region. Ringland thought that a park was not warranted and the men agreed that a comparatively small monument, encompassing the important ruins in Frijoles Canyon, was. Barnes suggested naming the area for Adolph F. A. Bandelier, a recently deceased anthropologist who explored the region during the 1880s and 1890s. [36] Secretary Houston thought that a monument would offer the ruins adequate protection, and would also protect Forest Service land from what that agency perceived as a 200,000+ acre land-grab. Houston expedited the proposal. On February, 11, 1916, President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed the 22,400 acre Bandelier National Monument.

The USFS created the Bandelier National Monument as a way to circumvent the attempts to establish a national park on the Pajarito Plateau. The opposition of the Department of the Interior to Douglass' bill in 1914 offered the USFS an opening, and the earlier proposals to establish a national monument at Puye paved the way for the preservation of specific features in the region. Quick action on the part of Secretary of Agriculture Houston allowed the establishment of a national monument while pro-national park forces tried to regroup.

The creation of the monument was a victory for the utilitarian conservationism embodied in Forest Service policy. It removed what USFS officials and many local residents regarded as the prime threat to the commercial development of the region. The 22,400-acre tract established by statute did not lock up large areas of the Pajarito Plateau. The vast majority of the region was still open to homesteaders, stockmen, and other developers.

The proclamation, however, did not end disputes over land on the Pajarito Plateau. Edgar L. Hewett and William B. Douglass would once again find themselves on opposing sides of the park question. The new National Park Service would also try to establish a national park in the region, and the Forest Service would oppose its efforts as well. Disputes over the comparative value of the Pajarito Plateau were only beginning to become complicated.

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## CHAPTER 2: THE COMING OF THE PARK SERVICE (continued)

The citizens of New Mexico, however, continued to support the idea of a park. The New Mexico Federation of Women's Clubs offered its support in 1917, and the membership of the New Mexico National Park Association grew. The Department of the Interior took Douglass' advice and adversely reported upon S. 2542. The bill died at the end of the 64th session of Congress. But Douglass continued to make important inroads in support of the concept of a park.

The 65th session saw the introduction of three new bills proposing a Pajarito region national park. Both political parties wanted credit for the establishment of the park. Republican Catron introduced S. 8326 on March 1, while on April 16, 1917, Congressman William Walton followed with House Bill 3216. On May 11, Senator A. A. Jones, a Democrat and the former Assistant Secretary of the Interior, introduced his own measure, S. 2291.

Propositions for a national park in north central New Mexico inundated the fledgling National Park Service. Even the New Mexico State Legislature overwhelmingly supported the national park idea. With the support of both houses, Governor W. E. Lindsey drafted a memorial to the United States Congress that urged its creation. In early 1918, the typically enthusiastic Douglass took the memorial to Washington to agitate in favor of the project.

Douglass was an effective lobbyist, but there were many obstacles to success. On February 26, 1918, he met with Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane and gave him the memorial. He also sent the memorial and the copies of Jones' proposal to the United States Forester and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. On March 8, 1918, Douglass met with Mather's assistant, Horace M. Albright, and found him anxious to proceed. The project, however, became tangled in the Department of the Interior. Puye was a part of the proposal, and Charles Burke, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, requested that the Park Service hold up its report to Congress. He wanted his superintendent in Santa Fe to evaluate the impact of the proposal on the Santa Clara Indians. Albright and Mather reluctantly agreed. The superintendent of the Santa Fe Indian School, Frederick Snyder opposed the project. Burke informally communicated this to Albright, who asked Burke to hold Snyder's report until he could investigate further. Until early 1919, the Bureau of Indian Affairs abided by Albright's request. But when Joseph Cotter of the NPS, apparently unaware of Albright's maneuvering, called Burke, the commissioner explained the delay and told Cotter that the Bureau of Indian Affairs had to oppose the inclusion of the pueblo in the park. [6]

When informed of the developments, Mather telegraphed Albright to tell him of the opposition of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. "Proposition now up to us," Mather telegraphed, "don't feel we should delay matter further by promising investigation." [7] Albright responded in a telegram the following day: "regardless of Indian Office believe we should favor Cliff Cities project to extent of delaying final report to Congress pending investigation Cliff Cities region as wonderful as Mesa Verde in many ways[.]" [8] The Park Service supported the bill, but because of Snyder's opposition, the Department of the Interior did not take the bill to

Congress.

New bills bloomed during the spring of 1919, kindling the enthusiasm of the Park Service. Senator Jones offered S. 666, "Creating the National Park of the Cliff Cities" once again on May 23, 1919, and on July 1, he revived a bill approximating the offering of 1916 to which Hewett had objected so vehemently. With the new interest, the Park Service began to maneuver. Mather commissioned a new inspection of the region and selected Herbert W. Gleason, a Department of the Interior inspector who was also an old friend of his, to visit the Pajarito Plateau as part of a tour of other proposed park areas in the Southwest during the summer of 1919.

Gleason reached the region in early June and made his tour. He visited the Bandelier National Monument, its detached sections, Otowi and Tsankawi, as well as Navawi, Tschirege, and other ruins. He also met with Douglass at his camp in Ojo Caliente, with Mary Austin, a noted author, in Espanola, and with Santiago Naranjo, the Governor of the Santa Clara Pueblo.

The region impressed Gleason, and protection of the Pajarito Plateau became an imperative in his mind. He labelled himself a "violent advocate" of the park proposal. Gleason found himself "righteously indignant in Otowi Canyon . . . to find that 'a woman from Philadelphia' had been at work there, upheaving the mounds, making no effort to preserve the walls [of the ruin]." Hewett had sponsored Mrs. L. L. W. Wilson, a teacher from Philadelphia, and between 1915 and 1917, she and a crew excavated Otowi under a School of American Archeology permit. She took the artifacts she collected to the Commercial Museum of Philadelphia. Gleason was appalled at what her crew left behind. They had been "heaping up rubbish in the effort to secure pottery relics," he indignantly informed Mather. [9] Douglass convinced Gleason that the establishment of the park would stop this kind of work. [10]

Gleason cited stockmen as the major source of opposition to the project. In his view, the livestock industry was a more significant obstacle than the Forest Service, a mistake that revealed his superficial understanding of the situation. When he found that the public overwhelmingly supported the idea of a park, Hewett worked to ensure that the Forest Service opposed all proposals. Douglass convinced Gleason that Hewett's "opposition [concealed] is based on the fact he will be shorn of his present authority and prestige if the park is created." Gleason, moreover, failed to see Hewett's behind-the-scenes maneuvering.

Hewett had good reason to be afraid of the latest round of park proposals. While visiting the Santa Clara Pueblo, Gleason made an agreement with Santiago Naranjo that would have curtailed Hewett's privileges. Naranjo complained that "alleged archeologists" indiscriminately dug on the Santa Clara reservation and wanted "to be able to say to these would-be diggers just where they may dig and [where] they shall not dig." Based on Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane's prior support of Indian rights, Gleason promised the governor that he and his successors would have the authority to prevent the excavation of ancient tribal burials and other sacred places. Despite close relations between Hewett and the Santa Claras, had the Park Service assumed responsible for the Puye ruins, Hewett's excavations could have been curbed at Naranjo's request.

The other apparent obstacle to creation of the park was the grazing issue. As always, Douglass contended that a stance of "no grazing" by the department meant no park. He made a "strong plea" for retaining the grazing clause in the proposed bill. Mary Austin told Gleason that she believed in "intelligent grazing," and Gleason remarked that he did not think grazing would be a problem as he "saw no cattle during all [his] journeys through the territory . . . [as] all the cattle grazing is done in the winter." Sheep grazing was even less of an obstacle. The only sheep in the region grazed the Ramon Vigil Grant. Will C. Barnes of the Forest

Service further diminished the potential for grazing when he indicated that rangeland within the national forest could not support sheep. Gleason told Douglass to muster the park supporters and "frame a bill which would incorporate their ideas and then thrash out with Mr. Albright the question of grazing" on the Pajarito Plateau. [11] The following day, Douglass wrote Albright, imploring him to allow grazing permits within the new park. Douglass repeated his long-standing contention that the New Mexico Stockmen's Association controlled the political hierarchy in the state and without its support, the project was doomed. Albright believed Gleason's contention that grazing was not a threat to park values in the region. He told Douglass that the latest revision of the bill allowed livestock grazing. [12]

Albright's concurrence elated Douglass. He believed that only one source of opposition remained: Edgar L. Hewett. Hewett continued to resist the "Cliff Cities" name, preferring instead his own "Pajarito National Park." Douglass asserted that Hewett joined forces with the "Forest Service in its effort to defeat this legislation," and the Park Service had to find a way around such an important adversary. [13]

Again protecting his interests, Hewett was instrumental in creating the conflict between the Forest Service and the NPS that dominated the Pajarito Plateau throughout the 1920s. Almost from the day of the establishment of the National Park Service, the two agencies engaged in a spirited rivalry. The missions and constituencies of both were similar and the agencies often coveted the same parcels of land for their programs. Conflict was inevitable in situations like the one that existed on the Pajarito Plateau.

The Forest Service had also accommodated Hewett's requests for permission to excavate its lands. He had been the primary archeological client of the USFS since before the establishment of the Bandelier National Monument. Forest Service officials such as Will Barnes were his personal friends, and the district foresters and the supervisor of the Santa Fe National Forest, Don Johnston, had great respect for Hewett. He served as their unofficial advisor on archeological issues. By the early 1920s, his word on land matters carried great weight among foresters in the Southwest.

As a peripheral character in the drama, Gleason was not always aware of the conflicts that existed before his arrival in New Mexico. His assessments were too often based on surface analysis and the opinion of the last participant with whom he spoke. After speaking with Naranjo, he assumed that the Santa Clara Indians had no objection to the inclusion of their reservation in the national park. In fact, this issue would split the Pueblo badly. His focus upon the stockmen as the primary source of opposition was also off the mark. He did, however, correctly assess the issue in question. Commercial use of natural resources became the center of the dispute, but the adversaries of the Park Service were not the local stockmen. Instead, the NPS and the Forest Service battled over incommensurable land values. The Park Service contrasted its emphasis on archeological preservation and inspirational scenery with the timber and grazing policies of the USFS.

Gleason's indiscretion contributed to the decline in relations between the two agencies. While in New Mexico, he gave interviews about the proposal that "very much disturbed" United States Forester Henry Graves. "It is best to be careful and not commit yourself on propositions like this," were Mather's words of caution to his old friend. [14] But the damage was done. When Gleason, Douglass, and Mather met in Washington in October 1919, Forest Service officials in Washington were strenuously objecting to the project. They argued that the value of the commercial resources of the region outweighed the scientific value of preserving the ruins.

The Park Service tried a novel approach, compromising on the content of the park in order to avoid conflict with the USFS. Mather asked Douglass if he could create a park without taking

in any national forest land. Douglass thought that it was possible but such a park would contain few important features. The group agreed that it would be best to get a national park no matter what the limitations and worry about extending it at a later date. Anxious for some kind of successful action, Douglass agreed to this new proposition and drew up a map and bill to present to Congress.

Such a rapid ad-hoc move created a completely new set of problems. The new proposal failed to address the preservation value of the plateau. Instead, the division of land among Federal agencies determined the boundaries of the park proposition. Someone had a claim on nearly everything on the plateau. Between national forest land, private grants, and Indian reservations, there was little left from which to create a national park. As a result, Douglass' new proposal was "confined almost wholly to the Santa Clara Indian reservation." [15] It was small, insignificant, and inferior to every other national park established during Mather's tenure.

The new proposal was unworthy of the national park designation. It had few supporters. Even Gleason thought it was specious. Mather had worked to exclude such atrocities from the system. Yet this latest proposal, drawn up at his request, did not even include the existing Bandelier National Monument, Otowi, Tsankawi, Navawi, or Tschirege. It contained few ruins, less scenery, and was minuscule in comparison to the other western national parks.

Instead, Gleason suggested a tactic that the NPS would come to favor: ask for a great deal more than could possibly be acquired and settle for more than was initially thought possible. From his perspective, Puye was the primary archeological attraction in the region, and the Park Service needed to begin there. It was more accessible than the road less Frijoles Canyon and received almost three times the annual visitation. As a result, Gleason believed that any national park established in the region must include the Puye ruins. A park with Puye as a central feature could become a foundation for the gradual acquisition of a significant park. Already reserved as a national monument, El Rito de Los Frijoles could become a later addition.

Even with Gleason's far-sighted suggestion, such a truncated proposition was of little interest to the Park Service. The Grand Canyon, Lafayette [Acadia], and Zion National Parks were the latest additions to the system, and Douglass' proposal was clearly inferior to the standards Mather and Albright insisted upon. Encompassing only 60,800 acres, instead of the 195,000 that Gleason suggested, the bill "practically eliminated all the features and ruins for which the national park was originally proposed to preserve." [16] It was barely worth the effort to research the status of the lands involved.

The latest proposal was an example of taking the pragmatic approach of the Park Service too far. Peripherally acquainted with the issue, Mather made his suggestion in order to expedite the process. Exasperated after years of failure, Douglass was willing to try almost anything. Only Gleason was able to keep perspective under the circumstances. Although he also would have acquiesced, he pointed out the larger picture. The Park Service upheld its commitment to quality park areas, and Mather's "park game" remained complicated.

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## CHAPTER 2: THE COMING OF THE PARK SERVICE (continued)

The pendulum slowly swung in favor of the Park Service. New Mexicans made the park a priority. Morrow was a long-time supporter of the various Pajarito Plateau proposals and state Government officials were also showing renewed interest. The Office of the Governor of New Mexico asked Edgar L. Hewett to provide a comprehensive report on the situation. With Hewett's continued support, the project stood an excellent chance of success. On December 8, 1925, he presented a preliminary report to Temple's committee that indicated that he still supported Nusbaum's conception of a park that "made the Forestry people gasp." His report to the Governor reaffirmed this stance, strongly emphasizing the need for more than archeological ruins to make a national park of the first order. [31] Hewett echoed the mainstream perspective of the agency, and his support made it likely to prevail.

Under the auspices of the Coordinating Committee, conciliation became the order of the day. But even with representatives of both agencies trying to work out an acceptable solution, there was little progress in 1926. Neither agency offered reasonable concessions. Early that year, Arthur Ringland, who served as the secretary for Temple's committee, became impatient with the lack of progress. He informed Hewett that the National Park Service was going to send a "Park Officer . . . to determine the feasibility of a National Park in the [Bandelier] region." [32]

There was only one man with the degree of knowledge and the level of responsibility this job demanded. Frank Pinkley's Park Service credentials were impeccable. No one questioned his devotion and loyalty. He had been an integral part of the Service's most difficult decade. On April 4, 1927, he wired his acceptance to Cammerer. After receiving the files concerning the monument and the range of park proposals, he embarked on an inspection tour that included most of the leading southwestern national monuments and the Pajarito Plateau.

Although Pinkley's autonomy and outspokenness occasionally made the hierarchy of the agency uneasy, the central administration of the Park Service had great confidence in him. They expected that as a good Park Service man, Pinkley would echo the departmental line on the proposed park; that he would report that a large park, containing more than archeological ruins, was essential. According to the standards Mather and Albright established, a national park on the Pajarito must be archaeologically significant, scenically spectacular, and comparable to the rest of the flagship category. Anything less than a park that took in everything of interest on the Pajarito Plateau, from Puye to Otowi to the Baca Location #1, was unacceptable. These rigid requirements limited the options of the agency. The Park Service could not compromise about size if it wanted to achieve park status, for it might end up with a national park parallel to insignificant places like Platt or Wind Cave. A national park on the Pajarito Plateau had to rival the Grand Canyon, Yellowstone, and Yosemite.

But Albright did not count upon Pinkley's commitment to the concept of the national monuments as a distinct category. "Boiled down," Pinkley wrote after his trip, "my report on the proposed Cliff Cities National Park is that the scenery is not of park status and ruins do

not make a national park, not in any number, kind or quantity; they make a monument." He reiterated his long-standing contention that the ruins were inferior to those at the Chaco Canyon and the Mesa Verde and suggested that Bandelier was of more interest to scientists than the general public. "It would be a distinct anti-climax for the average visitor to come from the Mesa Verde to the proposed Cliff Cities National Park," Pinkley told Mather, and there was little in the way of exceptional scenery in the proposed area. Most of it could "be duplicated several times over" in the Southwest. Since the Frijoles ruins were already protected as a national monument, Pinkley thought it best that the Park Service assume administrative responsibility for the area. But in a heretical stance, he asserted, "I would rather see them left as a monument under [the Forest] Service than be transferred to ours as a Park."

Pinkley found little support for his position in Santa Fe. In his view supporters of project thought of the "proposed park in monument terms for when I suggested that we make a monument out of Puye and Frijoles [Canyon] and let them make a park out of the fine scenery which . . . was back on the Jemez Mountains to the west and south, they immediately said that such an idea would weaken the park proposition." When Pinkley suggested that the ruins were national monument material, the park supporters pointed to Mesa Verde as evidence to the contrary. "I could only reply that national monuments are clearly defined by the [Antiquities] Act . . . while parks are not . . . so if Congress in its wisdom wanted to make a national park out of a duck pond that could be done but it would be no argument for making a national park out of every duck pond in the country." [33]

Pinkley's vision of the national monuments as equals of the national parks shaped his position. As far as he was concerned, the scenery and the ruins on the Pajarito Plateau were second-class, national monuments and national parks were two separate concepts, and the Bandelier conversion attempt represented an effort to minimize the differences. Pinkley could not condone the park effort. His position as superintendent of the national monuments made him feel as threatened as the Forest Service. The park idea was inflexible; it left no room for compromise. If the Bandelier region became a national park, Pinkley knew that the agency would soon look at other southwestern national monuments with the same purpose in mind.

Pinkley's report came as a major surprise to the strong pro-park element in the National Park Service. Horace Albright, the leading proponent of the park, thought that Pinkley took too narrow a view of the question, seeing it from an archeological perspective instead of from the "broader standpoint of a national park executive." [34] Albright suggested Nusbaum, whom he could count upon, as a more qualified judge of the situation. Exhausted by the earlier fray, Nusbaum was too busy at Mesa Verde to take on added responsibilities.

The rift in the ranks posed a problem for advocates of the park on the Pajarito Plateau. They could not go on promoting the proposal as if they had the unanimous support of the agency. The Park Service could not even approach the Coordinating Commission, for it lacked the unified front that was necessary to sway the Forest Service. As a result, the agency finessed the rest of 1927, allowing the term of the Coordinating Commission to expire and keeping Pinkley's report out of the public eye. Even friends of the agency were kept in the dark. On January 17, 1928, Hewett wrote the Park Service to find out if the project was still under consideration. More than half a year after Pinkley's report, the most important friend of the agency did not even know that the inspection was complete. Mather responded to Hewett's inquiry by offering the traditional response concerning park proposals on the Pajarito. He complained that "the lack of a definite proposal" hurt the project. If Hewett had a clearly defined proposal, the agency "would be glad to present [it] for some definite action." [35]

The question hung in a limbo imposed by the Park Service until late 1930, when Albright commissioned another study of the area. Roger Toll, the superintendent of Rocky Mountain

National Park and the primary inspector of national park proposals in the West, M. R. Tillotson, the superintendent of Grand Canyon National Park, and Nusbaum went to Bandelier to make another report on the proposal. Surprisingly, their report supported Pinkley's position. In their view, the scenery was not "sufficiently unusual and outstanding" to merit national park status. "The choice," Toll wrote, "seems to be between having a large and important national monument and a rather small and unimportant national park." [36] Although Associate Director Arno B. Cammerer thought that the agency should "aim high and then if necessary come down to what is possible to acquire," the report finally convinced Albright to put aside the park plans. [37] On January 2, 1931, he wrote that he was "inclined to favor the national monument idea [because] the reports which we have now before us have quite convinced me that we had better not try to get a national park in this section, at least not now." [38]

Even experts hired by the agency supported Pinkley. On February 10, 1931, Dr. Clark Wissler of the American Museum of Natural History and a member of the Committee on the Study of Educational Problems in the National Parks, suggested that the Park Service should "emphasize the archeological function of the proposed park [which] relieves us of the necessity to combat the argument that the area lacks distinctive natural scenery. . . . The park can scarcely be defended on scenic grounds." [39] Wissler effectively put the brakes on the idea of a national park on the Pajarito Plateau. Agency standards required not only archeological but scenic value as well. An indictment from as impartial an observer as was available damaged the chances of the park.

Even though the park project seemed futile, strong support for the idea still existed within the agency. Two days after Wissler's letter arrived, Cammerer expressed both disappointment and optimism in a memo he attached to it. "On the basis of this letter, if it stood alone," he wrote, "there would be no justification for more than national monument status for this area. From what I have heard, however, a good point could be made on scenic values. . . . I should like to inspect it some time with just that point in view." [40] There was still a little life left for the Pajarito Plateau national park.

But late in 1931, Roger Toll again concurred with Wissler's judgment, suggesting that the existing monument would "would make a splendid addition to the archeological national monuments . . . even if no other area were included." The Forest Service offered to turn over the existing Bandelier National Monument, but Toll believed that "they did not wish to lose any more area from the Santa Fe National Forest than was necessary for the protection of the ruins." [41] Transfer of the monument offered an acceptable compromise to both sides, and Toll recommended accepting the offer.

If it could not get a national park, at least the National Park Service could get what Frank Pinkley desired—administrative control of the archeological ruins on the Pajarito Plateau. A rapid increase in travel to the monument followed the completion of a new approach road to the monument boundaries, and it expedited negotiations. The Forest Service realized that it was not prepared for the onslaught of tourists the new highway would bring. Thus its policy regarding the monument changed. [42] United States Forester Major R. Y. Stuart wrote Albright that he was prepared to transfer the existing monument and 4,700 additional acres surrounding the Otowi ruins and Tsankawi Mesa as long as the access roads through the additional acreage were to remain open for the use of local residents. [43] Stuart was willing to cede it to the Park Service if it appeared to remove the pressure to convert large sections of the Santa Fe National Forest into a national park.

On February 25 1932, the Park Service assumed administrative responsibility for the new Bandelier National Monument, which included 3,626.20 of the 4700 acres that Stuart offered. The agreement resolved years of difficulty on the plateau. The Park Service had its ruins, but

no national park; the Forest Service retained the majority of its holdings in the region. [44]

Albright's aggressive stance toward the Forest Service created the climate in which the transfer could occur. After an onslaught which began with the very proclamation of the monument and with a slew of proposals that included large areas of the Santa Fe National Forest, the Forest Service was happy to accede to an NPS demand to transfer a national monument not much larger than the existing one. Instead of 200,000 acres, the Forest Service only gave up 26,026. Albright requested so much land that when his subordinates finally convinced him of the value of a pre-eminent national monument, orchestrating the arrangement became easy. His all-out frontal attacks made the USFS susceptible to a reasonable proposal.

By only giving up a monument, the foresters could also claim victory. They fought off a powerful attempt to cripple their interests in northern New Mexico. The Forest Service still administered most of the Pajarito Plateau and its policies were intact. Homesteaders and commercial interests continued to lease grazing and timber land from the USFS and in such circles, the foresters retained substantial influence.

Pinkley also emerged from the Bandelier transfer a victor. He held out for his definition of the national monument category, and in this case, the NPS followed his lead. As the result of the Bandelier case, Pinkley finally made his definition of the national monument category stick. Archeological sites, at least, were and would remain national monuments. Pinkley held out for the categorization of park areas according to the Antiquities Act and for quality national parks and monuments. No longer would he have to worry that the best of his archeological sites would become national parks. Although his budget problems in the Southwest continued, Frank Pinkley's archeological national monuments were safe from assaults within the agency.

The question of whether archeological, recreational, scenic or commercial values should take precedence on the Pajarito Plateau led to conflict between the National Park Service and the United States Forest Service. It was resolved politically, without actually comparing the relative merits of each case. Frank Pinkley's allegiance to the national monuments dominated his intellectual horizons, and he did not subscribe to the theory that an aggregation of values made a predominantly archeological area worthy of national park status. An expansive national park with the combination of important archeological ruins and average scenery was unacceptable to both Pinkley and the Forest Service. A much smaller national monument, focused primarily on its archeological component and administered by the NPS, was a better alternative. It posed no threat to the land management policies of the USFS because it required a comparatively small portion of national forest land. Pinkley's unlikely alliance with the Forest Service showed that commercial use of natural resources and archeological preservation were not mutually exclusive, particularly when contrasted to the threat scenic preservation presented to both.

After finally achieving his objective, Pinkley began to implement his plans for the Bandelier National Monument. With the help of the Federal emergency relief programs, the monument would flourish under Park Service administration in the course of the 1930s.

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# Bandelier

## Administrative History



## CHAPTER 3: EXPANDING BANDELIER (continued)

The first years of the Great Depression of the 1930s hurt the Park Service. There was little money for Federal agencies, travel decreased across the nation, and the agency was closely tied to the failing Hoover administration. The crash of the stock market and subsequent bank closures put pressure on the Federal budget, precluding expenditures for land acquisition by the agency. Small-town America was in desperate straits. Mustering the support necessary among local residents to establish new park areas was very difficult in a time when many did not know where their next meal was coming from. With powerful USFS opposition still extant and local economies in the West disproportionately dependent on that agency, Albright wisely put aside many of his plans and waited for a more favorable situation.

Many in the Park Service still regarded the transfer of the monument as a step on the road to eventual park status. The most obvious way to make the area more important in the overall scheme of the agency was to include the Puye ruins in a new national monument. If a new national monument was established at Puye in spite of adverse economic conditions, Albright would have a logical reason to continue to press for a national park that would encompass Puye, the detached Otowi Section, and the main portion of the monument. In this context, consolidation of the site by expansion became an efficient maneuver.

Although Frank Pinkley's report in 1927 undermined the Cliff Cities proposal, it also raised the question of the administration of Puye. Pinkley believed that Puye should be administered by the NPS. On this point, he and Albright agreed. After Roger Toll, Jesse Nusbaum and M. R. Tillotson recommended that the NPS accept the offer of the national monument transfer, Albright set his sights on Puye.

Albright's interest in Puye predated the 1930s. He first visited the area in 1919 and advocated the earliest agency efforts in the area. While still Mather's assistant in the late 1920s, Albright began to lobby for a Puye National Monument as way to get a Pajarito Plateau National Park. In 1928, he envisioned an "L" shaped [park], which would give [the NPS] all of the canyons, with their hundreds of ruins that lie between Puye and the Bandelier main section." [1] The "monument-first, then-the-park" strategy was not new; William B. Douglass and the Santa Fe Chamber of Commerce advocated a similar idea in 1916. Throughout the 1920s, the Park Service used similar methods elsewhere in the Southwest. After he became director of the agency in 1929, Albright aggressively pursued the acquisition of Puye. By early 1931, a side issue to the Forest Service transfer of the existing Bandelier National Monument developed. At Albright's instigation, the Park Service pursued the acquisition of Puye.

The Santa Clara Indians were firmly entrenched at Puye and to avoid acrimony within the Department of the Interior, the Park Service needed a legitimate reason to propose the transfer. In March 1931, Dr. Harold C. Bryant, who headed the Educational Division of the Park Service, spoke with Dr. Bates of Cornell University, who assisted the rebuilding of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Bates made an extensive investigation of conditions at Puye, and

determined that the ruins were in disgraceful condition. He advocated NPS administration of Puye if the Santa Clara Pueblo was allowed to keep the proceeds from the entry fee that visitors paid. [2]

This was precisely the kind of ammunition the agency needed. According to an expert, the site required the professional care that the Park Service could offer. NPS officials moved quickly. Associate Director Arthur E. Demaray, the Park Service liaison to the Congressional Appropriations Committee and an early advocate of the proposal, was put in charge of the attempts to create the Puye National Monument.

As liaison officer, Demaray pressed for a reevaluation of the status of the Puye ruins. He arranged for a group from the Congressional Appropriations Committee to make a trip to the Santa Fe area. They visited Puye, where Demaray reviewed the attempts to make a national park of the region. Although the committee was not favorably impressed with the idea of a national park, conditions at Puye convinced the congressmen that the NPS should administer Puye. Bowing to the realities of the situation, Demaray pushed the Puye National Monument idea. "Our principle stumbling block in the past has been our desire for a large national park," Demaray wrote Albright on June 8, 1931. "If we concentrate our efforts to better preserve and protect the prehistoric ruins under national monument administration, we can really get somewhere." [3]

Demaray's perspective shaped the Park Service view of its responsibilities in northern New Mexico. While he did not discount the value of a national park in the Pajarito region, Demaray was eternally a pragmatist. He believed that the Park Service ought to acquire Puye for the value of those ruins, not as leverage to create a national park. If a national park was the eventual result, it would be to the advantage of the NPS. If not, at least the safety of the Puye ruins would be guaranteed. Other opportunities for the Park Service would follow.

Jesse Nusbaum supported Demaray's position on the Puye issue. Prior to the Bandelier transfer, he began to explore the possibility of acquiring Puye. While working with Toll and Tillotson in 1930, Nusbaum approached Bureau of Indian Affairs Commissioner Hagerman and found him favorable to the concept of a Puye National Monument. Nusbaum informed his superiors and together they planned acquisition strategy.

In January 1932, after Demaray refocused agency policy, Albright wrote the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to follow up on Nusbaum's work. Charles S. Rhoades, the new commissioner, referred the matter to the Superintendent of the Santa Fe Indian School, Chester Faris. Nusbaum immediately went to Faris's office and discussed the matter with him. With a tentative commitment from the prior commissioner, the position of the Park Service looked strong. Its proposal was designed not to threaten the Santa Claras. As Bates suggested, the agency would only assume responsibility for the administration of the ruins. The Santa Clara Pueblo would continue to receive the revenue collected at the site and its council would retain veto power over potential excavations.

The resistance of the tribe to Government interference in their lives quickly dashed Nusbaum's hopes. On February 11, 1932, the Santa Clara Pueblo voted unanimously against turning Puye over to the National Park Service. As a result, Rhoades withdrew the support of the BIA, and Park Service attempts to add Puye to the system ended. There were, however, unanswered questions. For more than a decade, the Santa Clara Pueblo had been divided into a number of factions. Yet in the face of NPS acquisition attempts, the pueblo united. There was clearly more to the story than the vote itself revealed. Puzzled but undaunted, Nusbaum retrenched.

At a dinner party in March 1932, Jesse Nusbaum found out what had happened to his hopes

for Puye. Ed Lowrie, a Washington D.C. newspaperman working for the Brookings Institute, had been studying the problem of law and order in the pueblos. Lowrie and Nusbaum had become friends, and Lowrie often made use of Nusbaum's knowledge and contacts. Lowrie saw the factionalization of the Santa Claras as the greatest obstacle to the future development of the Pueblo, and he decided that the best way to get them to put aside their differences was to find a common adversary for them. Unfortunately for the NPS, the first opportunity that arose involved Puye. Nusbaum, now at the Laboratory of Anthropology, was not visibly involved with Park Service efforts to acquire Puye, nor had he informed Lowrie of his role in the project. At the dinner party, Lowrie boasted that his efforts were responsible for stopping the NPS. Nusbaum then explained his interest in the project. Lowrie, who was quite beholden to Nusbaum, was stunned. "It was a terrible blow [to Lowrie]," Nusbaum wrote afterward, "and I thought he would pass out completely." After coming to, Lowrie apologized profusely and professed his loyalty to Nusbaum. But the damage was done, and Nusbaum told Faris to put the project aside. Faris, whom Nusbaum believed approached the project half-heartedly, was glad to oblige.

Nusbaum counselled patience and suggested that the NPS let the issue drop until Lowrie returned to Washington. The Park Service had to "out-wait" the opposition. "We have just to match the patience of the Indian if we are to achieve success," Nusbaum wrote Albright. Then after the uproar died down, Nusbaum hoped the Park Service would begin new attempts to acquire Puye. [4]

But NPS enthusiasm for Puye waned as the reorganization of 1933 became imminent. The acquisition of the remaining national monuments of the Forest Service and War Department, as well as a broad array of other park areas, precluded Park Service interest in Puye. Horace Albright resigned to enter private business, and Arno B. Cammerer became director. Agency morale suffered; Cammerer was noticeably less aggressive than Albright and he faced an entirely different set of management issues. The reorganization of the Federal Government in 1933, which transferred a variety of park-like areas to the Park Service, forced changes in procedure and created confusion. With new responsibilities and an important role in implementing Federal emergency relief programs, NPS emphasis shifted away from acquiring more land in places like the Pajarito Plateau.

The failure to acquire Puye signaled the end of Park Service conceptions of an archeological national park on the Pajarito Plateau. All the proposals between 1900 and 1930 were predicated on the fact that the establishment of a park would affect a small number of people. Most of the land recommended for inclusion in the park belonged to Federal agencies. Before 1930, interagency cooperation could have established a national park on the Pajarito Plateau. By the 1930s, private citizens had a sizable stake in the region. Park proposals now affected the livelihood of more than a few remote settlers. Private landowners became a powerful force that agency planners had to address.

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# Bandelier

## Administrative History



## CHAPTER 3: EXPANDING BANDELIER (continued)

Even though the plan to establish a national park in 1964 progressed no farther than a subcommittee hearing, acquiring the Valle Grande remained part of NPS thinking. Agency officials continued to eye the Baca. In October 1969, Bandelier Superintendent Stanley T. Albright overheard a conversation at a Los Alamos Rotary Club meeting that led him to believe that Dunigan planned to sell the Baca. Park Service acquisition machinery began to gear up, but Dunigan never put the ranch on the market. The NPS was again thwarted.

Yet attempts to enlarge the monument continued. In 1971, the Park Service made a feeble effort to reacquire the game-trap, the cave kiva, and the Otowi ruins. The AEC was under pressure to dispose of some its holdings in the Los Alamos area. By February 1971, area pueblos and the USFS already expressed interest in the land. "If the NPS desires certain of these lands," wrote Acting Chief of NPS Environmental Planning and Design John S. Adams, "it had better move immediately and stake claim." [36] Park Service officials approached the AEC, and in a meeting on March 8, 1971, Los Alamos officials agreed to inform the NPS of any plans to dispose of the Otowi section.

But there was little pressure to dispose of Otowi. Thus, more than a year later, the NPS had no new information. On April 26, 1972, Bandelier Superintendent Linwood E. Jackson contacted "Bud" Wingfield of the AEC and found that the AEC had no plans to give up any part of the Otowi Section. Despite repeated attempts by Bandelier staff members to initiate negotiations, Otowi remained beyond the pale of NPS administration.

Dunigan did not fare as well as he had hoped with his ranch on the Baca. In 1964, he sued the New Mexico Timber Company, charging it with improperly caring for the land while it exercised its rights under a 99-year timber lease. According to the suit, the New Mexico Timber Company destroyed the surface value of Dunigan's land by cutting unnecessary roads, leaving the slash on the land, and denuding the region of mature trees. Dunigan was sensitive to the aesthetic values of his land and resented the tactics of the New Mexico Timber Co. [37] In 1970, the court ordered the timber company to pay Dunigan \$200,000 for damages to 5000 acres that it harvested after he filed the suit. In the end, the suit was resolved to Dunigan's satisfaction. The court allowed him to purchase the lease of the New Mexico Timber Company.

The Park Service feared the destruction of the upper Frijoles Canyon watershed, and it tried to purchase a portion of the Baca. The insensitive land practices of the New Mexico Timber Company drove home the vulnerability of the park. In order to prevent the canyon from the flooding and large-scale erosion that would occur downstream the Park Service sought to include the entire El Rito de Los Frijoles watershed in the monument. If grazing and timbering were not restricted in the mountains, Bandelier was at risk.

On May 3, 1973, Brewster Lindner, the head of the Division of Land Acquisition, wrote Pat Dunigan to explain the long-term plans of the NPS to acquire a portion of the ranch. He

wanted to avoid any chance of misunderstanding. Dunigan was interested in selling the small parcel that the Park Service wanted. After ordering an appraisal in early 1975, Lindner tendered an offer to purchase 3,076 acres of the southeast corner of the Baca for \$1,350,000, subject to legislative approval. [38]

Yet there were obstacles in the way of even this small acquisition. While Dunigan considered the offer, the Regional Office submitted the proposal to the NPS Washington Office for review. Three conditions concerned all levels of the Park Service. Dunigan previously conveyed a one per cent general royalty on the property to the Magma Power Company in 1963, and unidentified parties owned 11 1/4 per cent of all minerals, steam, geothermal and thermal energy. On April 4, 1971, Dunigan had granted Union Oil of California a 99-year lease of geothermal rights to the entire ranch. In response to questions from the Washington Office, Lindner opined that the 11 1/4 percent royalty was not a problem for the agency and said that Union Oil representatives expressed a willingness to release their claim on the 3,076-acre section unless an unusual find was discovered. Further correspondence with Dunigan convinced Lindner that the concession to Magma Power did not pose a problem for park management.

Satisfied with Lindner's assessment, Southwest Regional Director Joseph C. Rumburg Jr. recommended the acquisition in January, 1976. Rumburg believed that the cost of the tract would only increase if the project was delayed. Even though the agency had no written commitment from Union Oil, it would most likely follow through on its verbal commitment. After completion of the legislative process, the agreement was signed on January 28, 1977, and the acquisition of the headwaters of the Frijoles was complete.

The headwaters bill also gave the agency the authority to acquire the Canada de Cochiti Grant, south of the monument. A number of earlier park proposals included the tract. The building of the Cochiti Dam near the southern tip of the monument led the agency to consider a presence there. Moreover, the Park Service coveted the area for administrative purposes. It offered a potential buffer between the lake and the delicate ruins in the Bandelier back country. It also presented the Park Service with a way to expand its interpretive scope.

Once again, the idea of a national park on the Pajarito Plateau gathered momentum. Dunigan's earlier suit against the New Mexico Timber Company was highly publicized. The controversy over the destruction of the forest resource led to another grass-roots move toward the creation of a park. New Mexico Congressional Representative Manuel Lujan received letters from Los Alamos area residents. Then on December 28, 1970, he requested that the National Park Service congressional liaison follow up on the issue.

During the middle 1970s, park proponents got a lift from a new law. The passage of PL 94-458, the General Authorities Act of 1976 required the NPS to select a minimum of twelve areas a year for inclusion in the National Park System. Although these were disparagingly called "the park-of-the-month" proposals, some important areas were included. The Valle Grande was on the first list the agency submitted to Congress. Among the evidence that the agency offered was the designation of the Valle Grande as a national natural landmark in 1975, and the recommendation of the National Parks Advisory Board in 1962 that the area be included in a national park.

In the late 1970s, Department of the Interior and Park Service officials took one more serious look at the merits of the Baca location. In August, 1978, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior David Hales, and Southwest Regional Director John Cook visited the Baca location as guests of Pat Dunigan. After the trip, Hales had the Fish and Wildlife Service and the NPS prepare a prospectus that summarized the discussion. As it would give him an excellent tax advantage, Dunigan appeared ready to work out an agreement with the agency.

But high-level Park Service officials had other priorities. Dunigan wished to meet with NPS Director William Whalen to discuss the transaction. Whalen, however, was not interested in the project, and Dunigan was deflected towards Assistant Director Ira J. Hutchinson. [39] Quite rightly offended, Dunigan left Washington, withdrew his offer, and began negotiations with the Forest Service.

But despite Dunigan's anger, the park proposal gained credence on Capitol Hill. Rep. Phillip Burton, the Chairman of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, introduced a Valles Caldera National Park bill in early 1979 without approaching either the Park Service or Pat Dunigan. Dunigan discussed the proposal with Sierra Club Southwestern Representative Brant Calkin, and they decided the bill was "premature." [40]

Even though the purchase of the entire tract would cost somewhere in the neighborhood of \$60,000,000, the new proposal made headway. A new-area study of alternatives was drawn up with a focus on the interpretation of geothermal and energy-producing activities. This was applauded by the manager of the Harper's Ferry Center of the agency as an "excellent area for industry and the National Park Service to get together and proceed in the same direction." [41]

But in the view of others in the agency, the Valle Caldera was already compromised, and they questioned the efficacy of the park proposal. Lorraine Mintzmeyer, Acting Regional Director of the Southwest Region, turned back the national park idea in favor of establishing a national preserve. "The almost blanket uses of the area for geothermal exploration and development," she wrote, "would make preservation and management of the area as a national park or monument very difficult." Her argument paralleled that of Paul Judge during the discussions over Otowi. The level of development in the Baca equalled that in the old Otowi section. Questions over its suitability for a place in the park system needed to be addressed.

In an unfortunate coincidence, the option to purchase the Baca disappeared. In early 1980, Pat Dunigan collapsed and died of a heart attack. His death dashed the hopes of the Park Service. The Baca Location passed to the trust he set up for his two underage sons. The trustees were not interested in disposing of the property.

After eighty years, the attempts to preserve large sections of the Pajarito Plateau within the boundaries of a national park ended. A number of opportune moments came and went, and a series of unusual coincidences and circumstances thwarted the plans of the agency. It was as if Park Service efforts in the region were jinxed. Every time the agency came close to acquiring its national park, something got in the way.

The problems grew out of competing interests in the region. Each opportunity for the agency offered its competitors an equal chance. In many cases, other interest groups were more powerful than the Park Service. John Collier and the Bureau of Indian Affairs were influential during the 1930s, the creation of the Manhattan project in Los Alamos superseded Park Service interests in the region, and the Forest Service was always ready to thwart the NPS.

Another problem was that the agency never fully accepted the concept of archeological areas as national parks. The Park Service did not exist when the only archeological national park, Mesa Verde, was established in 1906. From Mukuntuweap to the Petrified Forest, most of its efforts centered upon acquiring national park status for natural areas. While on occasion, archeological park areas received nomenclatural designations like national historic park, other than the Pajarito Plateau efforts, the NPS rarely proposed archeological areas for park status. As a result, its efforts to change its perception of the plateau seemed somewhat hollow, as if

the emphasis on natural attributes was an elaborate rationale for the creation of a national park in the region. To outsiders like the Forest Service, the change in the focus of the agency offered evidence of the lack of merit in the entire idea. The more the Park Service tried for a national park, the smaller its chances of success became.

Like many areas within the park system, Bandelier was the focus of a variety of land acquisition attempts. What makes Bandelier distinct was that attempts to acquire land at the park ultimately changed the purpose for which the monument was established. The early attempts to create a national park, as well as most of the land acquisition attempts, focused on acquiring archeological resources or providing a buffer area to protect them. Beginning with the Jemez Crater proposal, later efforts to establish a national park looked to create a national park that subsumed archeological values to natural ones. Handed a mandate when it assumed jurisdiction of the site in 1932, the Park Service repeatedly tried to expand boundaries of the monument as it widened its interests and responsibilities at Bandelier.

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# Bandelier

## Administrative History



## CHAPTER 4: A SHOW PLACE FOR THE AMERICAN TOURIST

(continued)

At Bandelier, the Park Service did not inherit a physical plant from the Forest Service. Although the concessioner's buildings were adequate, if ramshackle, there was little else in Frijoles Canyon. A small, dilapidated ranger cabin, with a telephone line that hooked into the network of the Forest Service, comprised the extent of Forest Service improvements in the canyon. The only access to the canyon was via a steep trail, preventing the sedentary, the infirm, and the old from visiting the main canyon ruins. To make Bandelier fulfill Frank Pinkley's dream of an entry point into the southwestern national monument group required extensive development.

After the Park Service assumed control at Bandelier, Frank Pinkley began to press for the construction of a physical plant. The only facilities in the monument belonged to the concessioners. Pinkley needed some place to base his operation. Although George and Evelyn Frey ran the Frijoles Canyon Lodge, Pinkley found their facilities inappropriate. From his perspective, the lodge area was too close to Tyuonyi, the community house ruins. The whole canyon floor looked too much like a homestead to Pinkley, with fruit trees, a large garden, chickens and ducks in the canyon, and cattle grazing on the south mesa.



Before the coming of the CCC camp, the few trails in the monument discourage travelers who wanted to inspect the ruins. This photograph of the

area including the restored Talus House reveals the condition of the trails in the park prior to 1933.

Pinkley envisioned Bandelier as a prime attraction in the southwestern national monument group. More importantly, he saw it as the mouth of a funnel that would bring visitors to the other southwestern national monuments. As such, the monument required substantial development, the cornerstone of which was a road to the floor of Frijoles Canyon. Automobile accessibility would increase visitation dramatically, giving the agency justification for requesting substantial development funding.

For development purposes, the Park Service acquired Bandelier at precisely the right moment. It came into the Park System in 1932, ahead of the rash of park areas that Executive Order 6166, Franklin D. Roosevelt's measure to streamline the Federal bureaucracy, transferred to the agency. By the time New Deal programs, such as the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), were established, the Park Service, and particularly Pinkley, had specific plans for Bandelier. The Emergency Conservation Work (ECW) program of the Civilian Conservation Corp (CCC) gave the Park Service access to the necessary funding and work power to build administrative and visitor facilities from scratch. The Federal programs supplied funding and labor for the developments of the 1930s.

The most important feature of the development program was the construction of a road into Frijoles Canyon. Without a road to the canyon bottom, Bandelier would remain inaccessible. Although Forest Service officials opposed the idea of a road until the end of the 1920s, late in their tenure, they explored construction possibilities. The threat of local opposition thwarted any plans that developed. [1]

With his vision of Bandelier as a preeminent attraction among the southwestern monuments, Frank Pinkley advocated the construction of the road even before the Park Service assumed jurisdiction of the area. He weathered the opposition of a cadre of Santa Fe residents, to whom he referred as "mud-hut nuts," arguing that the road was a necessary improvement for a park area so close to an important tourist center. "We can't refuse 15,000 visitors admission" he wrote Horace Albright on October 8, 1932, "just because the Spanish didn't use automobiles 300 years ago: it just doesn't make sense." [2]

According to Jesse Nusbaum, it was not only Pinkley's "mud-hut nuts" who opposed the project. Much of the Santa Fe community, including prominent citizens such as Bronson Cutting, the owner of the New Mexican, resisted the idea of a road into the canyon. The Park Service presence was a feature in the volatile political climate of northern New Mexico, and Nusbaum worried that a proposal for a road would create new opposition. As a long-time resident of Santa Fe, his "firm conviction" was that the NPS should wait until there was a permanent ranger in Frijoles Canyon before it proceeded with the road. [3]

Despite resistance in Santa Fe, the NPS decided the road was imperative. Advocating its construction was an easy way to differentiate NPS administration from that of the USFS. "It would be unfortunate, indeed," Acting Director Arthur E. Demaray responded to Nusbaum on November 18, 1932, "if we were to follow a no more vigorous policy [regarding construction of the road] than was practiced by the Forest Service." [4] The road to Frijoles Canyon became a pivotal issue. Without it Bandelier would remain no different than the other Forest Service national monuments. Remote and unimportant, like many of the other national monuments, it would serve little purpose for an agency interested in attracting visitors.



Building the road from the mesa to the canyon was the single most important innovation in Frank Pinkley's development plan for Bandelier. As soon as CCC workers completed the initial trail, the Park Service opened it to visitor travel. Meanwhile, as this photo shows, CCC men continued to improve the road.

During the 1920s, Stephen T. Mather and Horace M. Albright developed the Park Service by providing visitor service and in the early 1930s, the agency closely adhered to their doctrine. Park Service inspections stressed the problems that existing conditions created. The lack of access impeded visitation. According to George Grant, a Park Service photographer who inspected and photographed Bandelier on October 20, 1932, the trail into the canyon was an "actual barrier" for all but the most vigorous travelers. The existing trail discouraged four of every five visitors who approached the park. Many looked over the edge at the trail and abandoned their plans to visit the canyon floor. "The visitor," Grant wrote, "must be able to get his car close to the points of interest." [5]

With a road to the canyon bottom, Bandelier could be as popular as any park area in the Southwest. The Washington Office of the NPS favored the development of the park and discounted opposition; Demaray told Nusbaum that "the easiest way to get visitors to Bandelier is to build a good road." [6] "Looked at from the standpoint of keeping visitors out of a national monument," Pinkley wrote Hunter Clarkson, the proprietor of the Indian Detours guide service, "the present trail may be considered a complete success, although we could, by putting in a few more steep angles and digging some holes in the trail[,] cut the present four thousand visitors in half." [7] Pinkley's facetious tone indicated his position clearly. In 1933, there were few projects more important to his southwestern national monuments group than the road to Frijoles Canyon.

To mask his true objectives and combat local resistance, Pinkley initially presented the road as a service trail. He stressed the efficacy of the road in letters to CCC and ECW administrators. Without the road, building the structures he sought for the canyon verged on impossibility. It also provided him a convenient way to achieve his goals without arousing the rancor of those who opposed him.

There were a number of possible routes for roads into the canyon. National Park Service Historian Verne E. Chatelain visited Bandelier with George Frey, the concessioner, and looked at the options. The New Mexico state surveyor had laid out one possibility, which had steep grades and was visible from the canyon bottom. Park Service landscape architects did their own road survey. The route the agency proposed was longer, but its grades were less

steep and according to Chatelain, the scar it left would be almost invisible from the canyon floor. [8] Despite the increased distance, a road that could not be seen from the canyon floor fit the philosophy of the Park Service. After a number of additional inspections, the longer, more scenic route was approved.

Construction began in November 1933, almost as soon as the CCC camp at the monument opened. On December 9, 1933, the first car went down the unfinished trail, carrying Mrs. Evelyn Frey and Walter G. Atwell, the Park Service engineer who oversaw the project. [9] The road, however, was far from complete. ECW regulations only permitted the construction of a truck trail twelve-feet wide with its funds. It took money from another New Deal agency, the Civil Works Authority (CWA) money and most of 1934 to complete the 22-foot wide trail to the canyon.

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## CHAPTER 4: A SHOW PLACE FOR THE AMERICAN TOURIST

(continued)

The passage of the Wilderness Act of 1964 was a major victory for preservation advocates, and their zealous fervor persisted for years to come. In essence, the advocates of the concept of wilderness had a new option. The Bandelier backcountry gave them another place where they could implement it. The draft of the Bandelier master plan included provisions for a floating marina on the new lake, as well a means to connect the separate visitor facilities in Frijoles Canyon with those proposed for the south end of the monument. The pro-wilderness groups believed that the NPS sought an auto road between the two areas, an idea antithetical to their conception of the management of the backcountry. From their point of view, the issue was very clear: a development at the southern end of Bandelier would encroach upon any undesignated wild land in the area. A designated wilderness was necessary to protect the pristine character of the backcountry. Wilderness advocates played to the current biases of their supporters by presenting themselves as defenders of the wild. They presented the Park Service as a short-sighted bureaucracy, concerned more with its position than its mandate.

Park Service officials saw the development of the southern end of the monument as a trade-off. It allowed them to protect the wild areas of the monument by offering the backcountry the protection afforded by a permanent Park Service presence. The development at the south end would also allow the agency to monitor the inevitable increase in visitation that the lake would bring. The Park Service saw other drawbacks to a wilderness designation. The Wilderness Act of 1964 limiting the ways in which Government agencies could administer wilderness areas. At Bandelier, this meant that backcountry excavations would have to be carried out without the benefit of mechanized equipment, making archeological research more difficult. The mandate for Bandelier made the monument an archeological area, not a natural one. Thus, the Park Service believed that to uphold its mandate, it had to oppose the wilderness.

The prospect of a wilderness at Bandelier did not appeal to many within the Park Service. The idea was new, and its ramifications remained unclear. There had not yet been a wilderness established in a designated archeological area. From the management perspective, the potential for conflict between different kinds of management objectives seemed too great. The administrative issues concerning archeological excavation and a designated wilderness seemed impossible to reconcile.

The no-wilderness recommendation of the agency, however, was not offered to allow the backcountry to be overrun with the curious from Cochiti Lake. The protection of resources in the backcountry was the agency's primary goal. There were many ways to uphold that obligation. The Park Service wanted to keep management options open, but the specific restrictions governing designated wilderness limited the options of the agency. According to Linwood E. Jackson, the superintendent at that time, the NPS had every intention of maintaining the roadless status of the backcountry. To do so without designating it as a wilderness made management of the area much easier.

Battle lines were clearly drawn. The wilderness constituency formed a private organization, the New Mexico Wilderness Study Committee (NMWSC), to evaluate wilderness proposals within the state. The Park Service previously recommended that no wilderness be established in the Chaco Canyon. The Wilderness Study Committee went along with the agency. Its members were not as supportive at Bandelier. Instead of concurring with the Park Service, the NMWSC proposed the establishment of a 22,133-acre wilderness that included the entire monument except for the area north of Frijoles Canyon.

The American environmental movement earned its spurs with the passage of the Wilderness Act of 1964. At Bandelier, it sought to apply a portion of its new power. Wilderness groups believed that the Park Service was compromising its principles in an effort to develop its constituency of sedentary tourists. Although they recognized the importance of the recreational visitor to the Park System, wilderness advocates could not condone developments designed to promote extensive use in previously pristine areas. In an era when Americans were suspicious of the motives of even the most benign of Government agencies, wilderness advocates sought safeguards to preserve the wild character of the Bandelier backcountry. From their point of view, the Park Service was not fulfilling the obligations of its mandate.

The issue came to a head on December 18, 1971, in a public hearing at the Los Alamos Inn in Los Alamos, New Mexico. Sixty-one people attended the meeting and forty spoke. Another 174 letters were placed in the record. Every one of the private citizens who spoke opposed the recommendation of the agency, as did all who wrote letters. "Why invite another Yosemite?" wrote Steve Schum, the President of the University of New Mexico Mountaineering Club. "Anthropologists can research and develop ruins without using mechanized equipment." Echoing the sentiment of many in the wilderness coalition, Elizabeth A. Jackson of Guilford, Connecticut, wrote that wilderness was "the only way to preserve [Bandelier's] pristine state." [31]

With the New Mexico Wilderness Study Committee leading the charge, private organizations overwhelmingly opposed the Park Service. Norman Bullard of the NMWSC expressed the view of the majority of the groups. He favored the wilderness designation because it would protect the backcountry from "changing administrative perceptions." [32] Many others stressed the compatibility of wilderness and archeological management. Of the forty speakers in Los Alamos, fourteen supported the Wilderness Study Committee and its 22,133-acre proposal, while an additional twenty-five supported the general idea of a designated wilderness in the Bandelier backcountry.

The National Parks and Conservation Association (NPCA), provided the sole support for the agency. The authors of the NPCA report wondered if any portion of the monument were suited for wilderness status. They used the same rationale that the agency did, focusing on the archeological mandate at Bandelier and its incompatibility with the concept of a wilderness.

NPCA support of the NPS position, however, was not unequivocal. The organization stated that the existing values at the monument had to be protected before new ones could be developed. It opposed certain aspects of the new master plan, including the proposal for a floating marina and the possibility of connecting Cañada de Cochiti to Frijoles Canyon by road. The NPCA believed that the area was unsuited for wilderness, but conversely, did not want to see major development in the backcountry. Its support for the agency was predicated upon a less extensive development plan.

The full range of issues was more complex than most of the respondents realized. Many of the individual respondents advocated adding the Cañada de Cochiti grant to the proposed wilderness. The agency wanted to acquire it as a buffer for the backcountry. Unaware that the

provisions of the Wilderness Act of 1964 limited wilderness areas to undeveloped land, some supporters even suggested that the entire monument, including the developed portions of Frijoles Canyon, be declared a wilderness.

The wilderness constituency, however, had a valid point. A designated wilderness guaranteed a pristine backcountry in the future. Its advocates sought to shape agency policy without clearly understanding the reasons the agency opposed the designation. Without agency affiliation and with a supportive public audience, they were free to challenge the plans of the Park Service without having to participate in subsequent daily administration.

Two viable management alternatives, easily construed as mutually exclusive, arrived at the same time and place. The newness of the wilderness designation and its appeal to vocal and visible interest groups made it an attractive option. It received considerable backing when compared to a plan that on the surface appeared to be another accommodation of sedentary America. In response to the public pressure, Park Service officials reconsidered. In August, 1972, the agency recommended a wilderness area of 21,110-acres for Bandelier. To the cheers of the environmental community and many within the Park Service, the Bandelier wilderness area was established in 1976.

The wilderness proposal and the proposed master plan for the monument did not turn out to be antithetical. Nor did the reconsideration alter the Bandelier master plan. "The purpose for which the monument was established . . ." read the wilderness recommendation, "remains paramount." [33] The Park Service was committed to the archeological resources of the monument. It also pursued the acquisition of the Cañada de Cochiti grant, as well as a development in the southern quarter of the monument.

The Park Service was determined to manage the proposed wilderness in conjunction with its proposed development, dispelling notions of the incompatibility of the two objectives. Despite changes in the attitude of the agency regarding the designation of a Bandelier wilderness, the Bandelier Master Plan of 1973 resembled the working draft of 1971. Only the most blatantly threatening features, the floating marina and the proposed "connection" between Frijoles Canyon and the Cañada de Cochiti grant, were excised from the plan. It seemed that a compromise had been reached.

Ironically, by the mid-1980s, much of the anticipatory strategy for the southern end of the monument had yet to be implemented. Little of the expected development in the surrounding area occurred. Cochiti Lake did not immediately spawn a flourishing city on its banks. In part because of the no-wake zoning, which the Park Service fought to keep, there was little pressure upon the monument from recreational users of the lake. There simply was no need for the facilities proposed in the master plan. Yet, the program remained a part of agency policy, ready to be implemented if ever needed.

In 1986, many of the programs that the master plan laid out for the Frijoles Canyon and Mesa areas remained in the planning stages. Despite the sanction of various restrictions in a transportation study by the Denver Service Center on the use of canyon, access to the Frijoles Canyon facilities continued to be uncontrolled. Private vehicle access to the canyon bottom continued unabated. In early 1987, no controlled transportation system existed to convey travelers to the Visitor Center. The picnic area that was to be phased out remained an important part of visitor accommodation in the canyon.

Yet the controlled-access policy that Frank Pinkley initiated has endured at the core of management philosophy for Bandelier. Park Service plans called for eventual limitations on access not only to ruins, but to the canyon itself. In keeping with the ideas Pinkley expressed during the 1930s, the Park Service constructed an ethic that will shape the manner that

visitors experience the canyon and its ruins.

By 1986, the land acquisition facets of the master plan of 1977 were not yet implemented. Besides the acquisition of the Cañada de Cochiti grant, the plan envisioned reacquiring four sites from the old Otowi Section, the Big and Little Otowi ruins, the decorated cave kiva, and the game trap near Mortandad Canyon when the Department of Energy declared them excess. The Department of Energy, however, clung to its holdings in the Los Alamos vicinity. Despite the continued efforts of a small group of enthusiastic advocates, no opportunity presented itself to the agency.

The most recent master plan was the first of three at Bandelier to prepare for the future. The plan remained a broad mandate, allowing for many kinds of expansion under appropriate conditions. The plan of 1977 allowed park managers a wide range of options and the discretion to determine when to press for the implementation of the programs. An anticipatory program, it left the Park Service with a mandate to serve in case of most eventualities.

Since the Park Service assumed management of Bandelier in 1932, agency personnel worked to accommodate the demands of diverse constituencies. Yet, agency philosophy continued to be strongly influenced by the overwhelming need to protect the ruins and ensure the quality of visitor experience at the park. What seemed like unnecessary restriction to the casual observer became a piece of a larger mosaic, designed to preserve the legacy of the monument while enlightening visitors in the present.

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## CHAPTER 5: CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND INTERPRETATION AT BANDELIER (continued)

Despite such restoration work, by the time the Park Service took over in 1932, many of the ruins in Frijoles Canyon were falling apart. Like many early archeologists, Hewett was more interested in artifacts than structures. He did little stabilization work, and the techniques of his era were inadequate when implemented. Nor was the Forest Service expert at archeological management. Catering mostly to Hewett and other specialists, the Forest Service did not use the ruins to try and attract tourists. By 1932, Tyuonyi had crumbled badly. Many walls had collapsed and those that remained were visibly unstable. [2]

For the Park Service, the protection of the ruins and their presentation were intrinsically linked. From the inception of the agency, Stephen T. Mather stressed visitation, and visitors who came to archeological areas like Bandelier wanted to see tangible evidence of the prehistory of the continent. To protect the structures and offer interpretation, the Park Service developed policies that straddled the preservation-use dichotomy embodied in the organic legislation that established the agency.

But when Park Service Custodian Edgar L. Rogers arrived in the summer of 1932, the ruins in Frijoles Canyon were poorly prepared for visits from the general public. Although the atmosphere of the canyon conveyed the mysteries of long-departed civilizations, the condition of the structures made it difficult for the uninitiated to grasp the nature of prehistoric life. If Bandelier was to serve as the gateway to the southwestern national monument group, the agency had to improve conditions at the park. [3]

Before the Park Service acquired Bandelier, Frank Pinkley had planned a broad-based program of development for the area, based on his work elsewhere in the Southwest. The program focused upon three facets of administration: ruins stabilization, capital development, and interpretation of the area for visitors. Pinkley's program called for vast commitment in all three areas. When the Park Service acquired Bandelier, Pinkley simply put his programs into action.

Pinkley's first archeological priority was the stabilization of the ruins. By 1933, conditions had deteriorated so badly that some of Tyuonyi was only one course of stone high. Pinkley needed more substantial structures to attract visitors. As soon as he could get clearance from the Civil Works Administration (CWA), he brought in archeologist Paul Reiter to supervise a crew of CCC workers.



After the initial excavations in Frijoles Canyon, the majority of ruins were not stabilized. By the time the Park Service assumed administrative responsibility for the monument, exposed ruins like Tyuonjyi had crumbled.

Although they performed some restoration and a little excavation, Reiter's crew focused upon stabilization and preservation. In 1934, the workers excavated two additional rooms and began restoration and stabilization work in Tyuonyi. Reiter also removed the plaster from a preserved section of painted wall in Long House and installed a glass plate to protect it from vandalism. The program made the park more attractive to visitors. Travelers could begin to see the outline of prehistoric life in the ruins of Frijoles Canyon. [4]

Stabilization programs continued throughout the 1930s. In 1937, Jerome W. Hendron, a seasonal ranger with archeological training, began the NPS ruins stabilization program at Bandelier. He directed a crew that replaced the roof in the kiva at Ceremonial Cave and continued stabilization efforts at Tyuonyi. Much of the mortar holding the rocks together had disintegrated, and Hendron's men reset the stones with a mixture laden with Portland Cement. They also reset fallen walls and rebuilt the lowest portions of the excavated semi-circle.

The large kiva, east of Tyuonyi in Frijoles Canyon, also received Hendron's attention. By 1937, its mortar had washed away, and the inner of the two walls of the structure had fallen. The crude outer wall seemed in danger of collapse. Previous excavators had left large mounds near the kiva that posed drainage problems. Brush and trees had overgrown the site, and windblown dirt and other debris covered the floor of the kiva to a depth of thirty inches. Hendron and his crew re-excavated the kiva and stabilized its walls. The upper levels of the outer wall were taken down and reset. Hendron used a cement mortar—five parts sand, one part fill, and one part cement—to set the stones adjacent to the inner wall. He and his men also rebuilt the ventilator shaft, forced mud between the stones in the inner wall to chink them, and treated much of the interior with a solution that stabilized adobe plaster. [5]



These two photographs show parts of Tyuonyi prior to and during stabilization.

Since Bandelier was a priority area in Pinkley's scheme, he continued to support the stabilization program. During the 1930s, ECW allocations made workpower easily available. In 1939, Robert F. Lister, an NPS archeologist, brought a crew to Bandelier to continue stabilization work. He stabilized the remaining walls of the Otowi ruin, caves on the Otowi Mesa, and 181 cave dwellings on the south side of Tsankawi Mesa. He also treated fourteen caves in Frijoles Canyon and remortared walls and reset stones at Long House in 1940.

Lister's work completed the first phase of stabilization at Bandelier. Its primary purposes were to prevent the ruins from further decline and give visitors a visual insight into prehistoric life. Some of the work was cosmetic in nature, but much was critical to the survival of the ruins. Most important, the first phase of stabilization gave Frank Pinkley the ruins that helped tell the story of Frijoles Canyon.

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## CHAPTER 5: CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND INTERPRETATION AT BANDELIER (continued)

In the late 1970s, the NPS planned to broaden the interpretive message of the monument by acquiring new areas. The 1977 master plan, created in response to the Cochiti Dam, was the culmination of these efforts. Park Service plans called for the acquisition of the Cañada de Cochiti Grant, the location of a stronghold from the Pueblo Rebellion of 1680 and numerous Spanish and Indian communities that had survived into the twentieth century. The new plan also included construction of a visitor center at the south end of the monument.

Again the agency planned to develop new attractions to relieve the burden upon Frijoles Canyon, this time by acquiring land that extended the scope of its interpretation into the historic period. The Park Service planned guided tours to Kotyiti, the fortified rebellion-era pueblo, and Cañada Village, within the boundaries of the grant. Trails from the visitor center to two sites in the southern section of Bandelier, the Painted Cave and San Miguel Pueblo, were also planned. The increased ease of access required more intensive management on the part of the Park Service.

The southern tip of the monument offered a new realm of possibilities for the members of the interpretive staff. They finally had visible evidence to dispel the myth that abandoned pueblos were evidence of a lost civilization. Kotyiti and Cañada Village showed that pueblo culture survived the arrival of the Spanish and adopted elements of the incoming Spanish tradition. The new sites showed pueblo life in the historic period and validated the argument that the members of the other northern pueblos—particularly the Cochiti, Santa Clara, and San Ildefonso groups—were the descendants of the aboriginal inhabitants of the Pajarito Plateau.

A major environmental disaster disrupted Park Service plans on the Pajarito Plateau. During the summer of 1977, a vast fire of human origin destroyed much of the forest in the northwestern portion of the monument, adjacent national forest lands, and portions of Department of Energy land. The La Mesa fire began in the late afternoon of June 16, 1977. It raged for nearly a week, burning more than 15,000 acres of the plateau.



The La Mesa fire in 1977 also inspired innovations in resource management. Fire-fighting operations threatened archeological resources in the burn area. Archeologists and fire-fighters worked in concert to fight the fire without damaging subsurface remains. In this photo, archeologists precede bulldozers along the fire lines to identify archeological resources.

As a result of quick thinking by regional office personnel and park staff, the cultural resources of the burning area were scrutinized by archeologists who preceded the fire-fighting bulldozers. This plan came about almost serendipitously. On his way to visit an archeologist friend at the Park Service regional office on Old Santa Fé Trail in Santa Fé, Dr. Milford R. Fletcher, the regional scientist of the Southwest Region, looked up and saw smoke on the Pajarito Plateau. He told Cal Cummings, the deputy chief of the Division of Cultural Resources in the region, that because Bandelier was an archeological park, the construction of fire lines required archeologists. Archeologists could locate buried archeological sites and direct the bulldozers away from the ruins. Cummings, Superintendent Hunter, and the Forest Service agreed; Cummings found and scheduled volunteers, and Fletcher provided on-site supervision. In the end, nearly forty archeologists worked in front of the bulldozers during the La Mesa fire. [20]

The fire cleared the way for cultural resource management on the plateau to expand into new realms. Prior to 1977, the Park Service, Forest Service, and LASL operated their cultural resource programs independently. The agencies had different management objectives, and often their perspectives seemed antithetical. The fire promoted new cooperation and awareness of the value of the ruins. There were, however, tense moments. In one case, Fletcher turned off a Forest Service bulldozer, telling its driver: "We don't care if the trees burn. They'll grow back. Ruins won't." But on the whole, each organization respected the primacy of the ruins. Veterans of the fire remembered the shared objectives as superseding the occasional conflicts. [21]

The concern with preservation set new precedents for Federal handling of fires in archeological areas. Superintendent John D. Hunter received one of the highest awards offered by the Department of the Interior, the Meritorious Service Award, for service that included his handling of the La Mesa situation. For other Federal agencies, the response of the Park Service provided a "consciousness-raising" experience. Fletcher and Park Service archeologists spoke to other agencies about the La Mesa fire and the ramifications of their

response. Although the fire burnt surface ruins, it made a survey of the archeological resources of the park much easier. The Park Service also acquired a wealth of new information about patterns of plant succession after fires, and in the early 1980s began to organize it. [22]

After the fire, the agency shifted its focus to other cultural resource needs at the monument. Vandalism remained a problem. Despite the best efforts of the Park Service, graffiti regularly marred the cavates in Frijoles Canyon. To limit its affect on visitors, park staff burnt fires in the caves to cover the scrawl of insensitive vandals with a new layer of char. But this type of solution could only address the effects of callous behavior, not its causes.

"Pot-hunting" also remained endemic. The unstaffed Tsankawi Mesa was a particularly tempting target for thieves of prehistoric artifacts. Comparatively few people visited the mesa, and the park had no uniformed ranger stationed there. Except for occasional patrols, signs and guidebooks were the only evidence of the presence of the Park Service. The wilderness area in the main section also revealed scattered evidence of digging. As in the 1910s and 1920s, when many southwestern archeological areas were in a similar state, the unpatrolled parts of the monument remained vulnerable to both pilfering visitors and professional depredators. [23]

The CCC buildings constructed during the 1930s also attracted the attention of cultural resource managers. The structures became a historic resource. Park rangers had always received questions about the buildings, and informally, the story of the CCC and Mrs. Frey's Frijoles Canyon Lodge became part of the interpretive story at the monument. The buildings were nominated for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places, and two Park Service employees, Laura Soulliere Harrison, an architectural historian, and Randy Copeland, an historical architect, prepared an historic district nomination for the buildings in Frijoles Canyon. On May 28, 1987, the Secretary of the Interior designated the CCC complex as National Historic Landmarks, the highest level of significance authorized outside of congressional mandate. Yet the structures required cyclic maintenance. [24]

During the 1980s, the Park Service undertook a major rehabilitation program for the structures. The program began in 1979, when Robert Butcher, the Chief of the Division of Maintenance at the monument, began a fund drive to rehabilitate the Visitor Center. Russell Butcher of the National Parks and Conservation Association, no relation to Robert Butcher, spearheaded the fund raising campaign to which corporations and private citizens contributed. During a three-year period, the program raised nearly \$60,000, approximately one-tenth of the entire maintenance cost. The money went toward an intensive program of repatching, repointing, and replastering the structures. Many vigas, the wood roof beams that protruded from the sides of the buildings, and canales, the open rooftop drains, had rotted, and these were replaced. During 1985-86, crews worked on many of the buildings.

Maintenance of the historic structures seemed a constant struggle. In the mid 1980s, park staff noticed dampness in the walls of many of the buildings. The staff found that runoff from the flat roofs of the buildings caused the problem. After the roofs and parapets had been foamed in 1981, some water ran down the outside of the walls, causing damage. In 1987, the park experimented with angling the parapets on the roof differently so as to channel the water from these to the inner roof. [25]

The desire for more comprehensive interpretation led to expanded archeological research in the 1980s. Most of the excavating done at Bandelier dated from the first two decades of the twentieth century, and since that time, southwestern archeology had matured considerably. Yet no one knew the range of archeological resources contained in the monument. Without that information, a coherent plan of administration was impossible. In the 1940s,

superintendents began to clamor for a site survey. Until the 1970s, they had little opportunity to undertake such an extensive project, but late in the decade, developments within the Southwest Region set the stage for a site survey at Bandelier.

During the 1970s, the agency developed the Chaco Center to expand archeological horizons at Chaco Canyon. The excavations there broadened archeological knowledge and led to the enlargement of the Chaco Canyon National Monument and its reclassification as a national historical park. After the completion of the Chaco project, and at the request of Superintendent J. D. Hunter and staff, the archeologists turned their attention to a site survey of Bandelier National Monument. During the summer of 1985, they began fieldwork at the monument.

Between 1932 and the 1980s, the range of cultural resource responsibilities at Bandelier changed dramatically. In the 1930s, the NPS thought only of its obligation to preserve and protect the ruins. But in the subsequent fifty years, the methods of the agency became more sophisticated, new technology and ideas were implemented, and a wider range of cultural resources became important at Bandelier. By the 1980s, the management of cultural resources at the monument included historic and prehistoric facets.

Yet cultural resources were not the only important feature of the monument. The establishment of the Bandelier wilderness and the La Mesa fire helped show that Bandelier had two futures, one archeological and one natural. The new planning practices of the agency offered visible evidence of the interrelatedness of these two facets of management. By the middle of the 1970s, the practices of the Park Service revealed an increasing emphasis upon the natural resources at the Bandelier National Monument.

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## CHAPTER 6: NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN MESA AND CANON COUNTRY (continued)

Increasing sophistication in the sciences also prompted new directions in natural resource management. For many years, natural resource management and protection had been synonymous. Resource managers simply preserved; they suppressed fires, protected flora and fauna from damage, and arrested poachers. But as the concept of the dynamics of ecological communities gained credence, scientists began to view the natural world from a different perspective. Sophisticated techniques offered a way to move into new realms of management. During the 1960s and 1970s, the genetic diversity of the planet became an important cultural issue, and the scientific public and the environmental community came to regard the park system as the best collection of natural diversity. New ideas of this nature hastened the implementation of up-to-the-minute scientific programs.

This led to a broadening of the range of responsibilities for resource managers within the agency. In the early 1970s, Chief Scientist Roland Wauer of the Southwestern Region implemented a program to assess the natural attributes of cultural areas. Armed with the latest scientific knowledge and technique, natural resource managers began to look at archeological and historical parks. [3]

Beginning in the early 1970s, this translated into more prominent interest in the natural resources of Bandelier. Rather than simply focusing on the cultural resources of the monument, the Park Service began looking at the natural resources of the undeveloped backcountry. Increasingly attuned to preservation responsibilities and spurred by the interest in the designated wilderness area, in 1973-74 the Park Service began designing a comprehensive resource management plan for Bandelier.

The new plan represented a departure from previous practices at the monument. Until the 1970s, concern for natural resources played a secondary role in the management of the park. The Park Service regarded Bandelier primarily as an archeological area. The proclamation establishing the monument did not refer to its natural attributes, Frank Pinkley paid little attention to the backcountry, and the postwar influx of visitors precluded attention to other issues. Despite the fact that the CCC workers cut trails and did some maintenance, there was little evidence of a coherent plan of natural resource management.

Prior to the 1970s, the Park Service simply reacted to most natural resource questions. When a problem occurred, the staff at the monument dealt with it as best they could. During the 1930s, webworms threatened the trees in Frijoles Canyon, and the custodian developed an eradication program. When small fires broke out, staff members rushed to put them out. A major windstorm damaged trees in 1952, and the agency responded by clearing out the downed timber. Despite frequent inspections, such isolated incidents comprised the extent of natural area management at Bandelier. Archeology and the needs of visitors simply superseded the management of the Bandelier backcountry. [4]

The feral burros that inhabited the backcountry offered the issue on which the need for natural resource management at the monument focused. The presence of the burros preceded NPS administration at Bandelier, but the first Park Service wildlife inspection in 1934 did not mention them. In 1940, however, NPS biologist W. B. McDougall saw approximately twenty during his visit. He recommended that the burros be eliminated, and later that year the regional office approved the first burro control plan for the Bandelier Monument. Slowly, the plan became practice. In September, 1946, rangers shot fifty-two burros, halving the population at the monument. In October and November, 1946, twelve more were destroyed, and burro eradication became policy at Bandelier.

Feral burros became a perennial issue at the monument. After a long period in which other issues diminished the importance of the burros, a "Long Range Wildlife and Range Management Plan," prepared in 1964, initiated new action. The plan recommended that rangers use high-powered rifles to eliminate burros in the higher elevations of the monument. The program also suggested trapping burros at watering holes throughout the backcountry.

In the fall of 1964, the Park Service hired the Los Alamos County Sheriff's Mounted Patrol to hunt burros at the monument. Despite confident predictions, they caught few animals. The rough terrain of the Bandelier backcountry thwarted the mounted hunters. Trapping agile burros in open canyons and mesas while on horseback was not an easy task.

With a mandate to eliminate exotic animals from park areas, agency personnel continued to try to get rid of the burros at Bandelier. In December 1966, rangers observed fifty-eight burros, and visitors reported twenty more. At about the same time, backcountry inspections reported damage to above-ground ruins and increased soil erosion. After viewing the evidence, the staff at the monument decided that there was a correlation between burro grazing and increased soil erosion, particularly in the vast area southwest of Alamo Canyon. The burros ceased to be merely unattractive residents of the backcountry. They became a menace to its ecological and archeological values.

In 1969, Superintendent Stanley T. Albright drew plans to combat the increasing numbers of burros. The plan reported that one hundred burros ranged over three-fourths of the 23,000-acre backcountry, and Albright advocated burro elimination by any available means. Despite his proposal and general acceptance of the idea that the burros had to be removed from the backcountry, there were no burro eliminations between 1969 and 1972. Additional sightings were reported, however, in 1970 and 1971, and the staff estimated the monument population at between fifty and two hundred animals.

The passage of the Wild Horse and Burro Act of 1971 complicated the management of burros within the national park system. The law protected wild horses and burros on BLM and Department of Agriculture (U.S. Forest Service) land. Soon the number of burros on the national forest land adjacent to Bandelier increased, and some crossed the boundary into the monument. The Park Service had to contend with a growing herd of burros in the Bandelier backcountry.

The burros posed a problem for the agency. Although NPS lands were exempt from the jurisdiction of the Wild Horse and Burro Act, the Park Service policy of removing exotic animals that altered ecosystems from park areas offended animal advocacy groups. [5] The agency needed to devise a strategy that removed the burros and did not hurt its public image. For regional office and park staff, the burro issue became a no-win situation. No matter what stance the agency took, portions of its constituency were sure to resent its actions.

At Bandelier, the Park Service found itself "working on a natural problem," Fletcher remarked, "to protect a cultural resource." Many park employees suspected that the burros

were responsible for much of the damage to archeological sites in the backcountry. Erosion in the backcountry had increased to an estimated thirty-six tons of soil per acre per year, an astonishingly high rate that threatened unexcavated archeological sites.

The Park Service started "from the beginning" in its efforts to assess the affect of the burros on the monument. The agency hired professional researchers, including John R. Morgart of Arizona State University, to determine the extent of the damage caused by the animals. Morgart's study offered a catalogue of the sins of the burro. A non-native species, burros had a profound impact on the ecosystems of the backcountry. Burros and deer competed for the same food during winter months, and the burros were so successful that USFS Supervisor John Hall complained to NPS Regional Director Frank Kowski that the they were destroying deer habitat throughout the region. The evidence piled up against the burros. With a mandate to preserve the resources of the monument, there was little choice. The animals had to go. [6]

Between 1974 and 1977, the Natural Resources Division of the Southwest Region spent \$130,000 on burro research and removal at Bandelier. In the process, the Park Service removed 130 burros, but its research showed that the agency barely held its own. The proximity of the protected burro herds on Forest Service and BLM land and the imperfect fencing on the western and southern boundaries of the monument allowed a constant ingress of burros. The animals also proved to have an astonishing rate of reproduction—29 percent. A rate of 25 percent meant that burro population doubled every fourth year. The Park Service seemed unable to win the battle, and what had been an issue became a crisis. [7]

During the summer of 1977, the La Mesa fire provided an opportunity to reduce the burro population at Bandelier substantially. During the third day of the week-long fire, Fletcher explained to Regional Director John Cook that the fire offered an "excellent opportunity to remove burros." Fletcher indicated that by destroying seventy-five to one hundred animals, the Park Service could nearly eliminate burros from the monument. After the fire, park staff members saw that the fire had driven deer out of their summer range, and deer and burros competed for the same forage. From the perspective of the Park Service, there was little doubt which animal was more desirable. Cook approved Fletcher's suggestion. Fletcher brought in a crew of "steady men," many of whom previously had worked at Bandelier and knew its canyons and mesas. He did not have to worry about them getting lost in mesa and cañon country. During the week that followed the fire, they shot sixty-six burros. [8]

But an intemperate remark cost the Park Service some public support. During the fire, a reporter spoke with Roland Wauer about the burro eradication program. During the conversation, the reporter wondered if shooting the animals bothered park rangers who primarily sought to preserve resources. Wauer responded by acknowledging the difficulty of the job, but also asserted that Park Service people were professionals who understand that unpleasant tasks were part of their obligation. Besides, he remarked casually, "our people don't suffer from the Bambi complex." The press seized on the remark, and it made headlines in a number of western newspapers. The public image of the Park Service suffered. [9]

After the fire, burro eradication efforts continued. In 1979, the Park Service reviewed its original alternatives from 1976 in an Environmental Assessment of the burro issue and found that it had no other options. The agency started a public review period that ended on March 7, 1980. The eradication program resumed, and on March 12-13, thirty-seven burros were shot.

The eradication program bothered animal advocacy groups such as the Fund for Animals, Inc. (FFA). An association devoted to protecting wild and domestic animals, the Fund for Animals believed that there was a better way to solve the problem. Nor were its members strangers to the burro issue. When burros posed a problem at the Grand Canyon National Park, the organization proposed a solution that led to the successful removal of many of the

burros there. After the animals were captured, they were put up for private adoption. The project solved the burro problem at the Grand Canyon and attracted favorable media attention.

Flushed with success, the Fund for Animals wanted the opportunity to try similar tactics at Bandelier. They and two other animal advocacy groups, the American Horse Protection Association and a small group from Tucson, the Animal Defense Council, filed a suit against the Park Service. On March 13, the Albuquerque District Court enjoined the Park Service from continuing the eradication program. The three-day reduction program, however, had already ended before the restraining order was served on Superintendent John D. Hunter.



During the 1970s, feral burros became a major environmental problem at Bandelier. Roaming the backcountry, they damaged both the cultural and natural resources of the monument. The Park Service spent large sums on studies, control, capture, and eradication of the burros. This photograph suggests the elusive quality of the animals.

Park Service strategists had to grapple with the lawsuit before the burro reduction could continue. The Fund for Animals, their allies, and the Park Service reached an agreement that allowed the FFA an opportunity to implement a live-capture program at the monument. The Fund for Animals subsequently withdrew from the suit, and after representatives of the Animal Defense Council failed to appear in court, the American Horse Protective Association became the sole plaintiff. The defections weakened the suit considerably. On August 18, 1980, the Federal district court in Albuquerque overturned the restraining order, and in December 1982, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver dismissed the suit. In early 1983, the Park Service made plans to proceed with its program.

Under the terms of the agreement with the Fund for Animals, FFA began its efforts to remove the burros from the monument. In May 1983, two cowboys from Bishop, California, arrived at the monument. In the company of a backcountry ranger, they tried to rope burros, and caught one. They followed with attempts to catch the burros in a foot snare, a snare hidden in small hole into which they hoped the burros would walk. They caught only two or

three more. After two weeks, the two cowboys withdrew.

The Fund for Animals then brought in Dave Erickson, an Arizona cowboy who had been responsible for their success at Grand Canyon. He used dogs to hold the burros at bay while his crew roped the animals. This novel approach netted more burros than previous efforts, but even with increased success, the removal of burros from Bandelier looked to be an arduous process. The closed box canyons within Grand Canyon National Park made catching burros a relatively easy task. Pilots chased the animals up the canyon until the burros ran out of room. Trapped against a three-sided canyon, the animals were easy to capture. But as the members of the Los Alamos County Sheriff's Mounted Patrol discovered in their effort to trap burros in 1964, the canyons in Bandelier National Monument were open-ended. In the canyons, the agile animals escaped their captors regularly.

Many in the Park Service believed that Erickson imported burros to fulfill his contract. As the height of tourist season approached, park rangers could not stay with Erickson as closely as they had with the earlier cowboys. Soon the burro corral on Frijoles Mesa began to fill. But there was one problem: most of the animals in the corral were tan with a dark cross running down their spine and across their shoulders. They were unlike any burros ever found in Bandelier, not at all similar to the larger black animals previously seen at Bandelier. "If those weren't Arizona burros, mister," Dr. Milford R. Fletcher later exclaimed, "then I've never seen one!"

Others in the Park Service called the burros "ringers," and they had plenty of circumstantial evidence to support their feelings. One park staff member arose at 2 AM and waited all night on Highway 4 in hope of catching a truckload of burros on their way to the corral on Frijoles Mesa. Seasonal Ranger Kevin Rodgers observed an Erickson horse trailer coming to the park late one evening, but did not realize its significance until too late. He also spoke with Erickson by telephone in his motel room around 11:00 PM the evening before the burros appeared in the corral. Since the animals appeared by 5:00 AM, so Erickson supposedly caught between fifteen and eighteen burros in unfamiliar country, along miles of backcountry trails, in less than six hours. No one succeeded in proving that Erickson did anything improper, but the circumstantial evidence was overwhelming.

Nevertheless, the origin of the burros was not an issue for the Park Service. The transaction between FFA and its contractor did not involve the agency. "The Fund for Animals made the deal," Fletcher pointed out nearly a decade later, "the Park Service was just letting them do it." Shortly afterward, Fund for Animals officials asserted that the twenty-nine burros they had captured, included at least sixteen whose status was termed "controversial," were the last in the monument. Claiming its work completed, the Fund for Animals left Bandelier, giving tacit approval to further agency programs to reduce the burro population in the monument. [10] The Park Service continued its eradication policy, shooting an additional twenty-two burros. The park also received money to rehabilitate its fences along the western boundary of monument, adjacent to the protected burro range on national forest land. By the end of 1983, there were few left within the monument.

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## CHAPTER 6: NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN MESA AND CANON COUNTRY (continued)

The La Mesa fire of 1977 provided another watershed in natural resource management at Bandelier. No one understood the historic role of natural fire in the region. Every eight to twelve years, natural fires would clear different areas on the plateau. Over time, this pattern created a mosaic of burned areas, leading to collections of trees of different age classes. Among mixed conifer environments like that of the Pajarito Plateau, this kind of burning led to a healthy ecosystem, but for the previous one hundred years, fire suppression remained the dominant mode of fire management for individuals and Federal agencies.




The Mesa fire in 1977 also inspired innovations in resource management. Fire-fighting operations threatened archeological resources in the burn area. Archeologists and fire-fighters worked in concert to fight the fire without damaging subsurface remains.

By the 1970s, a process of changing attitudes towards fire within the Park Service had begun. Scientists understood that the accumulated fuel loads of a long period of suppression presented a real danger to the resources of park areas. "With fire," Dr. Milford R. Fletcher asserted, "you can pay me now or you can pay me later." The idea of a controlled, human-induced fire to clear out areas of high fuel load gained credence. By 1977, some natural parks

such as Yellowstone and Sequoia had controlled fire programs in place. These programs generally allowed natural fires to burn within boundaries that fire specialists predetermined. If the fires exceeded certain prescribed conditions, then the Park Service would respond. Otherwise, the fire simply burned on with careful monitoring.

Despite a growing body of scientific evidence, people who had fought fires all their lives still resisted the idea. Fire had always been anathema—particularly to people in the arid Southwest—and a program that allowed fires to burn unchecked violated every principle they knew. Yet the scientists had considerable influence. In the spring of 1977, Regional Director John Cook approved a controlled burn program for the La Mesa area. Ironically, the fire started the month before the program was scheduled to begin.



The La Mesa fire occurred during June of 1977. Large portions of the Upper Canyon and Frijoles Mesa area were destroyed by the fire, as were extensive areas beyond the boundaries of the monument. Because of the large number of archaeological sites within the area of the fire, archaeologists from the Park Service Regional Office in Santa Fe and the School of American Research joined fire-fighters in front of the bulldozers on the fire lines. This extraordinary effort resulted in the protection of numerous cultural resources that might otherwise have been damaged or destroyed.

The La Mesa fire provided the Park Service with vast quantities of new information about fire. Terralene Foxx, a contract researcher, had set up vegetative plots to document the differences between areas that had been burned with some degree of frequency and those that had not. The fire burned all of her plots, but Foxx was able to use the plots to see how the fire affected areas with different levels of fuel loading. What she found was that areas that had recently burned were not affected as severely as those with higher accumulations of fuel. Her work fit with the growing body of fire research and helped convince many in the Park Service and in northern New Mexico of the value of programs of controlled fire. [11]

The establishment of the Bandelier wilderness in 1976 also forced the reassessment of management policies. In the aftermath of the environmental decade, wilderness experiences

became an important part of growing up for many Americans, and enthusiastic backpackers flocked to designated wilderness areas. The number of backcountry users at Bandelier jumped dramatically as soon as it became a designated wilderness. Visitation increased ten-fold the first year, and it added new responsibilities to the burden of the staff. [12] Not only did they have to protect Frijoles Canyon, they also had to maintain the pristine nature of the backcountry in the face of human encroachment. At the same time, they had to make sure that visitors were satisfied with their experience. In essence, the agency had to protect the wilderness area and its visitors from each other. The need for more sophisticated management became increasingly apparent.

The combination of the new resource management plan, which included provisions for the management of natural and cultural resources, the establishment of the wilderness area, the burro question, and the La Mesa fire pointed to the need for a resource management entity at the monument. Careful planning and management of the backcountry could ensure its survival and prevent situations that aroused public opposition against Park Service policies. Superintendent John Hunter and his staff planned a management unit that would include cultural and natural resource management responsibilities.

Under the leadership of John Lissoway, the first person that the Southwest Regional Office specifically trained in natural resource management, the resource management unit debuted in 1980. Its responsibilities included cultural and natural resource management as well as the wilderness area, and the park archeologist position also became part of resources management. This was an unusual practice. In most parks, wilderness responsibilities fell to the enforcement division, but as a result of the many research programs mandated for the wilderness, administration by resource managers seemed desirable. [13]

During the 1980s, the resource management unit grew in significance. It became equal in function to other divisions like protection and administration. But funding at the regional level for natural and cultural resources came from different and not interchangeable "pots" of money. Natural resources at the park received money from the regional natural resources funds while cultural resource money came from its counterpart in the region. During the early 1980s, Bandelier was a focus of natural resource activity and funding, while cultural resources had little to offer Bandelier. This contributed to a changing perception of the significance of the monument.

Funding at the regional level led to the perception of a lack of balance at the park. Because of the trend toward natural preservation in the agency, the increased sophistication of earth sciences, and the great need for management of natural resources at Bandelier, the disparity created tension. Lissoway went to "the well with the most water," natural resource and fire management funding. Cultural Resources at the regional level did not have the funding to match the expenditures on natural resources, and cultural resources managers in the Regional Office and at the park expressed concern that the bulk of spending at an archeological park went for programs directed at the natural resources of the monument. Without clearly understanding NPS allocation procedures, some park observers expressed frustration, wondering how the park could spend such a large portion of its budget on an area used by such a small percentage of its visitors.

The management of the backcountry also involved a sizable cultural resource component. Thousands of unexcavated archeological sites dotted the area, and these areas were better protected as a result of the burro reduction program, the new fire management policies, and other natural resource innovations. They did not help the park address the overcrowding of Frijoles Canyon, but they did further long-term goals of preservation.

The natural-cultural resource dichotomy closely mirrored the long-standing preservation vs.

use issue within the agency. Visitation remained a major force at the monument, and this characteristic dichotomy again appeared, unfortunately in the guise of natural resource versus cultural resource management. When some suggested that the backcountry received too great a percentage of funding, they intimated that the process left the main attraction, Frijoles Canyon, without the resources necessary to protect and explain it. From that point of view, larger expenditures on natural resources favored preservation over use. No one suggested that the backcountry programs were inappropriate; instead in an era of decreasing funding and limited options, greater attention for the features that bore the brunt of the effects of visitation seemed appropriate. But again, cultural resources at the regional level lacked the ability to provide the funding that its counterparts in natural resources could.

During the mid-1980s, there were signs of a returning balance in funding between the two arms of resource management. Cultural Resources at the regional level began to receive a larger portion of the monetary pie, which translated into more funding for cultural resources at the park. The initiation of an archeological survey at the monument meant a broader approach to cultural resource management and possibly a wealth of new interpretive information. As the head of the Resource Management Division, John Lissoway took steps to ensure a "holistic framework" in cultural and natural resource management policy. Regional natural resource managers also expressed willingness to accommodate cultural resources. "Put a cultural resources person in Lissoway's job [as the head of the Resources Management Division]," Milford Fletcher contended, "and we'll work just as closely with them." [14] By 1987, cultural resources had more money for its programs, and an equitable situation existed. Between the arrival of the Park Service at Bandelier in 1932 and the middle of the 1980s, resource management at the monument became an increasingly professional discipline. From its initial focus upon the ruins in Frijoles Canyon, it came to include both a larger area and scope. The backcountry and its resources, archeological and natural, became more important, and the philosophy of management at the park reflected the new priorities. Resource management became a function of specialists, who were assisted by contract researchers and an all-encompassing form of resource management was the result. By the late 1980s, balancing the different values of the monument offered the greatest internal challenge for park managers, while the world that surrounded the monument offered the greatest challenge to its future.

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## CHAPTER 7: "AN ISLAND BESIEGED": THREATS TO THE PARK

(continued)

On the Pajarito Plateau, myriad interests posed problems. The demands of the growing population of Los Alamos meant impingement on the values of the park. The various Federal agencies in the area, most notably the Department of Energy [DOE] and the United States Forest Service [USFS until the late 1970s, when it changed its name to USDA Forest Service], had objectives that often conflicted with those of the Park Service. Native American groups also exerted influence, as did private land owners and industrial concerns that sought to develop the economic potential of natural resources in the area. By the middle of the 1980s, the administration of Bandelier found itself in the vortex of a whirlpool of competing interests, each of which had the ability to affect the future of the resources preserved within park boundaries.

The people who lived in the town of Los Alamos were both the source of many of the threats to the park and the most vocal supporters of preservation efforts. The needs of the community put considerable pressure on the resources of the plateau and the park. But the highly educated, civic-minded citizens of the town also valued the beauty of Bandelier and its environs and consistently sought to protect the aesthetic and cultural values of the area as their community grew.

This internal conflict in Los Alamos often produced paradoxical situations. Los Alamos had a unique timbrè of life, a style all its own. Yet its individuality grew out of conflicting factors. Los Alamos was an enclave of scientific America located in a more traditional world. The average level of education in the community was unusually high. The relative inaccessibility of the town and its outdoor-oriented culture contributed to the dissatisfaction many residents felt about the comparatively few cultural amenities available in Los Alamos County. The long commuting time between "the Hill" and Santa Fe also frustrated local residents. Social change and development offered the promise of new experience while simultaneously threatening to destroy the insular world of Los Alamos.

Little was new about the nature of this conflict over the use of space. Again, the people of the Pajarito Plateau faced the classic conflict of incommensurable values. They had to weigh the relative merits of the tangible and intangible benefits each change might bring. A number of interest groups had plans for the limited space available on the plateau and deciding which use would take priority involved an intricate tangle of public, private, aesthetic, economic, and quality of life issues.

The question of the development of the old Girl Scout retreat called Camp Evergreen or Westgate, a fifty-acre tract opposite Apache Springs in the Jemez Mountains, at the outset of the 1980s typified the nature of the problems within the community and the threats the growth of Los Alamos presented to Bandelier National Monument. As the population of the Pajarito Plateau grew, so did the demands upon the limited space of the region. New residents needed housing, utilities, sewerage, and other services. As the area available for development

in and around Los Alamos diminished, remaining sections attracted the attention of everyone on the plateau—from potential developers to the Park Service and the Forest Service.

Camp Evergreen had a history of recreational use. In 1967, the Sangre de Cristo Girl Scout Council acquired the tract from the AEC and used the two structures on the property as the basis for a summer camp and retreat. In the ensuing decade, vandalism increased considerably. Buildings on the property were burglarized, vandals destroyed fences and latrines, and the leaders of the Girl Scouts worried about the safety of their charges. They made plans to sell the tract, surmising that it held promise for small-scale development. [3]

A prime piece of land on the Pajarito Plateau rarely appeared on the market. Just as the Park Service became aware that the land was for sale, a buyer purchased it. In October 1980, John Umbarger, a LANL employee, and his wife Kathy, Dennis and Linda Perry, and Larry and Sandy Luck delivered a down payment of \$25,000 out of a total selling price of \$275,000. Calling themselves Westgate Families, the partners planned a high-density development in the area. They sought to rezone the tract to accommodate their desires. [4]

The Park Service responded quickly to the challenge of a new "Bandelier Acres" subdevelopment. The regional office devised a strategy that included contact with the national offices of Girl Scouts of America and efforts to work with state and local Government to restrict uses of the land. The suggestion that the Park Service purchase the land with donated funds also arose. On December 22, 1980, Superintendent Hunter met with Umbarger, who had become the spokesman for Westgate Families, to review the plans to develop the Camp Evergreen property. Hunter expressed his concerns, which included the impact of more intensive use of an area of the monument that had previously received little visitation, increased threat of fire that a larger number of visitors posed, the interruption of the existing fire management plan, problems resulting from utility service, and noise and visual pollution brought on by the development. Despite the number of concerns, however, Hunter told Umbarger that the Park Service "had no real grounds to oppose [either] the rezoning or the project." Since the land fell outside of park boundaries, Hunter believed that agency policy prevented vigorous opposition. [5]

Umbarger and his partners carried their project forward. On January 14, 1981, they asked the Los Alamos County Planning and Zoning Commission to rezone the fifty-acre tract from W-2, wilderness and recreation status, to 13.2 acres of residential and agricultural, and 36.6 acres of planned development at 3.5 units per acre. The county commission scheduled public hearings on the issue.

The people of Los Alamos were upset by the idea of the development. Although Linda Perry remarked that the owners wanted to "preserve the integrity of the area," local residents were suspicious of their plans. The sale of the Camp Evergreen property also affected the plans of the Los Alamos Ski Club to engineer an exchange of land with the Forest Service to expand its ski runs. At the suggestion of the USFS, the skiers had purchased a 40-acre tract of wilderness along the Jemez River in the hopes that its value would equal that of a 150-acre parcel of national forest land the skiers coveted. But the \$275,000 price of Camp Evergreen had driven up the value of land on the plateau, and a new appraisal of the relative worth of the two tracts left the skiers with a shortfall of approximately \$350,000 in the proposed swap. This inadvertent complication by the Westgate Families in a matter of considerable local interest inspired antipathy towards the development, and the editorial page of the Los Alamos Monitor filled with anti-Westgate letters. [6]

The staff at Bandelier viewed the developments with interest and concern. Hunter reported that the "issue [was] heating up" and that people from Los Alamos requested more visible involvement on the part of the Park Service. "Some," he wrote regional director Robert Kerr,

"are quite perplexed by our lack of involvement." Even Hunter's public articulation of the stance of the Park Service did not stem the requests for more action.

The issue aroused much interest in Los Alamos, and local people took the lead in opposing the project. At a time when the leadership of the Department of the Interior unequivocally favored the development of public land in the West, Hunter and the regional office kept a low profile as Westgate became the most important local development issue of 1981. After considerable public scuffling and a number of legal challenges to the process by Westgate Families, the rezoning issue landed on a referendum ballot.

On June 30, 1981, the public turned back the zoning changes for the Westgate tract. Each of the three ballot issues failed by an average of about four percent of a total of 5,200 votes. The vote effectively terminated the development planned by Westgate Families. [7] During the following years, the community of Los Alamos battled over the development. The staff at Bandelier monitored it closely, but little fell within the realm of agency actions.

Westgate continued to pose a threat to the park. Westgate Families continued to press its case, and over time, won concessions from both the city and the county. In August 1984, the tract cleared the final zoning hurdle, and the county permitted a density of 3.5 units per acre over the entire fifty- acre tract. The owners announced that they would initiate studies to determine the most appropriate use of the land, and hoped to begin construction during the following building season, the spring of 1985. But after they received final clearance for utilities on the tract, Westgate Families sold the tract to Paul Parker, a local developer. The Forest Service sought to acquire the tract by an exchange of land, and Parker held up his plans to see what the foresters would offer. Throughout 1986, the USDA Forest Service searched for an appropriate tract to exchange, but found none. Parker remained patient. By late 1986, he had not begun to build. [8]

Yet the primary issue, reconciling the needs of the Los Alamos community with those of its neighbors on the plateau, remained. Los Alamos County would grow, and to a certain degree, the Park Service remained defenseless against such growth. In the 1980s, its best defense against impingement was to ensure use of the park by the local community. With Bandelier as a visible asset to the unique lifestyle of Los Alamos, the Park Service could rely on local people to point out the sensitivity of the values of the park and resist efforts that threatened to destroy the unique character of the region.

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## CHAPTER 7: "AN ISLAND BESIEGED": THREATS TO THE PARK

(continued)

Surrounded to a large extent by national forest land, Bandelier also faced the threat of visual pollution. During the 1980s, the Caja del Rio section of the Santa Fe National Forest, across the Rio Grande from the park, remained largely undeveloped. A large section of the area was designated wild horse and burro territory. Although the USDA Forest Service permitted wood harvesting, the foresters restricted permits for the tract so as not to disturb the wild horses and burros. In 1985, however, officials of the Santa Fe National Forest came under increased pressure to open up the area for more wood cutting. Stands of piñon trees on the tract caught the attention of New Mexicans as the prized wood became harder to find.

Dorothy Hoard, the National Parks and Conservation Association representative for Bandelier, began to stress the protection of the Caja section. The building of roads and the noise of vehicles, she wrote, would be "devastating" to the backcountry. Hoard, a long-time supporter of the park, also communicated with Forest Supervisor Maynard T. Rost of the Santa Fe National Forest. After her intervention, Rost included a statement that recommended protecting the visual quality of areas adjacent to Bandelier in the revised draft of the Environmental Impact Statement for the Santa Fe National Forest. [47]

Other Federal agencies had the ability to affect Bandelier. During the 1980s, the flood easement that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers held for the Cochiti Dam presented a substantive threat to the park values of Bandelier. The legislation that established the dam granted the Corps of Engineers the right to flood as much as 361 acres of Bandelier National Monument. Because the easement came from Congress, the Park Service had little recourse. In 1979, runoff backed up into Bandelier; reaching an elevation of 5,388 feet above sea level, within the legal limits set by Congress. The water threatened the Kiva House ruin at the base of Alamo Canyon. Prior to the dam, the elevation of the river was 5323 feet above sea level. [48]

As early as 1958, the Park Service had recognized the potential of damage from the proposed dam. On November 14, 1958, Southwest Regional Director Hugh Miller, members of his staff, and Superintendent Paul Judge of Bandelier met with representatives of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. Miller raised his objections to a portion of the proposal that allowed the dam to impound water to a level of 5,473 feet, backing water up each of the canyons in the monument. Although the engineers did not change the proposal, the Park Service entered its objection in the record.

The tenor of the late 1950s supported wholesale economic development of the Southwest, and Miller recognized the precariousness of the objection of the NPS. Throughout the 1950s, dam projects sprouted along western rivers; the billion-dollar Colorado River Storage Program and the construction of the Glen Canyon Dam typified the era. Nor did the Park Service have compelling grounds to oppose the easement. Regional Archeologist Charlie Steen assessed the prehistoric sites within the area of the easement and pronounced them "not

particularly significant." In the late 1950s, the Cochiti Dam also underwent a transformation from flood control dam to "multi-purpose" dam with an emphasis on attracting tourists to northern New Mexico. Miller opined that "our position will be difficult to maintain when the economic benefits of the project to Albuquerque are considered." [49] The Corps of Engineers received its easement, putting a portion of the monument permanently at risk. The flooding in 1979 was only a precursor to a more severe threat.

During the summer of 1985, the Corps of Engineers announced plans to use its easement and flood the lower reaches of Capulin, Alamo, and Frijoles Canyons in Bandelier National Monument. A warm spell in April, causing an unusually high amount of snow melt early in the year, prompted their decision. By early May, Elephant Butte and Caballo reservoirs in southern New Mexico had reached ninety percent of capacity, the highest levels in forty-three years. The Bureau of Reclamation asked the Corps of Engineers to store additional water in the Cochiti and Abiquiu reservoirs. In the opinion of the two Federal agencies, the level of water in the southern reservoirs threatened to flood a portion of the town of Truth or Consequences, five miles from the Elephant Butte Dam. The Corps carried out the request, and water began to back up into Bandelier. [50]

The array of water regulations in the arid Southwest further complicated the situation. The Rio Grande Compact of 1937 set up a commission to regulate water use along the river. Its members—New Mexico, Colorado, and Texas—developed an intricate system to divide the resources of the river. The terms of the compact granted the extra runoff to farmers below Elephant Butte, most of whom were in Texas. But the Rio' Grande Compact Commission could not release the extra water from Cochiti, for the courts had not established the rights of farmers in the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District (MRGCD), between Cochiti and Elephant Butte. As a result, the commission asked Congress to limit the flow of water through the district between July 1 and November 1 of each year to 1,500 cubic feet of water per second (cfs), the traditional amount tapped by farmers in the middle district. With as much as 8,300 cfs entering the northern reservoirs, and only 5,000 cfs before July 1 and 1,500 after leaving, Cochiti and Abiquiu dams filled beyond capacity, and the portions of Bandelier nearest the Rio' Grande were inundated. [51]

The creeping ascendance of the water throughout May and June posed serious environmental problems. When the water receded, the inundated areas would be, in the words of John Lissoway, an "aesthetic mess." A "bathtub ring" of drowned vegetation would remain. Lissoway thought the natural recovery of the region might take four to five years. Tree species like juniper and ponderosa pine were particularly vulnerable. If inundated for more than several weeks, they were unlikely to recover. Among the ponderosa pines that were threatened were a group of 450- year old trees that provided a winter roost for about twenty-five bald eagles. The park staff wondered whether the eagles would return after the flooding. The area would become "a vegetative wasteland," lamented Terrell Johnson, a contract biologist for the Park Service who studied the eagles. [52]

The date of July 1 loomed especially large for the NPS. Many of the threatened areas could survive inundation for a few weeks. But if the water stored in Cochiti did not go over the dam before July 1, the terms of the compact held it there until November 1, after the end of the irrigation season in central New Mexico. This protected the interests of farmers below the Elephant Butte and Caballo reservoirs, but threatened Bandelier. If the water remained in the Cochiti Reservoir after July 1, there was no chance of saving the inundated flora.

Throughout late May and early June, water backed up into the canyons. By early June, it reached within two vertical feet of the Kiva House ruin, and the hiking trails along the Rio' Grande washed away. The Park Service watched in dismay. "We hate to see it," Chief Ranger Kevin McKibbin told the press, "but there's not much we can do about it. . . . Our hands are

ted." John Hunter pointed out that resistance was futile. Congress had made the decision during the 1960s, and as much as he did not like the situation, he had little recourse. [53] The Park Service had nowhere to go with its complaints.

The flooding of Bandelier in 1985 attracted local, regional, and national interest. A vocal portion of the public expressed outrage. In a symbolic gesture of opposition, a bucket brigade went to Cochiti Dam to throw buckets of water over the top of the dam to flow downstream. Phone calls lit up the switchboard at the monument, many asking if the ruins in Frijoles Canyon were underwater. The New York Times ran a feature story on the issue, as did The Denver Post, The Philadelphia Inquirer, and a number of other daily newspapers across the nation. [54] Although some of the excess water was released from the dam, the lower reaches of the monument remained flooded.

Even after 1985, the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers retained the easement to fill the lower reaches of Bandelier with water. By June 8, 1987, high water was estimated to reach 5,444 feet above sea level. Despite public outcry at local, regional, and national levels, the law allowed the flooding of the monument. The presence of the dam and its potential to affect the monument presented a major long-term problem for the administrators of the monument. It offered one of the first cases of actual overlap between the groups that managed the Pajarito Plateau.

Yet the flooding was only the first of many similar collisions. The collection of threats to Bandelier offered a microcosm of the problems facing the park system. The limited space on the Pajarito Plateau and the needs of various constituencies created a matrix of conflict. Protecting the park from a variety of threats required constant vigilance, broad public support, and occasional Machiavellian politicking. At Bandelier, the Park Service held its own. But as the Pajarito Plateau became more crowded and more people sought to live, work, and play there, the problems continued to escalate.


The lesson of Bandelier was not its problems per se; the real story was in the exponential increase in the severity of threats to its integrity. The sheer onslaught of threat after threat by powerful individuals, corporations, and Government agencies was unparalleled. They appeared almost simultaneously in a brief period in the history of the park. Nor was there any guarantee that new threats would not arise. The story of Bandelier and its surroundings served as a barometer of problems and responses. As the amount of open space in the U.S. decreased, more and more park areas faced similar levels of pressure and layers of threats. The story of Bandelier will likely be repeated throughout the park system.

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U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE  
 FOREST SERVICE  
 HENRY S. GRAVES, FORESTER

# BANDELIER NATIONAL MONUMENT

WITHIN THE  
 SANTA FE NATIONAL FOREST  
 NEW MEXICO

- NEW MEXICO PRINCIPAL MERIDIAN
-  NATIONAL MONUMENT BOUNDARY
  -  NATIONAL FOREST BOUNDARY
  -  PUEBLO RUINS
  -  CLIFF DWELLINGS

SOME PARTS FORMER PART OF PROCLAMATION DATED FEB. 11, 1916.

